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A SOCIO-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN 
STEEL INDUSTRY, 1865-1929: FACTORY CLOSURES IN THE 
CYCLE OF CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT
ty
Daniel J .  Santoro 
University of New Hampshire, December, 1988
The case of the development of the American steel industry 
from 1865-1929 is used in a socio-historical analysis of factory 
closures in order to critically address the theory of deindustrialization, 
influential in  m uch curren t sociological work, developed by w riters 
such  as Bluestone and Harrison (1982). The historiography of the 
steel industry  is analyzed in order to examine the role of factory 
closures in the formation and disformation of the nation’s  basic 
capacity to produce by comparing the course of steel industry  
development from Reconstruction through th e  first th irty  years of the  
tw entieth century  to th a t following the Second World W ar, especially 
the development of the industry  subsequent to 1970—th e  so-called 
"deindustrialization wave." This approach is intended to  overcome 
problem s associated with the limited historical scope characteristic of 
cu rren t literature on deindustrialization.
By focusing on the transition from iron to steel production in  the 
dom estic context, the Homestead Strike of 1892, the form ation of the 
United S tates Steel Corporation in 1901, and  the rise of steel produc­
ing centers like Youngstown, Ohio, and  Gary, Indiana, a s  well as by
xiii
analyzing national economic policy, e.g., protectionism , and com m un­
ity case studies, several conclusions are reached. Factory closures are 
found to have played an  im portant role in  both development and  
dism antling of the domestic steel industry  so th a t th e  contemporary 
natu re  of factory closures is found not to reflect an  aberration of an  
otherwise healthy accum ulation process specific to the  current era. 
Since factory closures play essentially th e  same role in  industrializa­
tion and deindustrialization, it is suggested tha t su ch  events are  better 
understood w ithin the process of the reproduction of capitalist society 
as firms act to re-create the social conditions—i.e., class and m arket 
relations—under which capital accum ulation is possible. Specifically, 
factory closures historically enter: (1) th e  cycle of labor control as  
events which re-create the conditions u n d er which labor-power is 
bought and sold, (2) the cycle of capitalist competition as capitalists 
compete for control over production and  m arkets, an d  (3) the 
organization of geographic space in a way which facilitates capital 
accumulation.
xiv
Sociology is the art of saying old th ings in new ways 




SOCIO-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF DEINDUSTRIALIZATION
AND THE STEEL CASE
The issue and concept of deindustrialization h as  become 
im portant in social science. Within sociology itself, deindustrialization 
is discussed in a variety of subdlsciplinary contexts Including sociology 
of development, industrial sociology, sociology of work, political 
sociology, and economic sociology. In current sociological discourse, 
the concept of deindustrialization is applied to explain curren t trends 
in the economy and in  the workplace since World War II and 
especially since the 1970s. My work is intended to contribute to the 
debate over deindustrialization and offer a  critical examination and 
reconsideration of the theory by viewing it against the historical 
narrative of the domestic steel industry. In general, I assert th a t when 
viewed against a wider historical landscape, the concern of 
sociologists with deindustrialization as it is presently conceived m ust 
be re-evaluated--we cannot speak of deindustrialization per se as an 
historically unique process since its a ttribu tes and the events in which 
it is manifested are characteristic of the process of industrialization as 
well.
The approach I take in th is study is in line with growing interest 
in the discipline for attention to more historically oriented work in 
sociology: processes of political-economic development a t the 
system ic level and the relationship between these and processes
1
2played out a t the local and organizational levels; and the social problem 
of deindustrialization with special regard to the dynamics and effects 
of factory closures. Through sociological analysis of an  historical case, 
th a t of the rise and decline of the domestic steel Industry, the current 
crisis as it relates to the issue of deindustrialization can be more 
adequately understood by explicating the relationship between the 
event of the factory closure and the process of capitalist development.
In th is study, I develop a  sociological analysis of the history of 
steel production in the United States which places the process of 
deindustrialization in socio-historical context. This will be 
accomplished through the application of social-scientific concepts 
concerning political-economic development to the analysis of the 
historiography of steel. In taking a  socio-historical approach, I will 
examine the career of the steel industry  in the U.S. covering its 
inception and growth in the post-Civil War period to its apparent 
decline and transform ation in the post-World War II period. This will 
entail an  analysis of post-World War II developments in  the U.S. by 
setting them  against the major eras in the development of the steel 
industry in America from the end of the Civil War (1865) to about 
1929.
The focus of this introduction is to establish a  definitional 
starting point for the ensuing study. Therefore, the rem ainder of this 
chapter is devoted to three tasks: to define the work in term s of its 
historical orientation, to define deindustrialization as a  sociological 
issue, and to sketch the analysis and identify the issues covered in 
subsequent chapters.
3Historical Sociology and the Steel Industry Case
The history of the U.S. economy and th a t of the steel Industry 
subsequent to 1945, particularly since I960, h as  been of special 
Importance to sociologists working in  the area of deindustrialization. 
Schwelkart (1984, p. 33) states th a t concern w ith this issue has 
followed the "collapse of the post-WWII economic expansion." The 
concept of deindustrialization has gained acceptance in sociology in 
the wake of Bluestone and  Harrison’s (1982) work, The D eindustrial­
ization of America, and was developed largely in an  effort to explain 
the social importance of the post-war collapse.
In order to understand deindustrialization properly, both as a  
social issue and as a social scientific theory, the problem m ust be 
approached historically. Toward th is end, I draw  upon relevant 
conceptual frameworks and information from such  areas as sociology, 
political economy, and history in the  analysis of a  concrete case--the 
American steel industry—in order to form generalizations from the 
specific process of industrial development to wider systemic 
processes.
The United States steel industry  provides an  historical case 
against which the theories of political-economic development, i.e., 
those concerned with Its social, spatial, and temporal aspects, can be 
tested against historical evidence. This, then, is a  work in historical 
sociology. That Is, it is influenced by the social scientific tradition th a t 
seeks to "transcend the seeming boundaries between theory, 
abstractly formulated, and  history, concretely recorded" (Harvey 1982, 
p. xiv). In undertaking a  socio-historical analysis, I am concerned with 
two general realms of comparison. The first of these is the com­
4parison of theory to historical information, i.e., the extent to which the 
explanatory power of concepts holds up to scrutiny in term s of actual 
developments. Theda Skocpol (1984a, p. 362) describes historical 
sociology as  a  forum wherein "history and theoretical ideas [can be 
brought] to bear on one another." Here, Industrialization and deindus­
trialization, for example in steel, can best be viewed as historically 
situated processes manifested in concrete actions and living events, 
like the opening and closing of factories. These actions and  events 
produce patterns which need to be explained in  term s of their 
consequences and roles in the broader processes associated with the 
reproduction of the social relations of capital accumulation.
The second realm  of comparison Is th a t between eras. The basis 
of a  socio-historical analysis is to use what is known of the past to 
make sense of the present. As a  society, we have become concerned 
with the meaning of current social trends, and  social scientists have 
attached the  term deindustrialization to one such trend. My work is 
an attem pt to understand the present in term s of the p a s t in order, 
among other things, to determine whether or not we have named It 
correctly. But, my concern here is not merely one of sem antics. 
Rather, since we conceptualize and create terminology with reference 
to concrete social processes, a  crucial task of all social science is the 
constant re-evaluation of the "fit" between theory and historical 
experience (cf. Trudgill 1983, pp. 133-134, and  Com forth 1963, pp. 
60-62). In using the history of the  American steel industry, it m ust 
be borne in  mind th a t we choose our cases "so that... the far is seen as 
near and rather synonymous with the concerns of our own era" (Khleif 
1986, p. 219); and th a t the Issues of our own era, e.g., the
5deindustrialization of America, are necessarily lenses through which 
we view the past. The problem of deindustrialization, as  it is currently 
conceptualized in  sociology and  contemporarily experienced in social 
life, is  the vantage point from which the history of steel 
industrialization is viewed. In other words, an  idea about a  particular 
aspect of current social life is assessed in  relation to historical 
development of material conditions of which it is a  p art (cf. Comforth 
1963, p. i). In th is way, p resen t social conditions can be more clearly 
understood.
It has been argued th a t social scientific disciplines emerged 
with th e  need "to come to grips with the roots and unprecedented 
effects of capitalist commercialization" (Skocpol 1984a, p. 1), both  in 
defense and criticism of capitalist based developments (cf. Wallerstein 
1984, pp. 173-74; Anderson 1985, p. 31; and Hudson 1985, p. 35).
As a  society we continue to face the sam e problems in different form, 
and social science continues in  efforts to understand the 
contemporary course of capitalist development and its effects. The 
atten tion  sociologists give to th e  problem of deindustrialization is part 
of th is overall concern.
Definition of the Problem and Its Treatm ent w ithin Sociology
The starting point of th is  study is to Identify the way 
deindustrialization Is conceptualized in contemporary social science.
In developing a preliminary definition and point of reference for this 
study, particular emphasis is placed on the contribution made by 
Bluestone and Harrison (1982) since their work h as exerted the
6greatest influence on contemporary sociological treatm ents of the 
Issue.
Concern w ith the dynamics and effects of p lant closures on 
communities has intensified within sociology (as it has in other 
contexts such as government, law, and the labor movement). 
Schweikart (1984, p. 33) sta tes that, "Until recently...plant closings 
were accepted along with tornadoes, floods, and other d isasters as 
something to be endured." They were seen as "accidents" or "acts of 
God" connected with the vagaries of w hat is otherwise rational 
economic life. B ut the Increased frequency of p lant closures, espec­
ially since the 1970s, has prompted the analysis and discussion of a 
definite trend which social scientists have come to call 
"deindustrialization." It is the community case study, focusing on 
effects a t  the local level, which has made the strongest contribution to 
taking the discussion of factory closures out of the realm of accidental 
occurrence. With particular reference to the steel industry, Staughton 
Lynd's (1982) The Fight against Shutdowns: Youngstown's Steel Mill 
Closings and Buss and Redbum's (1983) Shutdown a t Youngstown: 
Public Policy for M ass Unemployment stand as the m ost influential 
studies. Such works have done m uch to move u s  away from the view of 
p lant closings as accidental occurrences connected with the tempo­
rary vagaries of an  otherwise self-regulating and rational economy by 
dem onstrating th a t p lant closings are the outcomes of decisions made 
by hum an  actors w ithin organizational structures of corporations and 
played ou t on the local level within communities. Along a  sim ilar line, 
Adams (1982, p. 6) discusses p lan t closures and movement of capital 
and jobs relating them  to a range of decisions made within capitalist
7firms where the realities imposed by political and economic structures 
establish the param eters within which such  decisions are made.
Within sociology, deindustrialization is generally defined as a 
process of redirecting profits and shifting of productive capital. 
Bluestone and Harrison (1982, p. 6) sta te  th a t "By deindustrialization 
is m eant a  widespread, systematic disinvestm ent in the nation's basic 
productive capacity" (emphasis added). It is accompanied by and is 
part of a  general pattern  of investment which, according to Castells 
(1980, p. 182), "tends not only to increase the capital-intensity of the 
product in question, b u t also changes the quality of the factor so as to 
make further investm ents profitable." Implied in the term  deindus­
trialization, then, is the dislocation of factors of production according 
to the criteria of profit. This suggests th a t factory closures need to be 
examined within the broader context of capitalist development. For 
example, such actions which in  part comprise the process of 
deindustrialization in the developed centers of the capitalist economy 
contribute to and reproduce the characteristic conditions of uneven 
development--the progressive and unequal economic differentiation of 
regions (Smith 1986, pp. 87-103).
The process of deindustrialization is summarized in  the current 
sociological literature in  term s of a  variety of behaviors and local 
events referred to as  "capital flight," "runaway shops," "fugitive 
industry" (McKenzie 1984), and "capital mobility" (Squires 1984). 
Such term s express the complexity of the phenom enon which covers 
a range of concrete actions of capitalist firms from lay-offs to actual 
shutdowns of production facilities In its m ost obvious and severe form. 
To such actions social scientists apply a  variety of interpretations:
8from viewing them  as ultimately contributing to industrial 
development and indicative of a  vital economy (cf. McKenzie 1984} to 
viewing them as destructive of bo th  labor forces whose skills are made 
superfluous and, ultimately, of communities (cf. Bluestone and 
H arrison 1982). Within this general range of debate over the issue of 
deindustrialization,1 Bluestone and Harrison's work has gained the 
m ost attention, and within sociology the m ost support (di Leonardo 
1985, pp. 237-238).
Bluestone and  Harrison (1981, pp. 298-300, and 1982, pp. 7-8), 
whose work integrates major findings of community level research, 
outline a set of criteria which specifically characterize the 
deindustrialization process:
1. Redirection of profits where profits earned through the operation 
of one facility are shifted to another or others within the same 
m ultibranch or m ultiplant operation. Profits are used to subsidize 
newer facilities, product development, an d /o r investm ent in new 
areas. "Such milking of a  profitable plant is especially common among 
conglomerates, whose managers tre a t some of their acquisitions as 
'cash cows'" (Harrison and Bluestone 1981, p. 299, cf. Bluestone and 
Harrison 1982, p. 7).
1 R.D. Norton's (1986, pp. 1-40) extensive review of literature th a t has 
emerged on the process of industrial m aturity and the industrial policy 
issue suggests th a t the  deindustrialization question has been covered 
from a  wide variety of perspectives from left, right, and center. All of 
these, the article suggests, appear to share a t least some agreement 
concerning the "mechanics" of industrialization, and  the cycle of 
growth, and maturity. Where they appear m ost significantly to differ is 
upon interpretations and conclusions concerning the impacts or 
consequences of the  process—interpretations w hich are then 
incorporated into debates over "industrial policies” and the course of 
"reindustrialization."
92. In addition to savings in the form of depreciation allowances 
companies m ight allow a  p lan t to run  down and redirect whatever 
profits are generated to other plants and endeavors.
3. Productive capacity of a  p lan t can be underm ined through the 
removal of productive capital from one p lan t to another, usually from 
an  older to a newer facility.
4. Plants may be sh u t down altogether and land and equipment sold 
on the open m arket or useful equipment moved to other operations.
5. A facility may be relocated to a new site in the form of the classic 
runaw ay shop. Harrison and Bluestone (1981, p. 300) state that,
"some firms do load their equipment onto vans, trucks, or planes and 
physically relocate substantially the sam e activity to a  new site" and to 
a  new labor force.
These five criteria are types or forms of capital shift and stages 
in a  single process tha t p lan ts may undergo. The first two stages take 
place in  the "form of finance capital (profits or savings reinvested 
elsewhere)"; the other three are the actual removal and  transfer of 
physical capital (Harrison and Bluestone 1981, p. 300). What they 
share In common are consequences; those of the movement of capital 
and its effect on workers and communities. Jobs move when capital 
moves, and jobs are created and destroyed when capital is created and 
destroyed.
Along a  sim ilar line, Ju n e  Nash (1985, p. 151), in developing the 
theoretical context for her community study  of Pittsfield, 
M assachusetts, offers this definition;
Deindustrialization is the  end result of processes th a t may
involve a flight of whole industries to low wage sites within the
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country or overseas, transfer of labor intensive production 
processes with or without conversion of existing facilities to new 
automated or high-tech industries, buying up smaller plants by 
conglomerates th a t milk them  for profits and discard them  soon 
after, as well as plant shut-downs.
In the sam e way th a t Bluestone and Harrison’s work integrated the
findings of local level studies, Nash's is exemplary of the influence tha t
works such  as the Deindustrialization of America have had on
subsequent community studies. While Bluestone and Harrison turned
to community studies in developing the concept of deindustrialization,
Nash's work dem onstrates tha t deindustrialization has become an
im portant organizing concept in subsequent community studies.
Similarly, Newman's (1985, pp. 5-19) discussion of the importance of
Bluestone and Harrison's work, especially The Deindustrialization of
America, dem onstrates its influence in the formation of a
deindustrialization perspective in urban and community studies.
Generally, deindustrialization has been defined as a  societal-level
process both constituted and Indicated by certain events among which
the plant shutdown and dismantling and physical relocation of capital
stand as its most apparent forms. Analyses of the deindustrialization
process by social scientists, particularly sociologists, have emphasized
the issue of factory closure in one form or another, e.g.. In term s of Its
national, regional, or industrial occurrence or in community case
studies.
An historically oriented sociological work can make an  
im portant contribution to this disciplinary endeavor, since, within 
historical sociology, em phasis is placed on the connection between 
events and social processes in the long term. It is to th is effort th a t 
the present work is directed. If deindustrialization and
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Industrialization are unique and historically discernible processes, 
then  they should differ in  term s of the meaning of the events which 
contribute to their construction. It can be shown, however, th a t the 
history of the steel industry  in the United States, in particular by 
comparing pre-1945 to post-1945 development, indicates th a t factory 
closures play the sam e role during periods of industrialization as they 
are assum ed to play during the current period of deindustrialization. 
Events which are currently discussed as indicative of deindus­
trialization are also indicative of, and  were in operation during, the 
period of national industrial growth. Factories close and operations 
move for the same reasons and according to the same logic th a t they 
did in the pre-World War II era, th a t is, with respect to issues of labor 
control, consolidation and formation of m arkets, and dynamics of 
capitalist competition. In a  word, the definition of deindustrialization 
offered by Bluestone and Harrison and by such thinkers as Ju n e  Nash 
also describes processes characteristic of industrialization.
To summarize: A socio-historical analysis can determine the 
significance of factory closures in the longer historical term  by 
delineating the relationship between the factory closure a s  local event 
and the operation of systemic processes. It will be shown th a t with 
respect to the general process of capital accumulation in the domestic 
context since the end of the Civil War, there is little difference in the 
tactics of firms vis-a-vis factory closures in the period of industrial 
formation and the period of its disformation or collapse. It is in this 
light th a t the theory of deindustrialization m ust be reconsidered, and 
the relationship between capital formation and disformation specified 
through a comparison of the steel Industry in the pre-1945 period of
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industrial growth w ith th a t of the post-1945 steel industry  in the 
period of its relative decline. This will be a  comparison, then, of the 
steel industry during the time th a t the United States emerged as a  
world economic and political power (post-1865) w ith the steel 
industry  during the period of deterioration of the hegemonic global 
position of the United States (post-1970).
A Socio-Historical Analysis
One basic assum ption of this work is tha t a  full understanding of 
social problems m ust rest on analysis of their history. This study is an 
analysis of the historical role of a  social process, defined as deindus­
trialization by such observers as Bluestone and Harrison—again, a 
process concretely expressed in definite actions such as factory 
closures. The American steel industry provides an  historical case of 
the rise and decline of a  basic industry within the domestic context. A 
sociological analysis of the history of th is Industry using historical 
accounts of the development of steel in  the U.S. since Reconstruction, 
accounts of its major labor disputes, national economic policy, and 
case studies of communities enter into the development of a theory 
taking into account the connection between organizational and class 
dimensions of deindustrialization.
In carrying out this sociological analysis of the American steel 
case, the writings of various historians of the steel industry  are vital.
Of particular importance Is the work of William T. Hogan, whose works 
include Economic History of the Iron and Steel Industry in  the United 
S tates (1971), a  five-volume history of the steel industry in America, 
and The 1970's: Critical Years for the Steel Industry (1972), a volume
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w ritten as a follow-up to the first. In Hogan’s  six volumes we have 
w hat stands as  the single m ost comprehensive and widely cited 
history of the American steel industry covered along the dim ensions of 
corporate organization, labor relations and unionization, technological 
developments In steel production, relations w ith other industries, and 
m arket structure and competition. Besides its  breadth of historical 
scope, what s tan d s  out about Hogan's work is h is integration of sources 
an d  his inclusion of lists of factory closings w ithin this general 
discussion of steel industry development. Hogan's work, however, 
lacks any significant attempt to  discuss the role of dism antled and 
shut-down factories in this overall development, except to identify 
them  rather uncritically as p a rt of a  process which he metaphorically 
desciibes as "tree pruning," i.e., destruction of "obsolete" capital and 
restructuring to make further industrialization possible.
I argue in  th is  dissertation tha t bringing more recent 
sociological analyses of the problem and process of deindustrialization 
in to  confrontation with such broadly historical and largely narrative 
w orks will refine and strengthen the sociological conceptualization of 
th e  meaning of factory shutdow ns by shifting attention from the  issue 
of industrial development to th e  more Inclusive issue of capitalist 
development. T his can be accomplished through  a sociological 
analysis which compares a period of Industrial growth to one of 
decline, and assesses the role of particular actions, such as factory 
shutdowns, in each period. In such  an analysis industrialization and 
deindustrialization are im portant only as m om ents within a  general 
process of capitalist development.
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In such  a  study, historical writings are treated as the "data" of 
sociological inquiry, vital in comparing histories a t particular points in 
time. For example, the history of the British steel industry in  th e  face 
of rising competition from the American steel industry  can be 
compared to th e  American steel industry in the face of Japanese 
Industrial development. At the same time, sociological writings, such 
as  community studies, are treated as sources of historical m aterial 
aiding comparison of "varying historiographical interpretations" of 
broad processes and significant events (Skocpol 1984b, p. 382). Here, 
case study literature provides accounts of communities living the most 
significant episodes in the  history of steel industry  development, such 
as  im portant strikes or particular shutdowns.
This study, which analyzes the historical importance of factory 
closures in the  development of the steel industry, will proceed as 
follows:
In the chapter to follow, three issues are addressed. First, I will 
d iscuss theoretical and methodological issues beginning with the 
m eaning of historical sociology as a  general approach to sociological 
work and its particular application to this dissertation. Within th is 
approach, two general assum ptions are developed concerning the 
contingent aspects of social structure and the articulation of social 
processes through time, and  the relationship between social 
structures broadly defined, arising and recreated within particular 
arenas of hum an action.
Secondly, I will d iscuss treatm ents of the issue of plant 
shutdow ns w ithin the curren t literature, particularly as  they relate to 
debates arising within sociology, for example: the industrial
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restructuring thesis ("creative destruction") versus the deindustri­
alization thesis (cf. Norton 1986. p. 13, "the destructive side of 
creative destruction"); and m odem ization/postindustrlalisin versus 
new International division of labor/underdevelopm ent. In light of such 
debates, the factory closure can be placed within the context of the 
process of the reproduction of capitalist society where the firm and its 
processes are b u t one arena wherein class relations and conditions of 
capitalist competition are recreated. The factory closure is therefore 
viewed a s  one among a  range of actions undertaken by business firms 
which historically have contributed to the reproduction of capitalism 
by, among other things, creating surplus labor and releasing capital for 
reinvestment. In explicating th e  relationship between the activities of 
complex organizations and larger structural processes, factory closures 
are am ong the "organizational solutions to problems posed In the 
production and circulation of capital" (Storper and Walker 1982, p. 
479). Since the shutdown is an  event as historically im portant to 
deindustrialization as it Is to industrialization, as relevant to growth as 
to decline, both can be conceptually subsum ed under the process of 
capitalist reproduction.
Thirdly, I will identify and discuss the major stages in the 
development of the steel industry  from its "take-off1 during 
Reconstruction to the  Homestead Strike of 1892; the period of tru s t 
formation from 1892 to the crucial year of 1901 when the United 
States Steel Corporation was formed; through its m ost im portant 
period of growth in the first half of the twentieth century to its 
decline in  the domestic context in the p o st-1945 era; to the so-called 
deindustrialization wave of the 1970s. Also In chapter 2 I will em pha­
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size the latter, thereby constructing an account of the post-World War 
II decline of the American steel Industry to which accounts of pre- 
World W ar II industrial growth will be compared.
Chapter 3 begins the discussion of the  growth of the United 
States steel industry from the post-Civil War period to 1892. During 
this period the steel industry emerged in the transform ation of iron 
m anufacture. This transition took place against the backdrop of the 
destruction of iron producing facilities, introduction of new 
technologies, and labor struggles. In the steel industry, events such as 
the Homestead Strike are intelligible In term s of craft labor resistance 
to the process of the subsum ption (submission) of labor under the 
conditions of capitalistic production. The destruction of the iron 
industry and the shift to steel production is associated w ith the shift 
to more capital intensive processes advancing the interests of owners 
while circumventing and redefining the political interests of workers. 
As such it is both analogous and relevant to curren t discussions of 
deindustrialization as tied to the process of "deskilling'' or the process 
through which craft is destroyed or emptied of content and  labor 
power is converted to mere factor of production (Braverman 1974 pp. 
131 and 139). Deindustrialization as general process, or factory 
closure as  particular event, m ust be viewed historically both as a  m ani­
festation or Institutional expression of the essential contradiction 
between wage-labor and capital, and as recreating this contradiction.
Besides its role in in ter-class processes, deindustrialization can 
be viewed as an  aspect of in tra-class competition. This is the central 
focus of chapters 4  and 5 which cover the period of monopolization in 
the steel industry from 1892-1901, the period of tru st formation
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culminating in the establishm ent of the United States Steel 
Corporation, and from 1901 through the first half of the twentieth 
century dominated by U.S Steel b u t also witnessing the rise of other 
monopoly corporate actors such as Jones and Laughlln, Republic Steel, 
and Bethlehem Steel, This history can Illustrate the importance of 
sh u t down and dism antled p lants during periods of both growth and 
decline in  capitalist competition within several contexts: between 
individual capitals; across industries; across regions; and across 
nations.
Currently, sociological discussions of the effect of deindustriali­
zation have focused attention on the socially destructive aspects of 
factory closures for communities, which are usually discussed as 
outcomes of the in terests of capital against the particular Interests of 
communities. Decisions to shu t down or move plants, made according 
to the accumulation dem ands of firms, disrupt community life and are 
made despite the locally situated social problems—the social costs to 
local communities—th a t these actions create.
The conclusions drawn by sociologists with regard to the issue of 
the social costs of deindustrialization come out of a  body of studies 
done from the late 1960s through the 1970s focusing on the wave of 
deindustrialization of the last decade. The scope of sociological 
discussion of this issue can be expanded by comparing case studies of 
communities which experienced the closure of steel mills during the 
1970s to communities a t different points in the history of steel 
industry  development.
Community level sources will be used to compare im pacts of 
dislocations a t different points in time, and im pacts of destroying a
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steel community to those of creating one. If the destruction of 
communities is currently discussed in. relation to the criteria of 
accum ulation according to which firms act, it  m ust be remembered 
th a t the creation of communities in the first place occurred 
historically with reference to the same criteria.
Summary
This dissertation uses the history of the  steel industry in the 
United States to assess the strength of the concept and theories of 
deindustrialization. Deindustrialization has been defined within 
sociology in term s of a  range of actions undertaken by capitalist 
business firms. One such action emphasized in current literature is 
the factory closure. In this work, I am interested in understanding 
the historical meaning of factory closures in capitalist development. I 
argue th a t sociological theories have placed insufficient em phasis upon 
the importance of such actions in the formation of industries, 
emphasizing Instead their role in, and taking them  to indicate, the 
decay of industries in the domestic context.
I will dem onstrate th a t factory closures are as definitive of 
industrialization as they are of deindustrialization, as currently 
conceptualized, and suggest the need to place the shutdow n within 
the context of the process of the reproduction of capitalist society. In 
this way, the opening and closing of plants are viewed am ong a  range 
of actions taken by firms in the local setting through which capitalist 
social relations and conditions of accum ulation are created, recreated, 
extended, and intensified against, and for the purpose of 
circumventing the political resistance of workers on the one hand and
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competing capitalist in terests on the other. The m eaning of factory 
shutdowns, whether occurring in the historical context of the "take­
off," growth, maturity, or senility of an  industry, rem ains consistent 
with the logic of capital accumulation.
CHAPTER II
DEINDUSTRIALIZATION AS AN ISSUE IN STEEL INDUSTRY 
DEVELOPMENT: HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALIST FIRMS, 
AND REPRODUCTION OF CAPITALIST SOCIETY
Introduction
In th is dissertation a socio-historical approach which places the 
factory shutdown in  the context of the reproduction process of 
capitalist society is developed. Rather than  viewing shutdow ns as part 
of an industrialization or deindustrialization process, they are more 
accurately seen w ithin a  range of concrete actions taken by capitalist 
firms which contribute to the creation, re-creation, extension, and 
intensification of social conditions of accum ulation which define 
capitalist society. In  th is  way, industrialization and deindustrialization, 
when viewed in the longer historical term, are seen as subprocesses in 
the more general process of capitalist social development. Industri­
alization and deindustrialization are terms currently applied to the 
process of industrial restructuring which is better understood as 
subsum ed under the  process of capitalist reproduction, i.e., the social 
reconstruction of conditions which make capitalist society possible. 
The m ost im portant issue is not the meaning of factory closures in 
relation to an industrialization or deindustrialization process, i.e., the 
construction or deconstruction of particular structures of industry, bu t 
their m eaning in relation to the process through which the most basic 
social relationships of capitalist society, namely, class and market, are 
recreated within w hich industrial structu res are In reality contained.
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As the historical record of steel industry  development in  the 
United States shows, factory closures have been central to both  the 
industrialization process in the domestic context, where national 
capacity to produce is progressively built, and to the deindustrializa­
tion process, where national capacity to produce is progressively 
dism antled in favor of the export of capital overseas and to other 
locations. In th is chapter, the param eters of th is overall research 
project are established through discussion of theory and the socio- 
historical method, the deindustrialization debate within sociology, and 
an  historical overview of steel industry  development, especially its 
post-World W ar II developments as they relate to the issue of deindus­
trialization. I propose a  socio-historical approach which links the 
dom inant relations of capitalist society, namely, class and market, the 
firm, and the factory closure within the unified process of the 
reproduction of capitalist society.
The Reproduction of Capitalist Society, the Firm, and the Factory 
Closure
By reproduction I m ean the historical process through which 
the dom inant relationships th a t distinguish one type of society from all 
others are re-created through hum an action. It is in  the process of 
reproduction th a t societies appear to persist even a t the sam e time 
th a t they undergo transformations which m aintain them  as 
distinguishable social systems. The reproduction of capitalist society 
is conditioned by the re-creation of its dom inant social relations, 
namely, class and m arket which are among w hat Wolf (1981, p. 47)
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would describe as  the "salient characteristics" of capitalism  as a  mode 
of production.1
Here, class is understood as a relation between "groups of social 
agents...defined principally b u t not exclusively by their place in the 
production process, i.e., by their place in  the economic sphere" 
(Poulantzas 1974, p. 27). Under capitalism, this relation exists most 
basically between owners and  non-owners of the m eans of production 
and therefore between buyers and sellers of labor power. Also, class is 
understood to be more th an  merely a  structural relation or category of 
hum an actors. Class is a process, or as  E.P. Thompson (1966, p. 9) 
argues, "something that happens (and can  be shown to have happened)
1 There is a distinction between the way I am using the term 
reproduction and the way it is used w ithin that body of literature 
known as social reproduction theory exemplified by the writings of 
such thinkers as Bowles and Gintis, Pierre Bourdieu, and Henry 
Giroux. According to Jay  MacLeod (1987, pp. 9-11) the focus of social 
reproduction theory is on individuals. The concern of social 
reproduction theory is the process through which class, for example, 
is reproduced through institutional and ideological processes, e.g., 
education, to which Individuals are subjected. In other words, social 
reproduction theory is interested in how "the social relationships and 
attitudes needed to sustain  the  existing relations of production in  a 
capitalist society" are perpetuated (MacLeod 1987, p. 9). As Abrams 
(1982, p. 262) states, w ithin this perspective, "the process of identity 
formation and the process of social reproduction are the same." My 
work is not opposed to the project of social reproduction theorists, in 
fact, I believe die two are quite complementary and  consistent with 
one another. I also believe both differ in  their em phases. I am 
interested in the role of the factory closure in the reproduction or re­
creation of class and m arket themselves as conditions historically 
emergent and definitive of capitalism as a  social system. I am no t so 
m uch interested in  this work in the transm ission of class and m arket 
position among individuals intergenerationally, although I also 
understand th a t some such cultural or ideological process m ust take 
place in order for capitalism to be reproduced in general.
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In hum an relationships." Therefore, as process, class is meaningful 
historically.
M arket is also a  relation between groups of social agents divided 
essentially as  buyers and sellers. Specifically, Rothman (1978, p. 22) 
discusses three types of m arket situation suggested in W eber's work: 
the labor m arket, which divides society into employers an d  employ­
ees: the money m arket, which separates creditors from debtors; and 
the commodity m arket, which distinguishes between buyers and 
sellers and landlords and tenants. This three-way m arket differenti­
ation is at the heart of the class system under capitalism and  suggests 
the extent to which market situations are related both to each other 
and to class. For example, class position can  be defined in  terms of 
the relation of individuals to the labor m arket where buyers and sellers 
of labor power confront one another and where labor power takes the 
form of a commodity which is subject, like other commodities, to 
supply and demand.
An approach through which these essential relations of 
capitalism can be studied is suggested by Abrams (1982). Abrams 
(1982, p. 89) argues tha t historical sociology, as it relates to the 
analysis of capitalist society, should address the concerns of Marx on 
the one hand and Weber on the other. Abrams (1982, p. 89) states,
Capitalism...is defined for Weber in term s of distinct economic 
practices embodying a  distinct complex of meaning. Whereas 
for Marx capitalism is a  type of relationship, a particular form of 
exploitation, for Weber it is a  type of practice, a particu lar way of 
organizing and giving meaning to action, a  way expressed most 
clearly [but not solely) in the firm or enterprise.
While neither Marx nor Weber neglected the  question of th e  relation
between structure and action, both exhibited a  tendency to  emphasize
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one over the  other. Therefore, Marx tended to define capitalism in 
terms of the  structural relationships which characterize it a  mode of 
production. Weber tended to  emphasize the firm as an  arena of social 
practice defining capitalism in terms of the  organizational context of 
economic action, for example, discussing bureaucracy as an  ideal type 
and de-emphasizing its relation to the political-economic context in 
which m odem  industrial bureaucracies arose. In this dissertation, it is 
my intention to address these complementary concerns of Marx and 
Weber by using  the history of factory closures in the steel industry in 
order to explicate the m utually  contingent relationship between 
structure and  action.
In th is  work, then, the  relationship between capitalism as social 
system and firm as mode of organization, is treated neither as one 
where the operation of societal level processes "derive implications for 
micro levels of social organization" nor a s  one where micro level 
relations serve merely as the  bases upon which "societal...level conse­
quences can be derived" (Baron and Bielby 1980, p. 747). Rather, the 
relationship between capitalism  and the firm is treated a s  a  dialectical 
one where th e  present course of capitalist development, itself the 
outcome of p a s t action, constrains and enables organizational action 
and where the  activities of firm s—e.g., the opening and closing of 
factories—re-create the conditions under w hich capital accumulation 
Is possible. In other words, i t  is through specific actions within the 
organizational context of the  firm that the essential relations of class 
and m arket are  reproduced. Therefore, capitalism  is understood as a 
type of society characterized by certain structu ra l relations, and the 
firm as an arena  of action where those relations are actually practiced.
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In this scheme, the factory closure is an  example of a  particular kind 
of corporate action which can be examined in the broader context of 
capitalist development and in which the relationship between the 
development of Arms and the reproduction of capitalist society can be 
observed. According to Abrams (1982, p. 192), "through the strike 
and the war [as events! we perceive classes and nations." The same is 
true of the  factory shutdown through which we perceive the ongoing 
creation of capitalist society.
The factory closure, as a type of event, will be studied histor­
ically so th a t Its relationship to the process of capitalist development 
can be analyzed. By doing this, the tendency in current social 
scientific literature to emphasize the importance of such events only 
with specific regard to the theoretically formulated process of 
deindustrialization can be re-evaluated. The factory shutdown may be 
understood as an event as historically im portant to the process of 
deindustrialization as it is to industrialization, a s  im portant to the 
current stage of industrial decline as to the period of industrial growth 
in the domestic context. In this analysis, industrialization and 
deindustrialization are viewed as im portant only as moments within a  
general process of capitalist development and not as  unique historical 
stages of development themselves. Both are related to each other as 
complementary aspects of the process of capitalist reproduction.
My basic approach will be to analyze the history of factory 
closures in  the American steel industry  in relation to three aspects of 
capitalist development—interclass processes, in traclass processes, and 
processes concerned with the spatial development of capitalism.
First, the role of the destruction of iron-making facilities in the
2 6
formation of the steel industry  in the transition from iron production 
to steel production in the  United S tates will be examined. The 
relationship between the destruction of the iron industry and the 
destruction of craft-based labor, which brought with it the intensified 
subjection of labor to the conditions of capitalistic production, will be 
emphasized in the discussion of the historical role of the factory 
closure in the cycle of labor control. In the history of the steel 
industry, th is culminated in the events surrounding the Homestead 
Strike of 1892.
Secondly, the role of the factory closure in the process of tru s t 
formation and monopolization in the steel industry will be discussed 
emphasizing steel industry development up  to and subsequent to the 
formation of the United S tates Steel Corporation in 1901. In this, I 
will also discuss the place of the factory closure within the cycle of 
capitalist competition over horizontal, vertical, and spatial control of 
production and markets across intra- and inter-national regional 
contexts—for example, in such things as the purchase of factories of 
competitors by others in order to sh u t them  down and the 
dismantling of the Welsh tin plate Industry and the removal of its 
facilities to the United States.
Finally, I will discuss the historical role of the factory closure in 
the geographic development of capitalism, i.e., in the creation of the 
"space economy" of capitalism  which is the process through which 
class and m arket come to be embodied in the creation and 
organization of space in a  m anner consistent with the imperatives of 
capital accumulation (Harvey 1982 and Smith 1986, p. 87). Especially 
im portant here will be the factory closure and its relation to processes
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of u rban  and regional development in the rise of m anufacturing cities 
like Youngstown, Ohio, and Gary, Indiana, and with them  the rise of 
the m anufacturing belt. This will provide an  historical basis of 
comparison to current discussions in the deindustrialization literature 
which emphasize the role of the factory closure in contemporary 
decline of "traditional" m anufacturing cities and regions of the United 
States.
This approach will be presented in more detail in  th is and later 
chapters. Overall, factory closures can be located within a  general 
process of investm ent and disinvestment, "mechanically" similar to 
th a t described currently as constituting deindustrialization. This 
process w as as vital to the building of the nation's basic capacity to 
produce and to the rise of Its industrial heartland a t the tu rn  of the 
century as to its dismantling in the contemporary period. This 
suggests th a t factory closures are better understood in  th e  process of 
capitalist development in general, th a t is. In the process through 
which capitalist social relations are re-created. By comparing the 
historical role of the plant shutdown in the process of monopolization 
to its role in the contemporary process of conglomeration, the c la im - 
made by certain proponents of deindustrialization theory—th a t the 
natu re of factory closures in the process of deindustrialization is 
unique to current domestic economic and social development can be 
called into question.
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Historical Sociology. Industrial Development 
and the Production of Capitalist Society
Historical sociology is an  approach wherein sociological theories 
are understood as explanations of historical Information, and wherein 
theories and concepts are continually assessed and reassessed in light 
of such information. I argue th a t since historical sociology addresses 
the issues of social structure, process, and event as well a s  the rela­
tionship between these, a  socio-historical approach lends itself to 
analysis of the meaning and significance of factory closures which are 
concrete events taken within current sociological discourse to 
constitute the process of deindustrialization.
Two Theories of Economic and Social Development: Sociology 
and the Meaning of Factory Closures in the Process of "Creative 
Destruction"
The necessity of a socio-historical approach to the issue of 
factory closures is suggested by the tendency in current writings to 
explain such  events primarily within the context of post-World War II, 
and especially post-1970 developments alone, wherein either of two 
opposing theoretical perspectives are typically applied. The first may 
be called the industrialization or modernization thesis in which 
developments in American capitalism are interpreted as part of a 
process of w hat Schum peter (1942, p. 23) has termed "creative 
destruction" where old forms of capital accumulation and organization 
are destroyed in the course of competition in order to create new 
ones. The second, influenced largely by Bluestone and Harrison's 
(1982) work, may be called the deindustrialization thesis, which is a 
critique of neoclassical economic theory and which asserts th a t factory 
closures and their im pacts indicate the "destructive side of creative
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destruction." Di Leonardo (1985, p. 242) argues that bo th  views 
exhibit organization around biological m etaphors. Of these  two 
metaphors in current use, the  first is structu ra l functionalist in 
orientation, where "economies are envisioned as healthy or ill bodies" 
(di Leonardo 1985, p. 242). The other is a  Social Darwinian m etaphor 
which views "economies as competitors in a  harsh  environment" (di 
Leonardo 1985, p. 242). Although both m etaphors transcend political 
orientations of particular writers, the first appears more characteristic 
of the outlook of adherents to the deindustrialization thesis. It is 
problematic to the extent th a t the imagery of the "destructive side of 
creative destruction" portrays factory closures as symptomatic, 
dysfunctional, and anomalous aspects of otherwise normal processes of 
social and economic development. The Social Darwinist/evolutionist 
view of factory closures seem s more characteristic of the neoclassical- 
inspired orientation. It is problematic to the extent th a t it asserts the 
inevitability of progress rooted in the implicit rationality of m arket 
forces as definitive of capitalist society (cf. Stein2 1980, p. 9; and 
Brown 1986, p. 50) where shutdow ns are explained in th e  language of 
neoclassical economics—as p a r t of the process of growth, progress, 
and modernization and therefore as ultimately beneficial to  society.3
2 On the natu re  of the capitalist market system, Stein (1980, p. 9) 
states, "We have a  system th a t for two hundred years picked winners 
successfully. That system is the free m arket, the free enterprise 
system in which people bet their own money on who the winners are 
going to be."
3 See also Arnold and Goulet (1982, pp. 37-63) on the three basic 
Institutions of American society and their supporting m yths-- 
capitalism and the myth of social mobility, technology and  the myth of 
progress, and national security and the myth of national interest.
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Factories are s h u t down or capital relocated in  the process of indus­
trial restructuring as  firms in competition w ith one another undergo 
changes directed a t making them  "tougher"--more competitive or 
profitable, for exam ple—by adopting new technologies or shifting 
investm ents into growth areas.
The creative destruction thesis was influenced by the economic 
theory of Joseph Schum peter (1942, p. 23), to whom the United 
S tates steel industry  was exemplary:
The opening up  of new m arkets, foreign or domestic, the 
organizational development from the craft shop and factory to 
such concerns as U.S. Steel illustrate the same process of 
industrial m utation—if I m ay use the biological term—th a t 
incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, 
incessantly destroying the old one, Incessantly creating a  new 
one. This process of Creative Destruction is die essential fact 
about capitalism. It is w hat capitalism consists In and w hat every 
capitalist concern has got to live in.
In sociology, th is view finds expression in modernization theory which
Is also known by other names, such  as diffuslonlsm, developmentallsm,
and equilibrium theory, among others. Economically, modernization
theory is neoclassical in orientation. Hechter (1975, p. 29) sta tes in
his description of diffusionism that:
Neo-classical economic theory holds th a t the expansion of 
efficient capital, labor, and  commodity m arkets into regions 
dominated by traditionally oriented groups should decrease 
regional economic Inequalities in the society as a  whole. Once 
the  peripheral region is brought into the national network of 
commercial flows and transactions, inequality might temporarily 
increase; b u t in time an  equilibrium will be reached and 
economic integration will be  substantially achieved.
For th is  reason, H echter describes diffusionism as an  "osmotic model”
of economic growth, th a t Is, a  model that argues the equalization of
economic resources between regions, where benefits "flow" from an
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area of "high concentration" to one of "low concentration" until both 
are brought into balance.
In this view, backwardness or modernity of particular regions 
are perceived as historically intrinsic conditions. Thus, the  descrip­
tion of an  area (or industry) as "backward" or "modem" is dependent 
on its own historical performance w ith regard to developmental 
processes. In sociology, culture is viewed as having an influence on 
w hether or not societies develop, i.e., to the extent th a t they  are 
governed by "traditional" or "modem" values. "Stagnated" areas are 
seen as eventually able to enhance their developmental position as 
cultural and material "benefits" accrue to them  from the develop­
m ental processes of more advanced areas.
Benefits from developed regions reach more backward regions 
because developed areas undergo a twofold process conducive to this 
"trickle down" effect. First, developed areas become more service 
oriented. Secondly, these areas face higher labor costs. Because of 
this, producers are motivated to move to more "profitable" areas. 
Thus, as an  old industry moves out, it aids the development of 
backward areas and "makes room" for the further development of the 
service or more advanced industrial economy. The major assertion of 
this model, then, is th a t in the course of economic and social devel­
opment, there is a tendency toward equalization, i.e., equilibrium 
between geographic regions. In other words, since the system  tends 
toward equilibrium, "present problems...are not necessarily the 
harbingers of an alarming state of crisis. Rather, they are only a 
reaffirmation of a  self-regulating m arket mechanism" (Watkins and 
Perry 1977, p. 20 and cf. Amin 1976 on center and periphery).
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According to th is  view, disparities between industries and regions will 
inevitably sm ooth themselves out.
Temporally, modernization theorists view societies as  under­
going a  generally linear course of upw ard development where they 
p ass  through stages ranging from traditional societies through various 
degrees of modernity. For example, W.W. Rostow (1964, pp. 4-11) 
identifies these stages as: traditional society, takeoff, m aturity, 
followed by a  period of high m ass consumption. In incorporating 
Daniel Bell's work into the modernization scheme, a fifth stage of 
national development can be added, th a t of post-industrial society. In 
Bell's (1973. p. 127) view,
A post-industrial society Is based on services....If an  industrial 
society is defined by the quantity of goods as marking a  standard 
of living, the post-industrial society Is defined by the quality of 
life as m easured by services and amenities...which are deemed 
desirable and possible for everyone.
Furtherm ore, Bell conceptualizes the  passage to post-industrial society
as originating in the advances made in the stage of high m ass
consumption. He again states (1973, pp. 127-128):
In the very development of industry  there is a  necessary expan­
sion of transportation and public utilities as auxiliary services in 
the movement of goods and the  increasing use of energy, and an  
increase in  the nonm anufacturing bu t still blue-collar force.
[Also] in  the m ass consumption of goods and the growth of 
populations there is an increase in distribution... and finance, 
real estate, and insurance, the traditional centers of white-collar 
employment.
The m ajor transformation in the  coming of post-industrial 
society is the shift from the struggle between capitalist and worker to 
"the clash between the professional and  the populace" (1973, p. 129, 
and  also 1978, pp. 147-148). Thus in  Bell’s model there Is no t only
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the development of the post-industrial society b u t the development 
toward a post-capitalist society, a  shift from the basic relations 
between capital and labor "in the locus of the factoiy" to those between 
professionals and  clients "in the organization and community” (Bell 
1973, p. 129).4 This change is supposed to occur as the "technical 
demands" of post-industrial society make "meritocratic sources of 
intergenerational sta tus persistence" (e.g., class) obsolete (Baron and 
Bielby 1980, p.743). With reference to Bell's work, Richard Louv 
(1983, pp. xvli-xviii) In America I describes the difference between 
industrial and post-industrial society and the passage from one to the 
other.
America I is made up  of all those steel workers and middle 
m anagers so bewildered by a  society that, more each day, does 
not seem to need them....America I is all those people left 
behind, outside the gates.... America II is alm ost adolescent in its 
headstrong exuberance. It sees the nation transforming into 
something new and fresh; it perceives the future as a  techno­
logical frontier to be conquered and won.
In general, modernization theory views the factoiy closure
w ithin the process of "creative destruction" and development toward
the post-industrial society which occurs as outmoded industries are
shifted out of regions and replaced by "higher" forms of economic
activity more consistent with the rise of a  service-oriented ra ther than
production-oriented society. For example. Ju sen iu s  and Ledebur
(1984, pp. 83 and 87) comment th a t the losses of industrial firms in
4 This appears consistent with Parson's suggestion tha t "capitalism is 
no longer an  appropriate nam e for the advanced w estern economies 
which should instead be identified as 'bureaucratic industrialism ’..." 
(Abrams 1982, p. 116). Like Bell's theory of the coming of post­
industrial society, Parsons views history In term s of a  unidirectional 
evolution toward modernity (Abrams 1982, pp. 112-113).
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New England and the rise of nonindustrial businesses in the region 
"may be indicative of a  movement of the New England economy toward 
the long-anticipated 'post-industrial' economy...toward the provision of 
services and financial and information expertise." If this is the case, 
then the benefits which they assum e to attribute to such development 
lead them  to conclude th a t outmigration of blue-collar workers "may 
be a desireable adjustm ent for the region" (Jusenius and Ledebur 
1984, p. 117).
McKenzie (1984b, p. 3), the leading proponent of this view as it 
relates to factory closures, argues the "case for p lan t closings."
There is a  movement afoot th a t seeks to destroy one of th e  last 
rem aining vestiges of the free-enterprise system  in the  United 
S tates: the right of the firm to close up  shop. Make no mistake 
about it—this movement is well financed, dug in, broadening its 
political support a t the federal and state levels, and (especially 
when there is a  rash  of large plant closings) attracting more and 
more media attention,
McKenzie and others assert tha t business should not be restricted in 
its decisions to locate, re-locate, or close down. Businesses locate 
their p lan ts to minimize production costs, and since this is the mark 
of a dynamic economy deindustrialization is considered a "nonexistent 
trend" (McKenzie 1984c, p. 11 and Bailey 1982, pp. 445-451). 
"Economic conditions in any dynamic economy are constantly chang­
ing, and businesses m u st be allowed the flexibility to fit their location 
to these conditions" (McKenzie 1984b, p. 8).
While factory closures may bring with them  temporary crises for 
workforces or localities (nations, regions, or communities), especially 
in the form of unemployment and other "adjustm ent costs," these are 
seen as the necessary costs of growth and development, creating
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problems no worse th a n  those associated with o ther forms of disloca­
tion (Littman and Lee 1984, p. 128). Ultimately, capital mobility is a  
process of industrial redistribution which resolves imbalances between 
regions and Industries (Hekman and  Strong 1984, pp. 65-66). 
D estruction of old form s and facilities of production in  the end gives 
way to more profitable, efficient economic structu res and practices, 
the benefits of which gradually spread to all segm ents of society. 
Problems Eire held to arise only w hen there is interference in th is  so- 
called "natural evolutionary" process, for example, w hen so-called 
"industrial policies" m aintain outmoded practices beyond their "life­
spans" and  block the  process of disinvestment from the obsolete to 
the m odem  (Thurow 1980, p. 77).
On the other hand , the deindustrialization th esis  interprets 
recent developments in  American capitalism as th e  "destructive side 
of creative destruction," exemplified m ost obviously by a wave of 
factory closures in the  1970s (Norton 1986, p. 13). Bluestone and 
Harrison (1982), leading proponents of this view, argue from a  critical 
standpoint and explain factory shutdow ns as part of the process of 
decline, underdevelopment, and stagnation in the nation 's basic capa­
city to produce. The costs of this are ultimately borne by society--by 
workers and communitites who, am ong other things, face unem ­
ployment and underemployment, loss of income, loss of tax revenue, 
and a  range of family, personal, emotional, and health  problems.
The nature of changes in direction of economic development in 
the post-World War II period and the  extent of problem s associated 
with them  have directed a great deal of attention in  sociology to the 
issue of factory closures, especially since the 1970s. Of special
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concern to  social scientists working in  th is area h a s  been the case of 
factory closures in the United States steel industry. Among com m u­
nity-based studies of factory closures, Lynd's (1982) and  Buss and 
Redbum ’s (1983) w orks on steel mill closings in Youngstown, Ohio, 
have been the most influential.
In 1977 Lykes Corporation, w hich owned Youngstown Sheet and 
Tube Corporation as a  subsidiary company, announced tha t it would 
close th e  Campbell Works and tha t 4 ,100  workers would be perm a­
nently laid off. In 1978 Jones and Laughlin took over the Campbell 
works, still closed, along with the Brier Hill Works, previously owned 
by Youngstown Sheet an d  Tube. In 1980 Jones and Laughlins closed 
Brier Hill and 1,400 workers lost jobs. In that sam e year United 
States Steel Corporation closed its MacDonald and Youngstown Works, 
leaving 3,500 workers unemployed (Buss and R edbum  1983, p. 23).
Lynd, historian an d  labor lawyer who worked closely with the  
"Save O ur Valley" Committee, set ou t to  document th e  political 
dynamics between un ion , community, and  corporation and the resis­
tance of workers and o ther local in te rests  to the unilateral decisions of 
corporations to close factories with th e  purpose of offering policy 
suggestions advocating "brownfleld" reindustrialization (see also Lynd 
1981, pp. 33-36).5 B uss and Redbum also examine th e  political 
dynamics surrounding shutdowns, b u t lay special em phasis upon the 
effects of social stresses on communities experiencing factory clos­
ures, including physical, emotional, an d  financial s tra in s  which w ork­
5 Brownfleld ^industrialization refers to  a polity of reinvestment in  
existing p lan ts or "traditional" industrial regions.
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ers and  families undergo as a  resu lt of term ination and "the 'ripple 
effect’ of massive job  and income losses throughout the community’s 
economy” (Buss and Redbum 1983, p. 7). The ultim ate purpose of 
their work is to suggest changes in hum an services policy dealing with 
m ass unemployment (Buss and Redbum 1983, pp. 149-159).
The influence of studies of Youngstown has been such tha t the 
experience of th is community h as  come to be considered the 
quintessential case for the analysis of the dynamics and impact of 
factory closings. On the significance of Youngstown, Jo h n  Logue 
(1985, p. 75) has written:
Youngstown is a  microcosm of the problems of the aging 
industrial towns of the Northeast: the predatory conglomerate, 
systematic disinvestment, the flight south, the trained labor 
force suddenly unemployed, the collapse of the community tax  
base, and the  obsolescence of the rusting  mills th a t once 
employed thousands.
Similarly, Bensman and Lynch (1987, p. 7), in  their study of factory 
closures in the Chicago area describe Southeast Chicago as a  "micro­
cosm of America's industrial decline." Community studies are valuable 
as ra th e r local "snapshots" of deindustrialization, freezing a  moment in 
the larger social process tha t reveals m uch th a t is Im portant concern­
ing th e  events subsequent to the  shutdown of a  plant. They also point 
to the seriousness of the issue by documenting the problem as a 
problem. For instance, Buss and  Redbum ’s work on w hat they consid­
er the "Ruhr Valley of America" is intended to expand the "research 
base" for beliefs about the im pacts and "public policies to address 
these directly" (1983, pp. 5-6). However, while these kinds of 
com munity studies are im portant sources of historical and sociological 
information, it is im portant to recognize (without devaluing their
38
contribution) th a t with their em phasis on the microcosmic, they have 
a  tendency to trea t shutdowns as isolated events. So, they carry with 
them  limitation of scope both  spatially and temporally. The reason 
such studies tend toward limitations like these m ay be attributed to 
the fact th a t "the impacts of closings are concentrated regionally and 
often reinforced by the relative lack of new offsetting economic 
opportunity" (Buss and Redbum  1983, p. 4). However, it is necessary 
to recognize th a t despite regional concentration of effects, even when 
manifested in particular shutdowns, deindustrialization involves more 
th an  locally situated processes. Also, while the effects of p lan t 
closures may be regionally concentrated, the factory closure a s  a 
problem is not historically limited b u t is characteristic of every period 
of industrial development. The use of the term "microcosm" by Logue 
and Bensman and Lynch is significant. It is indicative of a  m uch larger 
though unspecified historical context. It tells u s  something im portant 
about the character of the community case study. Buss and Redbum ’s 
and Lynd's studies are "local histories" (i.e., localized histories). This 
is consistent w ith Moore's (1987, p. 727) description of fieldwork as 
the creation of "current history" and ethnography as historical writing, 
"a primary source in the making." Their major contribution has been 
in the analysis and identification of the direct effects of factory 
closures, the political dynamics surrounding these local events, and, 
especially, their social costs to local communities, including the 
docum entation of increased stress levels and associated medical and 
emotional problems among individuals a t the sam e time th a t 
communities lose the resources to handle them.
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In essence, both approaches view plant closings as p a rt of a 
process of Industrial restructuring and the movements of firms into 
more profitable areas and  industries. Also, Bluestone and Harrison 
(1982, p. 15) describe the current problem of deindustrialization as 
unique to the post-World War II period, and although asserting a 
position which is critical of the neoclassical view and influential in 
leftist academic discourse, they describe deindustrialization as an 
aberration of the otherwise "normal and often healthy disinvestment 
process."6 For them, the problem is not deindustrialization or factory 
closure per se, but one of scale where conditions of post-war expan­
sion created "a torrent of capital flight" so th a t the disinvestment 
process, especially of the 1970s, has been decidedly unhealthy (Blue- 
stone and Harrison 1982, p. 15). The modernization and deindustri­
alization views differ, however, in their interpretations of the  impacts 
of th is process as either part of the "natural," upward evolutionary 
development of the capitalist economy or as deindustrialization, i.e., 
"industrial devolution" (Peet 1987a, p. 29). The terms 'industrializa­
tion' and 'deindustrialization,' and related term s currently in use in 
the  litera tu re-like  'capital flight,’ 'disinvestm ent,' 'reindustrialization,'
6 Along a  sim ilar line, Alfred Slote (1969) in h is Termination: The 
Closing a t Baker Plant, presents a  case study wherein the socially 
destructive aspects of p lan t closings upon workers and communities 
are illuminated. Quoting Sidney Cobb, who describes the p lan t closing 
as  a  "genuine social emergency" which means "pain, humiliation, and 
despair" for those affected, it is also admitted th a t "Change is neces­
sary  for progress. And it is imperative tha t we no t adopt laws and 
regulations which would seriously Inhibit change and progress" (Slote 
1969, p. 331). The implication here is also th a t the accumulation 
process is normally healthy, and plant closings constitute an  emer­
gency or an aberration.
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'modernization,' 'industrial devolution,' or 'coming of post-industrial 
society'--all variously describe the connotations, either beneficial or 
destructive, of the process of industrial restructuring within which 
factory closures are taken to play a  part.
While the debate over deindustrialization and the meaning of 
factory closures is an  essential starting point of th is socio-hlstorical 
analysis, my purpose is not to defend either the modernization or 
deindustrialization thesis over the other. In fact, I assert th a t the 
historical example of the American steel industry since the close of 
the Civil War can show th a t factory closures are as easily situated in the 
process of industrial growth in the national context as  they can be in 
the decline of an  industry or the industrial capacity of a  region or 
nation. Historically, factory closures have been p art of the process 
through which nations develop a basic capacity to produce as well as 
part of the process through which such capacity is dismantled. If this 
is the case, then  current explanations of factory closures m ust be 
reassessed since it would seem to indicate tha t the reed issue is not 
the building or dismantling of capacity to produce b u t the role th a t 
factory closures play in the creation and re-creation of the basic social 
relationships of capitalist society, regardless of w hether or not such 
events occur within the context of Industrialization or deindustrializa­
tion. Therefore, the issue is not the place of factory closures in  the 
development of industrial structure; more importantly, the issue is the 
relationship between such  events and the historical development of 
capitalist society.
Rather than  viewing factory closures as 'industrialization' or 'de- 
industrialization' and treating them in a  wider historical framework,
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they can  be explained In a  way which links the firm, as one constituent 
organization of capitalist society, and its actions In local situations, e.g., 
p lan t shutdowns, to the reproduction of capitalist systemic relations. 
Factory closures m ust be explained In the context of the relationship 
between the capitalist mode of production and  the capitalist firm, tha t 
is, w ithin the context of capitalism as a system  of social relations 
defined in  term s of class and m arket and capitalism  as social practice, 
or th e  confrontation between social actors in  an  organizational setting 
where systemically defined relations are played out. Here, the firm 
stands as one social arena where the confrontation between social 
actors produces or reproduces, in  spite of or against resistance, the 
essential relations of class and market. Viewed in this light, the 
factory closure is a  specific action taken by particular representatives 
of capital, whose interests are defined In term s of a  particular firm, 
against other representatives of capital and against labor forces. The 
firm a s  organization and the factory closure as specific action are 
analyzed historically vis-a-vis the determination of power a t the m ost 
Inclusive social level (cf. Bottomore 1979, p. 7).7 This is consistent 
with the  overall project of historical sociology, which addresses the 
process through which social structures are hum anly created, the 
conditioning of action by structure, and structure by hum an action
7 Abram s (1982, p. 36) states: "each mode of production [e.g., capital­
ism] is also a specific mode of power. And in  tu rn  each mode of power 
is a  defining context for action, a  definite way the p as t imposes itself 
on the present." Thus, capitalism, as a mode of power, conditions 
action. Actions in  tu rn  hold consequences for the mode of power, i.e., 
its persistence, abolition, or transformation. Factory closures sure held 
in th is study to enter into this dynamic as particular actions situated in 
the cycle of capitalist reproduction.
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(Calllnicos 1988, p. 1; Abrams 1982, p, 200; and Giddens 1977, p. 14, 
and 1979, p. 69-73).8
The development of this view of the historical role of factory 
closures will include an  historical overview of steel industry  develop­
ment in the United States. And, in th is chapter, the development of 
the industry  since the end of World War II as It relates to the issue of 
deindustrialization is emphasized. Throughout th is work, factory 
closures will be treated as local events undertaken by firms whose 
activities are vital in the extension of adm inistrative control over 
workforces, resources, productive activities, and geographical space. 
Such practices are Intelligible within the general capital accum ulation 
process and operate in the extension and intensification of com peti­
tion between capitals, i.e., firms, and the progressive subsum ption of 
labor under the conditions of capitalistic production as labor 
increasingly has imposed upon It the appearance of mere factor of 
production (Marx 1863-1866/1977, p. 1020).
8 Such an  approach is also consistent, I believe, w ith a  view of history 
which emphasizes the central place of class struggle in social change. 
There are of course, other theories of social change not concerned 
with class struggle. For example, the cyclical views of Spengler and 
Toynbee; the evolutionary/equilibrium perspective influenced by 
Durkheim through Talcott Parsons (which informed the sociological 
view of diffusionisn discussed above); and the conflict perspective 
influenced by Weber. One of the most valuable aspects of a  Marxian 
approach to history, especially for historical sociology, rests in a 
fundam ental assum ption of historical m aterialism  concerning the 
inseparability of hum an agency and history. Rather th an  viewing 
history as an  outside force operating according to its  own dynamic to 
which hum ans are passively subject, history is viewed as the total 
process of hum an production of society where hum an  societies are 
understood as "embedded in their own past" (Abrams 1982, p. 35). 
This stands opposed to, for example, the Parsonian view of social 
evolution which describes "structural change divorced from historical 
action" (Abrams 1982, p. 116).
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Overview of Steel Industry Development: The United States Steel 
Industry in the Pre- and Post-World War II Periods
Steel production is synonymous with industrialization. To a  
great extent, the history of steel production in the United States is the 
history of the nation's development as a  world capitalist power which, 
among other capitalist nations, underw ent massive industrialization 
during the second half of the nineteenth century. Heilbroner and 
Singer (1984, p. 171) point out th a t a t the time of the American Rev­
olution, steel could be produced only in small quantities "In crucibles 
not m uch larger than  a  vase. At the Crystal Palace Exposition of 1851 
a 2 -1 /2  ton  ingot of steel (made by combining the outputs of many 
crucibles) was a  sensation." When Andrew Carnegie's Edgar Thomson 
works began production in 1875, the Bessemer Converter, which 
revolutionized steel production, could pu t out about five tons of steel 
in less th an  half an hour. In 1900 mechanized steel p lan ts used 
massive converters which could p u t out 20 tons of steel a t  a time 
(Heilbroner and Singer 1984, pp. 170-172), so th a t by the  turn  of the  
century the international competitive position of capitalist nations, 
national strength, and soundness of a  nation's foothold in modernity 
were m easured in millions of tons of steel output.
In the United States, the transform ation of the iron industry and 
the growth of the steel industry w as rapid after the Civil War. The 
stages of its development correspond to advances in capacity of firm s 
to control increasingly large m arkets and integrate all aspects of steel 
production, from ore processing to finished steel products, under
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single corporate adm inistrations. As Samir Amin (1975, p. 357) has 
argued,
Eveiy phase of [capitalist economic] expansion is characterized 
by a  particular accumulation model: a  type of propelling indus­
try, specific forms of competition and a  definite kind of firm.
Along a similar line, Hymer (1975, p. 37) believes tha t the  stages of 
capitalist development have been accompanied and propelled through 
development and  transition in  concurrent stages characterized by 
dominance of representative types of business organizations. Such 
forms have developed from the workshop, single factory company, 
national corporation, multidivisional corporation, and m ost recently 
the m ultinational corporation.
Thus, in the specific case of the domestic steel industry, it is in 
tu rn  asserted th a t its stages of development are demarcated by 
changes in the form of the capitalist business firm—an organizational 
level model of capitalist accumulation, competition, and labor control 
under which production is carried out. The history of the steel indus­
try  can then, for example, be traced through the  history of its firms, 
the forms of which rise historically in  response to problems presented 
in the  process of capitalist accumulation, e.g., its  history from the 
Carnegie Steel Company; to Carnegie Steel Company, Limited; to 
United States Steel Corporation; to USX. This socio-historical analysis 
of the  factory closure issue explicates the relationship between the 
development of firms and the reproduction of capitalist society.
Besides these organizationally defined stages, the history of iron 
and steel production in the United S tates can be broadly divided into 
two stages of national development: pre- and post-Second World War.
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The choice of 1945 as a  dividing point between two eras is no t made 
arbitrarily. The stages correspond to the period of the rise of the 
United S tates as  a  world industrial capitalist power from the Civil War 
to its relative and gradual decline as  such  In the years following World 
War II9 which Mandel (1978, p. 122) describes a s  "characterized by 
decelerated capital accumulation."
Current deindustrialization literature in  sociology is concerned 
largely with the discussion of factory closures in  relation to p o st-1945 
developments. In my work, em phasis is placed on p re-1945 history in 
relation to which post-war development will be understood. Particu­
larly, the focus of this work is iron and steel industry  development 
from Reconstruction to about 1929—to the height of its development 
in the pre-World War II world. This, of course, does not cover the 
complete history of iron and steel production in  America, so some 
reference to pre-Civil War industrial development is im portant in 
establishing the  context of a  study which places a  great deal of 
emphasis on post-Civil War history.
From Workshop to Factory: Industrialization and Capitalist 
Development
Iron production in America dates to colonial times when the 
first blast furnace was constructed a t Saugus, M assachusetts, in  1645 
(Davis 1933, p. 139, and Hogan 1971, p. 1). The first iron works built 
outside of New England were constructed in New Jersey  in 1716.
9 In this work, 1945 is considered to be a  turning point in the 
economic and political history of the United S tates marking its 
transition from growth on the one hand to hegemony and decline on 
the other.
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From these times until the first decades of the nineteenth  century, 
iron production remained a  very small scale, geographically scattered, 
largely craft-oriented endeavor, supplying only local m arkets (cf. 
W arren 1973, p. 11; Potter 1969, pp. 47-50; and Szymanski 1978, pp. 
151-161).
Supplying the needs of small agricultural m arkets, the produc­
tion of iron in the United S tates was itself "analogous to agriculture" 
(Warren 1973, p. 11). While in Britain, by  the beginning of the nine­
teenth  century, advances h ad  been made in  the use of coal to provide 
the blast for its furnaces, in the United S tates m anufacture of wrought 
iron depended on charcoal fuel almost un til the time of th e  Civil W ar.10 
This required vast am ounts of timberland since a typical ru ra l blast 
furnace might require some two to five thousand acres to supply it 
with sufficient fuel for a  year (Warren 1973, p. 11; and Temin 1964, p. 
85). One commentator summarized the character of iron production 
in America in these terms:
'the manufacturing operations in the United S tates are all car­
ried on in little ham lets, which often appear to spring up in the 
bosom of some forest, gathered around the waterfall th a t serves 
to tu rn  the mill-wheel. These villages are scattered over a vast 
extent of the country, from Indiana to the Atlantic and  from 
Maine to North Carolina, instead of being collected together, as
10 A similar system  of charcoal-produced iron remained in  operation in 
Sweden, which lacked a domestic source of coal, until th e  late nine­
teenth  and early twentieth century. Sweden’s iron industry  remained 
fairly lucrative as it supplied the steel works in Great Britain and in­
dustrializing United States and  Germany un til it was finally displaced 
as a  source of ferrous input in  steel malting with the introduction of 
basic open-hearth steel (Soderlund 1960, p. 60-64). In th e  open- 
hearth  process, molten iron could be directly charged in to  the furnace 
and a  greater portion of the charge could consist of scrap iron and 
steel.
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they are In England In great manufacturing districts' (Warren
1973, p. I I ) .11
Iron production remained largely a  rural endeavor for the first half of 
the nineteenth century in a  system  where m anufacture took place 
under the direction of an artisan  ironm aster who supervised the whole 
process from the making of wrought iron to the finished product. 
Production a t these sites was carried out until fuel was exhausted or it 
became too difficult and costly to transport wood for charcoaling as 
the forest steadily receded from the mill.
For the first half of the nineteenth century the United States 
remained a nation tha t was largely agricultural, and the nation 's iron 
industry  remained relatively small in scale and largely oriented to 
supplying agricultural markets. The picture changed somewhat in the 
1840s and 1850s with the expansion of railroad building (Biyant and 
Dethloff 1983, p. 114). Much of th is construction utilized British 
imported rails, and the role of domestic iron producers in this period 
rem ained relatively small in supplying the rail m arket until after the 
Civil War with the erection of effective protectionist barriers (Potter 
1969, p. 47, and Agnew 1987, p. 39).
Hogan (1971, p. 11) sta tes th a t "it was somewhat presum ptious 
or prem ature to speak of an  iron and steel industry" in the United 
States In 1860. The so-called take-off of the steel industry and the 
rise of industrialization in America began with the end of the Civil War
11 W arren is quoting Zachariah Allen's (1829) work Science and 
M echanics. Also quoted in connection with the character of early iron 
m anufacture is F.W. Taussig (1931), in whose Some Aspects of the 
Tariff Question is written, '"Tiny Ironworks everywhere, b u t particu­
larly in Pennsylvania, with poor equipment and uneconomic force of 
men, passed rapidly from birth  to death; they rose and fluttered like 
May flies'" (Warren 1971, p. 11).
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and the post-1865 political conditions of Reconstruction, i.e., those 
conditions which led to the  transition of the United States from a 
largely agricultural nation to an industrial one. From the earlier 
decades of the nineteenth century, American capital faced several 
m ajor political problems. Foremost among these w as competition 
from Britain's more advanced industrial economy which placed 
American capitalists In competition w ith foreign capital over control of 
the domestic m arket. In addition, the pre-Civil War domestic 
economy was dominated by Southern slave-owning agricultural wealth, 
disinterested in and opposed to full-scale domestic industrial 
development since it benefited from trade with industrialized Britain. 
Also, since the nation was from the time of Independence largely a 
household and skilled independent artisan  economy, America suffered 
a chronic Industrial labor shortage.
Domestically, the full development of the United States as  a  
capitalist industrial nation rested on the outcome of a  political struggle 
on two fronts: between wealth-owning factions and the domination of 
the factory over the plantation, and between industrial capital and 
direct producers over the shift of the location of production from 
m anufacture in the household and workshop to industrial production 
in the factory. Fundamentally, this m eant tha t the "trick" was to get 
direct producers off the farm, out of the workshop, and into the 
factory. Not unique to the American case or iron industry  case, the 
problem of wage labor recruitm ent was historically the most essential 
problem of capitalist industrial development.
Britain's Industrial Revolution of the  eighteenth century was 
centered especially on the industrialization of textile production. The
49
subsum ption of labor to the dem ands of capitalistic factoiy production 
was accomplished w ith the development of the power loom, spinning 
jenny, and, eventually, the self-operating mule. Such Innovations made 
the centralization of capital and therefore the factoiy and mill town 
possible, and represented the appropriation of the m eans of produc­
tion and subsistence as capital. Along with these innovations, the 
industrial wage labor force was created as an  outcome of land enclos­
ures, foreclosures, and  evictions, especially in Celtic regions like Ire­
land, w hich forced peasan t proprietors and rural artisans from the 
countryside to growing industrial centers like M anchester (Engels 
1845/1987, pp. 52-53, 66, and 280).12
As recognized by Raymond Williams (1973, p. 302), the 
development of Industrial capitalism is a  process where countryside is 
eclipsed by  city. Tilly (1983, pp. 123-124) discusses the process of 
urban industrialization as the relocation of m anufacture from the 
countryside to cities, a  process which he describes a s  the deindustri­
alization of the countryside as m eans of production were concentrated 
as capital in the cities. If in England the growth of industrial urban  
centers involved pushing labor off the farm and out of the workshop
12 The creation of th is industrial proletariat was not dissimilar in 
process from the creation of an  agricultural proletariat in Britain as 
feudalism gave way to agrarian capitalism. Enclosure forced serfs and 
villeins off their holdings, and common lands as land w as given over to 
the pasturage of sheep so tha t wool could be sold on the  growing con­
tinental m arket (see Cohen's 1978, p. 175-180 discussion of th is and 
his comments on Its importance to Marx's formulation of the transi­
tion from feudalism to capitalism in the process of primitive accum u­
lation). The creation of a  proletariat necessarily implies the dispos­
session of independent direct producers, their separation from the 
means of production—once independently owned, and their subm is­
sion to capital in exchange for wages (Zeitlin 1981, p. 110-111).
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into the factory, industrialization of the United States, which also 
centered on textile production, pulled labor into factory. At places 
like Lowell, M assachusetts, and M anchester, New Hampshire, centers 
of textile industry  growth in the United States, unm arried daughters 
of farm families in New England comprised a  surplus labor force 
brought to the factories by promises of benevolent corporate pater­
nalism . The mill in terests preached a  philosophy of "benevolent 
control" which in the words of Hareven and Langenbach13 (1978, p. 
14),
treated workers as  the "corporation’s children" and which 
perm eated all aspects of life; the organization of work, the strict 
m anagem ent of boardinghouses, the founding of charities, and 
the endowment of churches....[T]he Company also regulated their 
behavior after working hours in  order to reassure their parents. 
The boardinghouses were locked a t 10:00 P.M., church  atten­
dance w as compulsory, and alcoholic consum ption was 
prohibited.
In this way, "the mills...sought to recruit into their workrooms and 
carefully supervised boardinghouses single young women from the 
'virtuous ru ra l homes' of middling yeomen" (Prude 1983, p. 2).14
13 Barbara Wertheimer (1977, pp. 16-84), in her discussion of the 
factory bell, relates a similar story of the rise of company control over 
the  lives of working women.
14 When these daughters of "virtuous rural homes" finally organized the 
Female Labor Reform Association (FLRA) in 1845 and began asserting 
the ir rights a s  "free-born Americans, children of the Revolution and 
equal in b irthright to the  mill owners" and dem anded reduced hours 
and  participation in establishing working conditions (Wright 1982, p. 
ii), blacklisting and strikes became more common. Mill owners 
sought "greener pastures" in the labor of agriculturally displaced Irish 
and later French-Canadian immigrants (Hareven and Langenbach 
1978, p. 14). See also Bridges (1986, pp. 163-164) who argues th a t 
the  "Lowell girls" exemplified artisans of the Jacksonian  age who 
viewed themselves as  "proud bearers of the ideology of Paine and the 
American Revolution" and who based political claims as laborers upon 
appeals to equality and natural right.
51
Industrial revolution does not represent the mere restructuring 
of economic life—th e  giving up  of the farm and  workshop for the 
pattern of industrial life of the factory. Industrial revolution is also a  
revolution of capital involving the  conversion of labor processes into 
processes of capital accumulation, tha t is, the passing of control over 
labor processes from direct producers to capitalists. Industrial 
revolution is therefore political revolution. Compulsion of laborers to 
the discipline of the factoiy is m ade possible by technological and 
organizational changes which m ake previous forms of production 
unnecessary and bring the seller of labor power into a  dependent 
relationship with capital because the seller of labor power confronts 
the buyer of labor power as owner, controller, and m anager of the 
m eans of production and subsistence. This is consistent with Mane's 
(1863-1866/1977, pp. 1019-1023) discussion of the process of 
subsum ption of labor to the conditions of capitalistic production, 
where the first stage in  the process of separation of labor from the 
m eans of production necessitates change in the scale of production 
through mechanization, centralization of production, or some other 
means which for all practical purposes m akes handicraft or artisanal 
production impossible. In both the  British and American cases, 
industrial revolution, the rise of the textile industry, and the rise of 
the factoiy took place with the dislocation of agricultural labor forces. 
Also in each case, industrialization of textile production provided the 
im petus for the industrialization of other aspects of production and
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destruction of craft in  those areas as well, especially resource 
extraction, energy, transportation, and most notably Iron production.15
Changes in the scale of production came with the introduction of 
coal fuels and with advances in river, canal, and rail transport which 
made it possible to mechanize and to build perm anent factories 
around which mill communities could be built so th a t industrialization 
was a  process through which "old artisanal centers were bypassed and 
eventually ruined" (Chirot 1986, p. 224).16 Still, in the iron industry, 
these changes came a t first not to production of basic wrought iron 
itself, b u t only to factories making finished and semi-finished 
products. For example, in 1812, the first rolling mill was built a t 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for the production of rods for nail making 
and hardware articles. Typical of the time, the mill was still depen­
dent upon rural artisans for the iron which was worked up  into 
finished products. This kind of mechanization of production, occur­
ring in the context of the labor shortage of early industrialization, was 
directed a t replacing unskilled labor so tha t more scarce craft labor 
could be focused on "jobs requiring more skill, judgement, and 
complexity" (Sennett and Cobb 1972, p. 12).
It was not until 1818-1819 th a t iron production began to move 
completely into the factory. At th a t time, a  rolling mill was built at 
P ittsburgh given over to the production of wrought iron Itself and 
selling semi-finished sheets and bars. The move from the countryside
15 See also Elisha P. Douglas (1971), The Coming of Age of American 
Business: Three Centuries of Enterprise. 1600-1900.
is "(EJvery new factory built in the country bears In it the germ of a 
m anufacturing town" (Engels 1845/1987, p. 66).
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to the factory was pushed by the adoption in America of techniques 
which had been in use in Britain since the latter part of the  eighteenth 
century, particularly use of coal as fuel and the replacement of the 
open forge with the introduction of the so-called reverberatory or 
"puddling" furnace. The puddling furnace m ade refinement of 
comparatively large batches of iron possible representing, therefore, 
change in the scale of iron production w ithout fundamentally changing 
the craft of iron making. The change in scale, however, did neces­
sitate the replacement of the artisan 's ham m er with mills consisting of 
series of grooved rolls (Hunter 1969, p. 90).17 It was not un til the 
Introduction of the Bessemer converter for steel making th a t skilled 
craft labor would begin to be replaced by mechanization as  the con­
verter made the craft of iron puddling unnecessary (O’Connor 1935, 
pp. 29-30; and cf. Sennett and Cobb 1972, p. 12). What th e  power 
loom and spinning jenny  were to the movement of textile production 
from the household to the factoiy, so the puddling furnace and steam- 
driven rolling mill were to the subsum ption of the craft of ironmaklng.
17 On British iron producing developments of a  century earlier and of 
iron puddling, Engels (1845/1987) wrote:
The rich iron deposits of England had  hitherto been little 
developed; iron had always been smelted by means of charcoal, 
which became gradually more expensive as agriculture improved 
and forests were cu t away. The beginning of die use of coke in 
iron-smelting had been made in the last century, and in 1780 a 
new method of converting into available wrought iron  coke- 
smelted iron, which up  to th a t time had  been convertible into 
cast iron only. This process, known as ’puddling', consisted in 
withdrawing the carbon which had mixed with the iron during 
the process of smelting, and opened a  wholly new field for the 
production of English iron.
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and with It the iron master, to the conditions of capitalistic 
production. However, while Iron production was relocated from the 
workshop to the factory under the compulsion of the reverberatory 
furnace, the Iron industry, like other emergent industries In the 
United States, remained scattered and uncoordinated.
The formation of the domestic Iron industry as a  genuine 
industry  Intensified following Northern victory in  the Civil War, which 
brought about political changes facilitating the protection and 
therefore the growth of the domestic industrial capitalist class. It was 
Reconstruction which created conditions favorable to national indus­
trial capitalist development against foreign, largely British, capital— 
consolidation of the domestic m arket, and in  the area of labor control, 
creation of the conditions for the further transform ation of the work­
force from a craft-based to an  industrial one. This was eventually 
accomplished through such policies as the erection of trade barriers, 
provision of a federal reserve system, and immigration policies all of 
which were made possible by the Union's victoiy. The Civil War, in 
essence, broke, in favor of rising Northern industrial capital, the 
economic and political force of the long-standing alliance between 
Northern m erchant capital and Southern slave-owning planter wealth 
which had  hitherto benefited from "free trade" with Britain 
(Szymanski 1978, p. 153). On the outcome of the Civil War, Douglas 
Dowd (1977, p. 62) wrote:
If we may judge the intentions of warriors by w hat they do after
victory, die organization and functioning of the American federal
government during and after the Civil War tells u s  tha t northern
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intentions were to adapt federal power to the needs of indus­
trial, not planter, capitalism .18
American Industrialization advanced rapidly with the support of 
the state. Western expansion provided new m arkets and new sources 
of fuel and other raw materials. The country was soon carpeted with 
railroads, and if the pre-Civil War political economic orientation of the 
country radiated South to North along the Mississippi River, it 
changed direction from E ast to West along the Transcontinental 
Railroad.
From Company to Corporation: The Transition to Steel Production 
The first stage in the development of the steel industry  in the 
United States began in  the post-Civil War period around 1865 and 
culminated in 1892 with the strike a t Homestead, Pennsylvania. This 
was the period of transition from iron production to the emergence of
18 There is a  parallel to be drawn between the political struggles 
represented by the debates over the English Com Laws in the first half 
of the nineteenth century and the American Civil War. Both repre­
sented political conflict between the interests of industrial capital 
against agrarian wealth, both were victories of Industrial over landed 
wealth, and both resulted in changes of direction of state policy in 
support of such interests. For Britain, where industrialization was well 
advanced in comparison to other capitalist nations, the repeal of the 
Com Laws supported a free trade policy and access of British capital to 
foreign m arkets and goods. In the United States, an  emerging indus­
trial capitalist nation which had to compete with Britain even over 
control of its  own domestic market. Union victory established the 
basis upon which industrialization could advance, especially in the 
form of protectionist policies (cf. Kaufman 1982, pp. xxvill and 18-20). 
One question th a t historians have debated is why, in the American 
case, the industrial-agrarian conflict led to war and not to a  legislative 
solution (Genovese 1965, pp. 5-10). My position on the issue Is not to 
ask  w hether or not the war was inevitable. Since the war did take 
place, it is more im portant for this study  to understand its conse­
quences for political economic development and its relation to the 
development of the iron and steel industry.
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the nation's steel industry. Set against the backdrop of the dism an­
tling of iron producing facilities was the  adoption of steel producing 
techniques such  as the replacement of the puddling furnace w ith the 
Bessemer converter; the complete adoption of coal fuel and steam  
power; the shift from an agricultural m arket to an  industrial one as 
companies rushed to supply steel rails for railroad expansion; and 
m ost importantly, represented by the defeat of the Amalgamated 
Association of Iron and Steel Workers a t  Homestead, the final tran s­
formation of the labor force from a  craft based and highly skilled one 
to an  industrial labor force. In basic steel production, this created a 
workforce of semi-skilled operatives subject to the political and  
economic costs of advancing mechanization. At the  beginning of the 
period, "Steelworkers had been the m anipulators of raw m aterials and 
molten metal. They became the tenders of machines" (Brody 1960, p. 
31).is
These trends in steel production were accompanied by other 
changes in the industiy. The steel industry  was developing away from 
local m arkets and scattered, decentralized production to regional and 
national m arkets and the growth of more centralized steel producing 
districts in and around places like Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Chicago, 
Illinois; Youngstown, Ohio; Wheeling, West Virginia; and Birmingham, 
Alabama. Geographic centralization and the urbanization wave of the
19 Brody (1960, p. 30) offers th is example:
Where mechanization w as perfected, the steel was rolled entire­
ly w ithout direct hum an contact. Visiting Englishmen saw  the 
operation of Pennsylvania rail mills conducted "practically by the 
agency of unseen hands." There w as "no labour a t all a t the  
rolls."
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late nineteenth century were taking place along side of corporate 
centralization.
As in  other industries, like railroads and oil, the corporate 
landscape of the steel Industry was changing from one in which small, 
independent, often single factory concerns predominated toward 
combinations characteristic of the post-Civil War merger movement.
In 1889, the precedent for such  development was set with the for­
m ation of the Illinois Steel Company, the first large-scale combination 
in the industry (cf. Jennings 1926, p. 449). By 1890, in  a  climate of 
mechanization and merger, the United States steel industry  surpassed 
th a t of Great Britain in output of basic steel.
From 1892 to 1901, the merger movement in American 
capitalism continued and in steel the great tru sts  of the industry were 
formed, culminating in 1901 with the formation of the United States 
Steel Corporation. United States Steel brought together under a 
single corporate adm inistration the largest steel tru sts  in basic, semi­
finished, and finished steel products. These included Carnegie Steel 
Company, Ltd.; the Moore Group of steel concerns; the Morgan Group, 
which held Illinois Steel among its other concerns; American Steel 
and  Wire Company, which a t one time controlled seventy-five percent 
of the nation's wire production, and Shelby Steel Tube Company, 
estim ated to have controlled ninety percent of the nation 's seamless 
steel tube capacity (Boore 1951, pp. 60-61).
Where these tru sts  had previously combined m any independent 
producers and gained control over aspects of the steel m arket, United 
S tates Steel combined tru sts  and contributed to the domination of the 
domestic economy by huge monopolies. Concerning the magnitude of
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the formation of United States Steel, according to Foster (1986, p. 
64),
It has been estim ated th a t between a  quarter and a  th ird  of all 
U.S. capital stock in manufacturing was directly affected by 
mergers taking place between 1898 and 1902 alone. The 
formation of U.S. Steel in 1901 fused 165 separate companies to 
create a monopolistic corporation controlling approximately 60 
percent of the total steel industry.
These trends in the concentration of the Industiy  continued through 
the first half of the twentieth centuiy. In addition to U.S. Steel, other 
corporate actors, such  as Jones and  Laughlin, Bethlehem Steel, and 
Republic Steel, rose to pre-eminence.
Each stage in  the growth and  expansion of the steel industry  in 
the post-Civil War period, each transition to wider and more consoli­
dated m arkets and to more centralized production by the Industry 's 
firms, was accompanied by rounds of factoiy closures. First, the 
transition from iron to steel production was accompanied by the 
abandonm ent of iron producing facilities. Jones and Laughlin, for 
example, closed 32 iron puddling furnaces by 1892. By the tu rn  of the 
century, the basic steel producing companies, all of which were 
producers of wrought iron in the 1800s, had completely ceased iron 
production (Brody 1960, p. 8).
Secondly, under the protection of the Morrill Tariff of 1861, the 
McKinley Tariff of 1891, and the Dingley Tariff of 1897, all of which 
represented the progressive severing of British steel producers from 
access to the American market, there was the exportation of British 
steel capital to the United States. This is especially true of the 1890s 
when the American tin  plate industry  grew using facilities imported 
from Wales and followed by migration of Welsh labor (Hogan 1971, p.
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351; and Knox 1944, p. 12). It Is against th is background, of Britain 
challenged in the 1880s and overtaken In the 1890s by "upstart" 
industrial capitalist nations like the United States and Germany, tha t 
British Marxist historians trace the decline of Britain as an  industrial 
power (Caslin 1987, p. 257). With special regard to its steel industiy, 
Hobsbawm (1968, p. 134) notes:
From then on Britain was one of a  group of great industrial 
powers, b u t not the leader of industrialization. Indeed, among 
the industrial powers it was the m ost sluggish and the  one 
which showed the m ost obvious signs of relative decline.
Thirdly, the merger movement in steel gained m om entum  in
the last years of the nineteenth century, leading toward the formation
of United States Steel Corporation in 1901. Between 1898 and  1900,
for example, eleven large mergers occurred involving alm ost two
hundred independent companies. During this period, steel companies
were no t only buying and building plants, bu t th is process also brought
plant shutdowns, dismantled facilities, and capital flight as  companies
sought to establish m arket control, organizational coordination, and
geographic centralization of production. An outstanding example of
this is found In the history of the Shelby Steel Tube Company prior to
its acquisition by United States Steel. Shelby pursued a policy of
acquiring the plants of competitors in order to sh u t them down,
dism antling facilities and transferring them  to other Shelby plants,
especially those located in  and around Toledo and Shelby, Ohio.
Fourthly, in the process of monopolization, United S tates Steel
Corporation closed or abandoned 33 plants from the time of its
formation to 1905. From 1910 to 1920 there was another wave of
closures undertaken by the corporation, among which was th e
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reduction from 34 to 26 p lants operated by USS's National Tube 
Company, and from 1923 to 1929, United States Steel dismantled or 
abandoned 30 of its plants. At the sam e time the corporation was 
undergoing vast external and  internal expansions and was consolidat­
ing its monopoly position, for example, between 1906 and 1911, 
United States Steel built its  huge steel producing facilities and the city 
itself of Gary, Indiana. Throughout th is  time sim ilar developments 
were taking place within other steel corporations. In general, the 
drive toward more centralized and expanded production w as 
accompanied a t each stage by a parallel drive to sh u t plants down. 
Abandonment and dismantling of plants historically have been part of 
corporate policies which seek to concentrate operations.
From Corporation to Conglomerate: The Decline of Steel Production 
in the United S tates and Post-World W ar II Developments
Domination of the United States economy by large, multidivi­
sional, nationally organized firms initiated the consolidation of the 
hegemonic position of the American steel industry in the world 
m arket, a  position which in the post-World War II years has been 
steadily eroding. The position of the domestic steel industry was 
established upon expanding internal m arkets for steel related to the 
needs of large-scale militarization, the growth of the automobile 
industry, massive urbanization, and, in general, expansion and intensi­
fication of consum er as well as industrial m arkets (Warren 1973, pp. 
214-230). The global position of American steel accompanied the 
growth of what W arren calls world steel districts. The United States 
steel industry grew into a  "world industry” in the wake of the great
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boom of post-war "world reconstruction," based on a  foundation of 
American capital. In 1945 a t the apex of its development, the 
American steel industry provided the world with 62 percent of its 
steel fWarren 1973, p. 9). From that year through the 1950s and 
1960s the position of American steel relative to world m arkets was 
declining. By 1968, the United States accounted for only 22.5 percent 
of the world's steel, and "In 1971 for the first time since 1890 her 
output of steel was exceeded by another nation when the U.S.S.R. 
pulled ahead" (Warren 1973, p. 10 and cf. Chirot 1986, p. 229).20
As the "moment of truth" for British steel came in the 1880s and 
1890s, the m ost critical years for the steel industry  of the United 
States came in the late 1960s and 1970s. It w as during th is time tha t 
the international position of the industry  began its m ost severe decline 
as it was Increasingly challenged by foreign producers, particularly 
Japan . Referring to these developments, Bluestone and Harrison's 
(1982, p. 5) description of the contemporary United States and  the 
current deindustrialization crisis is strikingly similar in tone and 
sentim ent to Hobsbawm's description, cited above, of the decline of 
Britain in the nineteenth and  early twentieth centuries:
[E]ven before the 1980s began, the American standard of living
no longer placed us first among the developed nations of the
20 During the 1950s, the development of Soviet steel industry was 
pushed by Stalin 's consideration of steel production as the basis for all 
further Soviet industrialization. Thus, steel was considered a  "leading 
link" in Soviet planning, an  industrial sector which commanded de­
velopmental priority even a t the expense of the development of other 
sectors (Clark 1956, pp. 267-277; Naum 1961, pp. 236-237; and 
Ellman 1979, p. 18). As Naum (1961, p. 237) sta tes about post-war 
Soviet Industrial development, "Everything else w as largely neglected- 
-the more so, the less it happened to be connected with steel."
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world...-Adding to the economic despair is America's apparent 
inability to compete in the global marketplace. O ur share of the 
world's m anufactured exports has fallen from more than  25 
percent to less than  17 percent in the last twenty years, and 
relative to our strongest competitors, it could easily be argued 
th a t we are being rapidly pushed to the sidelines.... [And] the 
num ber one product sold to America was passenger motor 
vehicles, followed by iron and steel plates....
An im portant organizational development th a t propelled the advance
of Japanese steel and the decline of American steel w as the m ost
significant merger in the whole history of global steel since the
establishm ent of United States Steel in 1901: the formation of Nippon
Steel Company.
Nippon Steel, which merged Yawata and Fuji Steel Companies, 
produced a corporation of unprecedented size in the steel industry.
In the  very first year of operation, 1970, the new company,
...produced more steel...than the United States Steel Corporation 
which up to th a t time, had  been the unchallenged leader in 
world steel production. U.S. Steel's output of crude steel in 
1970 was 31.4 million n e t tons, while Nippon Steel’s was 37 
million net tons (Hogan 1972, pp. 114-115).
Led by Nippon Steel, by 1971 Jap an  took the lead in productivity of
basic steel when it  surpassed the levels of ou tpu t of the European
Economic Community (EEC) and the United States (Warren 1975, p.
224; and Hirschmeier and Yui 1981, p. 302). In 1985, Japanese steel
ou tpu t was 105 million tons, 14 percent of the world's total output,
while the  United S tates accounted for 80 million tons or 11 percent of
the to ta l—this dispite the absence in Ja p an  of domestic sources of
iron, coal, or energy (Yachir 1988, p. 17).21
21 Acs (1984, p. 83) also points out tha t by 1980, the United States 
steel industry was third in ou tpu t behind the Soviet Union and Jap an  
in addition to lagging behind in combined output of the EEC. On this 
point, Yachir's (1988, pp. 17-18) study shows th a t in  1985, EEC
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As the United States emerged as a  leader among capitalist 
industrial nations in the 1870s to 1890s depression, the increasing 
importance of Jap an  among capitalist nations and as  a  steel producer 
took place in the context of the recession of the 1970s. In steel 
production, capacity across the developed capitalist countries has 
declined. In North America it has fallen from 156 million tons in 
1978 to its present level of 136 million tons and, it  is estimated, m ust 
be fu rther reduced to 125 million tons by 1993. Japanese steel 
capacity has fallen too, b u t not at quite the velocity. Through the 
1980s Japanese steel capacity went from 142 to 125 million tons and 
is expected to hold a t about this level for the immediate future. In 
general, capacity use across the developed world was about 58 percent 
(Yachir 1988, pp. 6-7).
Idled steel capacity has brought with it an  employment crisis 
throughout the developed capitalist world. As is true in  general of the 
curren t crisis in steel with regard to national production levels, export 
levels, degree of internationalization of production, and  level of 
capacity use, the employment crisis across the capitalist world varies 
in severity. Least affected has been Japan , whose labor force in the 
steel industry  declined 22 percent between 1973 and 1982. In the 
United S tates the steel labor force fell by 38 percent over the same 
period and  by 59 percent in the United Kingdom. Across the EEC 
some 800,000 jobs were lost—about one-third of those employed in 
steel production (Yachir 1988, p. 8). The unprecedented decline of
nations together accounted for 121 million tons of steel or 17 percent 
of the world's total.
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capacity use in  the world’s steel industry has made factory closure a 
problem across the world.
It is against these international developments and in a  business 
climate currently  explained by steel producers and com mentators 
alike in term s of the "challenge from foreign competition"22 th a t the 
present condition of the domestic steel industry  is discussed (cf. 
Mueller 1982, pp. 76-77; and Cox 1987, pp. 318-320). Paul Tiffany 
(1988, p. 3) summ arizes the condition of American steel production 
since the Second World War;
The American steel industry  has degenerated to an  apparent 
state of perm anent contraction. Steel mills, once surging with 
orders to be filled, are now forever shuttered in m any parts of 
the nation. Numerous companies have filed for bankruptcy, 
while o thers escaped by only the th innest of m argins.23 
Workers, once "idled," were then  perm anently eliminated, and
22 At the time th a t it was filing for bankruptcy in July  of 1986, LTV 
Corporation, the  nation's second largest steel producer, placed a full 
page advertisem ent in the New York Times in order to explain the 
need for the corporation's reorganization. The advertisem ent which 
appeared on 18 Ju ly  1986 quoted chairm an and chief executive officer 
Raymond A. Hay, who said "The weakness in  the steel and  energy 
sectors is due in large part, to an unprecedented and sustained level of 
imports over the  past several years which continues, virtually u n ­
abated. It is  estimated th a t direct and indirect imports account for 
about 51 percent of total steel consumption in the United States."
23 For example, in July 1986, LTV, the nation's second largest steel 
producer filed for bankruptcy and operation under Chapter 11 for a 
period of one and a  half to four years, citing the "slump" in  the U.S. 
steel industry as  its reason. Operating under protection of Chapter 11, 
LTV posted a  $610.4 million loss in  September of tha t year (Time. 28 
Ju ly  1986, and  New York Times. 11 September 1986). The condition 
of the United S tates steel Industry which drove the value of USX stock 
down also m ade this major domestic steel producer the object of a  
potential take-over led by "corporate raiders" Carl Ichan and T. Boone 
Pickens, who had  been buying up shares of USX stock in  September 
and October of 1986 (Wall S treet Journal. 22 September 1986; New 
York Times. 2 October 1986; and Prokesch New York Tim es. 26 
Septem ber 1986).
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steel imports displaced an ever larger share of the domestic 
m arket.
Several major interrelated trends can be more specifically identified 
concerning the present stage of development of the American steel 
industry  a t home in the post-war period including the conglomeration 
and diversification movement representing the flight of domestic steel 
producers from steel production, and  the rise of decentralized, 
nonunionized, smaller scale specialty steel producers.
The basic structure of the United States steel industry 
remained, for the most, part unchanged from the time of the 
formation of the United States Steel Corporation until the opening of 
the 1960s (Hogan 1972, p. 11). From that time, the direction of steel 
industry  development w as toward concentration of control over steel 
production through the acquisition of steel firms engaged in similar 
processes and steel firms engaged in  processes located on longer 
chains of production. In other words, the domestic steel industry  
grew largely through intraindustry acquisitions—steel firms acquiring 
the properly of other steel firms.
Changes in the corporate structu re of the steel industry  were 
precipitated by a  developing condition where the  requirem ents of 
profitable steel mill investm ent have become more costly and lower in 
ra te  of return. Such is the case in the  climate of world steel 
production b u t more so in the United States. Describing the condition 
of "frozen Investment in fixed steel capital," which has been steadily 
decreasing since about 1970, Yachir (1988, pp. 6-7) states:
From 1975 the figure of $US5.7 billion of investment (in $US 
1975) for the m ain capitalist countries taken as a  whole m ust be 
appreciated in relation to the cost of a  single big steel plant.
The investm ent expenditures of the US, Jap an , and the EEC
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would in 1978 hardly finance the building of two steel p lants of 
an  average size! Investment in Western steel industry is now 
limited to modernization and capitalist rationalization of 
production. The age of accum ulation in the steel Industry is 
definitely over in the big capitalist countries.
This condition is associated with a  major reorganization movement in 
the steel industry. In the United States th is has been taking the form 
of conglomerate diversification or the retrea t of American firms from 
production of basic steel, the shift of capital from traditional leaders in 
the steel industry from steel production to unrelated industries, in tra­
industry mergers and  take-overs of steel firms by other conglomerates. 
Steel firms are both taking over and being taken over by unrelated 
concerns.
The extent of diversification is illustrated by these examples 
(Hogan 1972, pp. 12-14):
• In 1964, United S tates Steel Corporation moved into the chemical 
Industry by buying the assets of Industrial Chemical and Protective 
Coating Division of Pittsburgh Chemical Company. In 1966 United 
States Steel formed its  USS Chemicals Division, and in  1969 the 
Corporation became a  producer of plastics with its acquisition of 
General American Transportation Corporation. United States Steel 
also undertook ventures In titanium , engineering, consulting, and  real 
estate.
• At about the sam e time, Bethlehem Steel Corporation acquired 
Kusan, a  producer of plastic parts, and an  eighty percent share of 
Multicon, a  company producing houses.
• In 1968 National Steel Corporation entered alum inum  production 
with an  investm ent of more th an  $100 million. Through the
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acquisition of alum inum  concerns National pu t together a  fully 
integrated alum inum  operation from smelting to distribution.
• In 1969 Republic Steel organized Republic Steel Enterprises, Inc., a 
wholly owned subsidiary which brought Republic Steel into real estate 
and housing. Similar developments took place in Inland Steel 
Corporation and Armco, the la tte r explaining the drive to diversify for 
"the maximum benefit of its shareholders" (Hogan 1972, p. 14).24
The symbolic if not the actual height of the diversification 
movement affecting the steel industry  was reached in 1986 when 
United States Steel Corporation changed its name from USS to USX.
In the newly reorganized holding company, steel and related produc­
tion, organized in a  corporate subunit which retains the  name U.S.S., 
accounts for only 31 percent of corporate interests.25 U.S.S. division 
stands among three other subdivisions of USX including M arathon Oil 
Company, Texas Oil and Gas Corporation, and U.S. Diversified Group, 
the la tter of which is involved in  chemicals, engineering, and real 
estate (Hicks, New York Times. 9 Jiffy 1986). The recent reorgani­
zation resulting in the formation of USX is the culmination of a  move­
ment in the steel industry to direct investments away from steel and  
toward the  production of other materials in  order to establish flexi­
bility and  control over a variety of areas. The most im portant consid­
eration in  investment, defined by  the dem ands of capital accumulation, 
is not the survival of a  particular industry or nation b u t the survival and
24 Hogan is quoting a  letter from the president and chairm an of Armco 
which accompanied the corporation's 1966 Annual Report.
25 M arquis (1984, p. 25) reports tha t in 1984, U.S. Steel's sales of 
steel accounted for only thirty-four percent of all of its  revenues.
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advancem ent of capital. For example, conventional wisdom accounts 
for the decline of the steel industry explaining tha t sh u t down of steel 
plants is an  outcome of product substitution, e.g., th a t "aluminum, 
plastic, and other material...have substitu ted for the product" (Time 23 
Ju n e  1986). But, steel corporations are no t the passive victims of 
substitution. At a  1969 press conference, Edgar Speer, then 
ascending to the presidency of United States Steel Corporation, was 
asked, "What does U.S. Steel intend to do about the use of plastics by 
the automobile industry?" He replied, "Go into the plastics business" 
(Hogan 1972, p. 13).
Accompanying diversification among steel producers, beginning 
in the 1960s, was an  "abrupt outburst of another form of corporate 
change—the steel takeover" (Hogan 1972, p. 16). Assets of steel 
companies were increasingly being taken over by other conglomerates. 
At the height of th is movement in 1968, five out of the top 20 steel 
producers were taken over by conglomerates. Included among these 
were Lykes Corporation’s takeover of the nation's eighth largest steel 
maker, Youngstown Sheet and Tube, and Ling-Temco-Vought's (LTV) 
takeover of Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation, followed in 1984 by 
LTV's takeover of Republic Steel (Hogan 1972, p. 17; B uss and Red- 
bum  1983, p. 20; and Time. 28 Ju ly  1988).
Part of the trend toward the conglomeration of the  traditional 
integrated steel producers was the decline of their role in  the 
domestic production of steel. Along with the movements to diversify 
and toward corporate takeover, Adams and Mueller (1986, p. 83) 
state:
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Major Japanese steel producers have acquired equity shares in 
several integrated American steel firms [and] jo in t ventures 
[between domestic and foreign firms] have been organized to 
build and operate new steel installations.
In other words, "The geographic area of the United S tates is...not
necessarily synonymous with the ’home m arket’ of the American steel
industry" (Adams and Mueller, 1986, p. 77). This refers to an old
battle. In 1865, the geographic area of the  United S tates also w as not
synonymous with the American home m arket, and from the end of the
Civil War through the second half of the nineteenth century American
iron and steel producers were engaged in  a  struggle w ith British steel
capital over control of the American m arket in the period of the
industry 's formation. Presently, in the period of its decline, there is
an  ongoing increase in the proportion of integrated steel products
supplied by foreign producers (Adams and Mueller, 1986, p. 79).
Yet American steel producers are no t to be thought of as the
passive victims of parasitical foreign competition. One of the
alternatives considered by USX in the attem pt to head off a  takeover
and increase the value of its  stock was to look for a  foreign buyer for
its steel making division. Prokesch (New York Times. 26 September
1986) wrote:
Potential purchasers could come from Jap an  or South Korea.
But m ost Japanese steelmakers already have partners in the 
United States....And, the Koreans...seem committed to 
developing their domestic steelmaking capacity ra th e r than  
making foreign acquisitions.
At the same time tha t these developments were taking place, the
United States government finalized a  trade agreement w ith Europe
outlining a  program involving importation of European produced steel
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and steel products In exchange for more open access of U.S. 
producers to European m arkets for the sale of citrus fruit.
With respect to foreign m arkets and in  relation to foreign steel 
producers, such  is the legacy of the United States steel industry 
subsequent to the formation of the United S tates Steel Corporation. 
Following World War I, opportunities were seen by m any in the steel 
industry, including Elbert Gary, to secure a  place in foreign m arkets by 
supplying the steel needs of the world's war-torn economies. Tiffany 
(1988, p. 10) states:
Operational managers of USS...sought to expand their foreign 
business by exploiting the void in European production caused 
by the destruction of capacity during the war. This objective 
came Into conflict, however, with American investm ent bankers 
who foresaw great opportunities in  Europe through profits th a t 
could be secured from underwriting loans to reconstruct 
European industry...."Should the American steel industry let the 
foreign steel producers take away its world markets?" asked one 
banker bluntly in 1927. "It should," he answered.
With a sim ilar approach taken in the rebuilding of the steel industry
following World War II, finance profits were contingent upon the
success of th e  steel industries of other nations In which bankers were
invested.
This m eant tha t American steel producers were to avoid im ped­
ing European and Aslan steel production if loans were to be repaid 
(Tiffany 1988, pp. 10 and 168-169).26 Tiffany's overall argument.
26 For example, as  Chirot (1986, pp. 194-203) comments, the Mar­
shall Plan of 1948 was designed to provide the capital to be invested 
in  European industry  in order to produce exports, in  tu rn , in order to 
pay for American imports so th a t between 1945 and 1955, $38 billion 
dollars in loans and grants were provided for the industrial develop­
m ent of other nations, seventy-five percent of which went to Ja p an  
and  Europe. The Bretton Woods Agreement four years earlier estab­
lished United States currency as world currency and ushered in th e  
so-called Pax Americana. This was the political basis upon which the
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based on his account of post-war steel industry  development, is th a t 
the curren t condition of the steel industry is the outcome of destruc­
tive and wrong decisions which have led to its decline domestically. 
The purpose he gives for writing the  book is the hope th a t the lessons 
of the steel industry since 1945 will help u s  to avoid sim ilar mistakes 
in other industries (Tiffany 1988, p. 190). There is no denying the 
extent to which current social conditions are outcomes of decisions 
made and actions taken in the past. What he  seems to neglect, 
however, is the criteria which govern or a t least constrain decision­
making. Overall, such criteria have less to do with the dem ands of 
industrial development and more to do with the historical necessity in 
a  capitalist world-system to accum ulate wealth. While th e  decisions to 
which he refers may have run  counter to the development of the steel 
industry, they may have made more sense in the context of an 
economy dominated by finance capital. It m ust be borne in mind, for 
example, th a t U.S.S. was a creation of finance capital, an  invention of 
banking interests led by J.P. Morgan. To Tiffany, the decisions made 
concerning the nation's steel industry  with respect to foreign 
m arkets—the decision to accumulate wealth In the form of interest on 
loans to rebuild industries of other nations—w as the moral equivalent 
of the Trojans allowing the wooden horse w ithin their walls, knowing
United S tates established itself as an  exporter of finance as  opposed to 
industrial capital.
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full well It would lead to their downfall.27 Thus, Tiffany (1988, p. 11) 
concludes:
The domestic steel industry 's p lans for global hegemony were 
th u s dashed by the very force th a t brought it  to life: th e  nation's 
powerful private investm ent banking community. The 
steelm akers, for all their supposed power an d  influence, in fact 
were the subordinate actors in the drama.
Along with all of these  changes affecting large steel companies,
the "form" of domestic steel production is shifting from a  m arket
dominated by the traditional large, integrated firm s to the rise of
"mini-mills" and, to a lesser extent, th a t of the so-called specialty steel
producers. This growth h a s  been accompanied by the geographic shift
from a  relatively high wage to a lower wage, generally nonunionized
labor force (Agnew 1987, p. 167; Cox 1987, pp. 318-320; Adams and
Mueller 1986; Acs 1984, p. 98; B arnett and Schorch 1983, pp. 83-
103; Sabel 1982, pp. 204-205; and Hogan 1972, p. 11). The impact of
27 Reading Tiffany's account of the fall of the American steel industry, 
with his em phasis on m istakes and bad  decision making, reminded 
me of Barbara W. Tuchm an's (1984) work, The March of Folly: From 
Troy to Vietnam. It too is a  history of mistakes, although w ith respect 
to military history. To Tuchman, the imagery of the  Trojan horse as It 
h as come down to u s in folklore and legend is striking and provides 
her with the central organizing concept of her survey of war. "The 
episode of the Horse exemplifies policy pursued contrary to self- 
interest—in the face of urgent warning and feasible alternative" (Tuch­
m an 1984, p. 37). With respect to his discussion of the relationship 
between finance capital and domestic steelm akers, it  is a m etaphor 
with which I th ink  Tiffany would agree and a type of which pervades 
his work. But, a s  Tuchm an (1984. p. 36) recognized, in the tale of the 
Horse, the gods are the ultim ate motivator^, so m u s t it be remem­
bered tha t business decisions are made ultimately with reference to 
the constraints and  within the param eters of the logic of capital 
accumulation, so th a t the "downfall" of an  industry cannot be explained 
w ith reference to decision making alone.
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these non-integrated producers on the conglomerate sector of the 
industry is illustrated in this example from Acs (1984, p. 101):
The Raritan River Company in  Perth Amboy, New Jersey, 
reopened in 1980, has a capacity of 800,000 tons of finished 
steel per year. The plant produces high quality wire rod. It is 
one of the m ost technologically advanced of the new mini-mills. 
The firm produces its product for the automobile Industry and 
sells in over 30 states a t a  cost of about 300 dollars per ton. The 
Raritan River firm was instrum ental in forcing U.S. Steel out of 
the wire rod business. In 1983, U.S. Steel closed about 20 per 
cent of its capacity and took a  1.2 billion dollar write-off.
The mini-mills are, therefore, offering a new source of domestic
competition to the large scale integrated corporations and have been
described as the "dynamic component of an otherwise sick steel
industry in  the United States" (Cox 1987, p. 333).
The mini-mills are the equivalent of the "high-tech" sector of
the steel industry, able to utilize advanced technology on a  smaller
scale to produce for specially m arkets with cheaper materials; e.g., the
ferrous inpu t of mini-mills is largely scrap steel a s  opposed to iron ore
(cf. Agnew 1987, p. 167). Also, in m any ways, the  rise of the mini-
mills represents a  reversion to an  earlier stage of steel industry
development to the extent that they are located close to local markets
(and so are not tied to old steel centers) and therefore are highly
geographically decentralized. The m ost im portant advantage of the
mini-mills is found in the political flexibility from the point of view of
employers, to avoid unionized workforces and freedom from w hat has
become the weight of large organization. Cox (1987, p. 333) explains:
Large scale no longer necessarily has economic advantage and 
may have the competitive disadvantage of rigidity, a rigidity
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derived both from heavy investment in  a  technology th a t  m ust be 
amortized28 over a  longer time and from bureaucratic rules....
Domestically, mini-mills are capturing increasingly large m arkets from 
the integrated producers who are themselves "adopting som e of their 
features" (Cox 1987, p. 333). It is estimated th a t by about 1991, mini- 
mills, which currently account for 18 to 20 percent of dom estic steel 
production, will account for about 30 percent of the steel produced in 
the United States, and by the end of the century they will account for 
about forty percent of total national steel production (Time 1986, 23 
Ju n e , and Hicks, New York Times. 31 Ju ly  1986).
Changes in the domestic steel industry  of the United S tates re­
flect a  wider crisis in world capitalism, particularly in steel production 
which has had  an  impact on all developed capitalist nations. Yachir 
(1988, p. 5) summarizes the main points of th is crisis in general and 
in its specific effect on the steel Industry of the United S tates.
In 1975, for the first time since the Second World War, the 
production of steel fell spectacularly in all the main capitalist 
countries. The phenomenon first appeared in line w ith the 
cyclical development of the steel industry  whose expansion 
since 1950, had shown quite regular fluctuations. However, it 
soon became obvious th a t this crisis w as not like the others.
The fall in production, which was striking in Its extent, was only
28 Amortization refers to the rate of renewal of fixed capital or the 
am ount of value th a t m ust be accumulated in order to renew fixed 
capital. In modem, capital intensive, highly centralized capitalism. 
This means th a t if the rate of market expansion is low or m arkets me 
shrinking or rem ain constant over a  given period of time, and  
increasingly large investments in fixed capital are being m ade, then 
the  period over which th a t capital m ust be amortized expands. This 
problem of accumulation is especially acute w hen combined w ith the 
complementary tendency for the tu rn  over tim e of fixed capital to 
shorten. This forms an im portant contradiction of "late capitalism." 
th e  tendency toward the sim ultaneous increase in investm ent in fixed 
capital, amortization, and velocity of tu rn  over time of fixed capital 
(Mandel 1978, pp. 230-231).
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the firs t sign of a  series of troubles which affected employment, 
investm ent, m arkets, prices and profits. World-wide, the crisis 
struck all the steel industries of the developed capitalist world 
a t the sam e time, although with a  differentiated impact. All of 
this reflected a situation  much more complex th an  a  mere 
conjunctural dow nturn in their economies.
Of the steel industries of the developed capitalist countries, th a t 
of the United States has been  most seriously affected. The combined 
steel capacities of the United States, the EEC, and Ja p an  fell between 
1973 and 1975 from 400 to 330 million tons. In 1985, United States 
steel ou tpu t had  decreased 35 percent compared to the 1979 level, 
th a t of the EEC, by 15 percent, and th a t of Jap an  by 6 percent (Yachir 
1988, p. 6). So, even Jap an , considered to be the up-and-coming cap­
italist nation and  a  leader in  world steel production and technology, 
h as not been unaffected. An important reason for these developments 
in  the world steel industry have been attributed  to the emergence of 
new producing countries in  socialist and Third World nations contrib­
uting to the shrinkage of international m arkets and access to  high 
quality ores. For example, the  share of the Third World steel pro­
ducers in world production increased from 1.6 percent in  1955 to 5 
percent in 1974 and 10 percent in 1985, a s  the economic crisis of 
the 1970s "accelerated the international redistribution of production" 
away from the United S tates and toward Ja p an  and other nations 
(Yachir 1988, pp. 18-19; and  Amin 1988, pp. 1-2).29
29 Currently, Socialist countries, primarily the Soviet Union and 
People’s Republic of China, together account for 38.1 percent of the 
total volume of world steel production. The U.S., EEC, and  Jap an  
account for 41 percent and  other advanced capitalist nations account 
for an additional 9 percent (Yachir 1988, p. 18). This m eans tha t 
participation in  world steel production is  split fairly evenly between all 
advanced capitalist nations and the rest of the world, w ith the former 
accounting for a  total of 50 percent and th e  latter 48.1 percent of 
global steel production.
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The leveling of competitive conditions between developed and 
other capitalist nations has led to the  adoption by the enterprises in  
the capitalist world of relocation programs directed a t Investment, 
especially In the Third World where cheap labor forces and cheap 
energy and other resources can be utilized (Amin 1988, pp. 1-2). This 
investm ent pattern in steel as in other industries has served to shift 
capacity from and develop the Industry in other countries according to 
a  pattern which involves the shut-down of plants In traditional 
producing areas and the opening of new ones (Frank 1980, pp. 81 and 
153).
The development of the steel industry in  the Third World has 
been generally consistent with the model of dependent Industrializa­
tion offered by Evans (1979) and Bom schier (1981), th a t is, industri­
alization conforming for the most p a rt to a nation 's "dependent inte­
gration into the world capitalist system ” (Amin 1988, p. I).30 In this 
definition, dependence stands as a  "situation in which the rate and 
direction of capital accumulation are externally conditioned" (Evans 
1979, p. 27). With special regard to the steel industry, establishm ent 
of sta te-run  enterprises In nations like Brazil, Chile, and Argentina, 
among w hat Amin (1988, p. 2) calls "semi-industrialized" countries, 
were able to assert themselves as new  competitors of m ultinational 
concerns of the core (Evans, 1979, p. 45).
30 Although certainly not suggested by many of the  adherents of this 
view, the choice of die word dependency is probably poor and should 
not suggest th a t Third World nations are powerless to exercise influ­
ence over the course of their own development. The power of the 
First World, while considerable, is no t absolute—as history bears out.
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Overall, the position of Jap an  as the leader among capitalist 
nations with respect to world, including Third World, steel m arkets, 
rests  on its ability to expand exports, create m arkets for them, and 
export production. This is accompanied by a  parallel inability of 
American producers to do so (Yachir 1988, p. 19). For example, with 
respect to one of the traditional U.S. markets of Latin America, the 
ideology of desenvolvimentismo in Brazil, a  form of "economic 
nationalism," accompanied political nationalism and was translated 
into policy w hich Increased the role of the state in  th a t nation 's indus­
trialization and development in order to "dis-involve" foreign con­
cerns.31 This industrialization policy was based upon the substitution 
of foreign im ports for domestically produced consum er and industrial 
goods. Here, industrialization is bolstered by state-supported protec­
tionist barriers, government programs involving the shift of income 
away from export consumption to domestic consum ption, investm ent 
in Infrastructure, and the established position of the state as an agent 
of foreign investment. All of these things combined to lim it the role of 
foreign determination of the Brazilian economy. As Cardoso and 
Faletto (1979, p. 129) observe, "This was the time of national steel 
foundries, oil refineries, and electrical power stations." By 1964, the 
Brazilian public sector controlled m ost of the steel Industry and was a 
prim ary exporter of iron ore which undercu t the  Influence of Ameri­
31 The particular case of Brazil, it could be argued, dem onstrates what 
Chirot (1986, p. 195) following Block (1977, pp. 70-118) calls the 
assertion by "’national capitalist'" forces of a right wing "nationalist 
closure" of the domestic economy which "promised a safer economic 
environment free from international, and particularly American, 
competition" (Chirot 1986, p. 195).
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can companies like the United States Steel Corporation (Evans 1979, 
pp. 33 and 252-253; and Cardoso and Faletto 1979, p. 139). Thus, the 
relationship between United States steel producers to certain nations 
of the Third World changed in the post-war period as nations like 
Brazil were able, as Evans (1979, p. 81) states, to "internalize" aspects 
of its manufacturing. Where American interests controlled three-fifths 
of all direct investments in Brazil in the immediate post-war period, 
this share has been steadily declining a t the same time tha t the share 
of Jap an  and the European countries has been expanding in in terna­
tional m arkets (Evans 1979, p. 82).
Not only did the relationship between United States steel 
producers and Third World m arkets change, b u t so did their situation 
with respect to Europe and Japan .
From the late fifties onwards...it became clear th a t North Ameri­
can firms were no longer competing so m uch with a  declining 
British empire as with a  rising combination of Japanese,
German, and other European firms (Evans 1979, p. 82).
In the early 1960s, the strategy of Increasing geographic diversifi­
cation by expanding U.S.-owned steel manufacturing in Europe was 
abandoned owing to the high costs necessary for capital intensive 
investment (Tiffany 1988, pp. 180-181). In 1960 Benjamin Fairless, 
speaking on behalf of the American Iron and Steel Institute, stated, 
"We can 't very well scrap our existing plants, representing an  invest­
m ent of m any billions of dollars, and spend more billions to build new 
plants overseas’" (Tiffany 1988, p. 181). Apparently, though, they 
could scrap p lan ts in order to pursue more secure investments in  oil, 
chemicals, plastics, aluminum, real estate, insurance, etc. Therefore, 
the strategy of corporate development among the steel companies was
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product diversification and conglomeration as opposed to geographic 
diversification of steel production.
Related to all of these developments in  the steel industry of the 
United States—diversification, takeover, loss of or surrender of the 
domestic steel m arket, and the rise of mini-mills—is the "deindus­
trialization wave" of the 1970s, the progressive disinvestm ent in  and 
dismantling of the nation's basic capacity to produce. Of these 
changes, Hans Mueller (1982, pp. 76-77) states:
In the late 1970s...several of the large [steel firms] launched a 
drive to eliminate some of their structu ral deficiencies, involving 
a t times major surgery on the substance of their companies. The 
task  was facilitated by the ease with which public reaction to 
p lant closures could be deflected against Imports.
It is in light of such streamlining operations, as Mueller calls them, 
th a t current social scientific emphasis on the Issue of factory closures 
arises, as does the concept of deindustrialization in an  attem pt to ex­
plain them in the post-World War II historical context. At the heart of 
both the deindustrialization process, as it is currently described, and 
th is  drive to eliminate structural deficiencies through conglomeration 
is the closure of factories. For example, of United S tates Steel Corpo­
ration 's diversification into nonsteel areas, Bluestone and Harrison 
(1982, p. 4) state:
In Pittsburgh, the U.S. Steel Corporation called a  press confer­
ence [in 1970] to announce th a t it would perm anently close 
down fourteen mills in eight states (principally in Pennsylvania 
and Ohio) within the year, thus laying off over 13,000 workers.
Its reward was an  $850 million tax  break from the federal 
government, which it la ter pu t toward the down paym ent on the 
purchase of M arathon oil.
Overall, in the seven-year period from 1979 to its reorganization as
USX, United States Steel Corporation alone closed "more than  150 of
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Its plants and facilities...and trimmed more than  50,000 workers from 
its steel force" (Hicks. New York Times. 9 Ju ly  1986).32 Factory 
closures have always been part of the process of capitalist industrial 
development, and in order to understand them  fully they m ust be 
studied historically.
Conclusions
The deindustrialization view, particularly th a t developed by 
Bluestone and Harrison, is central to contemporary sociological work 
aimed a t explaining the direction of economic development since the 
Second World War. But the deindustrialization thesis has come under 
a ttack  from both the left and the right. Conservatives call the concept 
of deindustrialization mythical, descriptive of a  nonexistent process 
which in actuality is nothing more than  the normal operation of the 
m echanism s of a  dynamic, progressive, and ultimately benevolent 
economy (cf. McKenzie 1984c, p. 11-27). The em phasis in the dein­
dustrialization literature upon the social costs of factory closures—their 
dislocating and destructive influence upon individuals, communities, 
regions, and nations—speaks to this criticism by moving away from the 
conservative tendency to trea t workers as mere factors of production 
subject to "adjustment costs." Adjustment costs become a  m uch more 
serious issue when they involve alcoholism, suicide, the lose of homes, 
the  loss of security, erosion of community tax  base, and other 
problem s associated with m ass unemployment.
32 United S tates Steel Corporation once employed about 50,000 
workers in the Monongahela Valley alone. By 1986, employment had  
dropped to only 5,100 (Marquis 1986, p. 23).
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From the left, the internal logic of the deindustrialization thesis 
is questioned. Deindustrialization is held to refer to concrete social 
processes, b u t also to mystify them  (di Leonardo 1985, pp. 237-257; 
and Houston 1984, pp. 257-260). In other words, Bluestone and 
Harrison's conclusions are limited to the im pacts of the current wave 
of disinvestm ent characteristic of post-1945 economic developments, 
b u t it is only implicitly th a t the meaning of such  developments are 
discussed in relation to the process of capitalist production and 
accum ulation itself—its meaning in term s of class and m arket rela­
tions. Factory closures, for example, are adequately and successfully 
placed within the context of the post-war rise of mergers and con­
glomeration, b u t these in tu rn  are not placed within the context of the 
historical process of capital accumulation itself. Of fundam ental imp­
ortance here is the tendency to submerge the "fundamental reality of 
class" by discussing factory closures primarily as a problem of unem­
ployment (Houston 1984, p. 259). As Houston (1984, p. 259) states:
[Bluestone and Harrison's] analysis depends upon how capital is 
accumulating. If the process of capital accumulation results in 
stable high paying jobs as in  the 1950s and 1960s then  it's 
acceptable. But if deindustrialization in  the 1970s and 1980s 
leads to a  loss of these Jobs, then it is not. This kind of 
nationalistic perspective is limited and  m ust be a t  least 
questioned.
By referring to the deindustrialization thesis as a nationalistic per­
spective, Houston is implying th a t its problems stem from a  limitation 
of scope associated with the reality of capitalism as a  world-system. 
This is a  criticism with which di Leonardo (1985, p. 243) would agree.
In this work I contend also tha t ideas concerning deindustriali­
zation are limited in historical scope, so th a t the best way to question
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the concept of deindustrialization is to examine the  factory closure not 
merely as a  contemporary social problem b u t as an  historical problem. 
As Zeitlin (1984, p. 363) argues, in order to understand any social 
phenom enon it m ust be studied historically because historical study 
allows u s  to observe the "alternations" of society. By limiting its 
analysis primarily to domestic developments since 1945, the current 
analysis of deindustrialization exhibits a  kind of historical "tunnel 
vision." By analyzing factory closures, central to the deindustrialization 
thesis, in the alternation between industrial growth and Industrial 
decline, their relation to specific processes of industrial development 
can be seen to be less im portant and the ir role in the  general process 
of the creation and recreation of capitalist society specified. In so 
doing an  explanation of factory closures can  be developed which 
recognizes th a t they are characteristic of both industrial growth and 
industrial decline th a t does not necessitate the association of such  
growth with social stability. Industrial growth need no t imply the 
acceptability of capital accumulation.
The essential purpose of a  socio-historical approach to any 
aspect of social life is to clarify the connection between structure, 
process, and event. Such an  approach lends itself to analysis of the 
meaning or significance of factory closures which are concrete events 
held in current sociological analyses to constitute the  process of 
deindustrialization, and which I argue are better placed within the 
process of capitalist reproduction. In essence, th is work is directed a t 
analyzing w hat it is about the factory closure tha t m akes capitalist 
society possible. As "event is the  empirical form of system" (Sahlins 
1985, p. 153), the factory closure, as particular event, is an empirical
form or concrete expression of the relations and processes of 
capitalism.
CHAPTER III
IRON, STEEL, AND THE 'COMING OF AGE' OF U.S. CAPITALISM 
IN THE POST-CIVIL WAR PERIOD: 1865-1892
Introduction
The events of the period after the end of the Civil War In the 
United States, the post-1865 era through the 1890s, were crucial 
both In the general development of American capitalism and particu­
larly In the domestic iron and steel industry. It was a crucial period 
because it was then tha t American capitalism became genuinely 
industrial, dominated by a  capitalist class whose wealth was industrial 
wealth, characterized by a  working class whose labor power, formerly 
rooted in craft, was utilized In the overseeing of machines; and it was 
then th a t the steel industry, upon the basis of the destruction of iron 
m anufacture, emerged as a  genuine industry. Internationally, it was 
also a crucial period since the years 1873-1895 were those of "Great 
Depression" in the world economy (Beaud 1983, pp. 117-144). The 
development of the steel industry domestically can be linked to the 
cauldron of events and processes unfolding a t this time on the world 
stage, especially those concerned with the decline of British 
hegemony during this "age of imperialism." The years of the first 
major development of the domestic steel industry, roughly from the 
end of the Civil War In 1865 to the Homestead Strike of 1892, 
correspond to those of th is "Great Depression" of the second half of 
the nineteenth century and form the focus of th is chapter.
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Each a t different points in history, the industrialization of the 
United S tates and its  deindustrialization are related to w hat Chase- 
Dunn (1978, p. 110) identifies as a  tendency for capitalism, by virtue 
of its internal logic, to develop from "unicentric" (hegemony) to 
"multicentric" (equalization) control of m arkets.1 Capitalism, then, is 
predisposed to crises of accum ulation associated with the leveling of 
competitive advantages. The current decline of the American steel 
industry, the shift of investment out of steel production and into other 
endeavors, along w ith resu ltan t factory closures comprising the 
"deindustrialization wave," are understood w ithin the context of the 
recession of the 1970s and 1980s. This crisis, generalized across the 
major world capitalist powers, affected each differently. So, Japan , for 
example, affected relatively less severely than  the United States, has 
risen to pre-eminence as a world steel producer as the hegemonic 
position of the U.S. was and is steadily eroded. In the second half of 
the nineteenth century, the United States rose to pre-eminence as a 
capitalist power and as a  steel-producing power as  well during a 
period of global crisis which also had differential effects on the world 
capitalist "old guard," such as Great Britain and France, and global 
"newcomers" such as the United States and Germany (cf. Chirot 1986, 
p. 244). Thus, the period of British decline w as a t the same time the 
period w hen the United States came into its own as a significant.
1 The description of the distribution of competitive advantages as 
"unicentric" and "multicentric" is relevant to a  variety of contexts 
within which capitalist competition takes place—within the world- 
system between capitalist nation-states, between firms acting on the 
international level, within nations between regions, and between firms 
with each other.
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industrial capitalist power in the world a rena  (rising to m eet Britain 
on its way down). As Chlrot (1986, p. 203) observes, "as in  the case of 
the British in the nineteenth century, [the United States] h as  been 
unable to prevent serious economic rivals from growing." Not only 
could the United States not prevent economic rivals from growing, b u t 
it pursued a  trajectory of accumulation w hich involved investm ent in 
the industrial growth of other capitalist nations.
Beaud's (1983, p. 121) assessm ent of the Great Depression of 
the 1873-1895 period provides a  general guide for explaining and 
analyzing the conditions within which the U.S. iron and steel industry 
developed. His identification of im portant factors contributing to the 
crisis provides the "sign posts" along which the historical narrative of 
iron and steel development can be presented. Beaud argues th a t the 
1873-1895 depression, like other capitalist crises, "result from the 
Interaction of four fundam ental contradictions.” These include, in his 
terms: (1) "the contradiction between labor and capital, th a t is, 
concretely, between capitalist companies and  the working classes"— 
attention to which is fundam ental in any analysis of capitalist proc­
esses; (2) "the contradiction between capitalists (either in the  same 
sector or between sectors)," where competition both conditions and is 
conditioned by the extent and intensity of class conflict; (3) "the 
contradiction between national capitalisms," a s  an aspect of capitalist 
competition, between nationally defined segm ents of the capitalist 
class, over the establishm ent of markets for labor and other commodi­
ties; and (4) "the competition between dom inant capitalism s and 
dominated peoples, countries, and regions," again as an  aspect of the 
process of m arket and class formation (Beaud 1983, p. 121). In
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essence, the dynamics of class conflict, capitalist competition both 
domestically and Internationally, and imperialism are fundamentally 
im portant to understanding and discussing any aspect of capitalist 
development.
It is with reference to this scheme th a t the development of the 
steel industry  and the destruction of iron production in the  United 
States will be approached. Therefore, the following issues, particularly 
im portant to the emergence of the domestic steel industry, are em­
phasized: (1) the events surrounding the labor conflict a t Homestead, 
Pennsylvania; (2) the relationship between the iron and steel industry 
and the railroads and owners of steel capital with each other; (3) the 
impact of post-Civil War developments upon the supersession of the 
United States over Britain as an industrial capitalist power; and (4) the 
struggle between American and British capitalists over control of the 
United S tates market. Here, state support for the domestic develop­
ment of industrial capital in the form of a program of protectionism is 
understood as a  "direct analogue" of imperialism, especially with ref­
erence to Britain's scram ble for foreign m arkets (Chirot 1986, p. 85).
Of all of these issues, developments on the front between capital 
and labor are most important. Beaud (1983, p. 121) points to  the 
relationship between the crisis of 1873-1895 and the intensified 
resistance of workers to the conditions of capitalist production.
During th is period internationally, "the working classes organized and 
asserted themselves and  by the end of the period had a discernible 
effect in the functioning of national capitalisms." It was the period of 
"affirmation of the working classes" where the "capitalist bourgeoisie 
had to contend with a  working class which was increasingly conscious
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of its own position...and finally imposed a  new balance of forces"
(Beaud 1983, p 125).
In the United States, these international trends in the organiza­
tion of the working class took form in the  establishm ent of various 
workers' political organizations, the trades union movement, and 
strikes which Jerem y Brecher calls the "Great Upheaval" of 1877. 
Brecher (1972, pp. xxiv-1) describes the post-Civil War depression in 
these term s:
Depressions had been a  regular feature of capitalist society since 
its  start. B u t by 1877, depression had  lasted longer th an  any 
tim e before in American history. For workers, conditions were 
quite desperate. Wages throughout industry had  been cu t more 
th a n  twenty-five percent, below subsistence in  many cases, while 
a n  estimated one million workers were unemployed.
In the face of such  conditions,
Ju ly , 1877...marks the first great American m ass strike, a  
movement which was viewed at the time as a  violent rebellion. 
S trikers stopped and seized the nation 's m ost Important 
Industry, the railroads, and crowds defeated or won over first 
th e  police, then  the s ta te  militias, and  In some cases even the 
Federal Troops. General strikes stopped all activity in  a  dozen 
m ajor cities, and strikers took over social authority in 
communities across the  nation.
The G reat Upheaval, insofar a s  It represented the initiation of worker
organization and resistance, w as a complementary process to the
Depression of 1873-1895.
In post-Civil War America, the political struggle between capital
and labor, and the essential "tone" of the Great Upheaval, emerged
from th is  issue of labor-use, described by Brecher (1972, p. 21):
The enormous expansion of industry after the Civil War had 
transformed millions of people who had grown up as farmers 
an d  self-employed artisans and entrepreneurs into employees, 
growing thousands of whom were concentrated within each of 
th e  new corporate em pires.
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In the steel Industry, the Homestead Strike of 1892 represented both 
the final stage and the final act of resistance to th is transformation.
The Homestead Strike, as a  particular event in the political struggle 
over labor control and labor use. and its relationship to the destruction 
of the iron Industry, form a  particularly im portant focus of this 
chapter.
The Civil War and the Issue of Industrialization 
My concern in this section is not so m uch with the Civil War 
itself as  it is with its meaning and impact on the course of capitalist 
development in America, and ultimately, development of the iron and 
steel industry. For my purposes, the most im portant considerations of 
the w ar are those th a t have to do with the political conflict th a t the 
war represented and the political-economic conditions th a t post-war 
"reconstruction" brought into being, along with their role in 
development of industrial capitalism in the United States.
The impact of the war on the process of industrialization was not 
direct. The mobilization for war and w ar production were no great 
stimuli to the nation's rate and level of industrialization. In fact, there 
is some evidence to the contrary, th a t the w ar itself actually stifled 
industrialization (cf. Cochran 1969, p. 140-149).
With regard to the issue of the effect of the w ar on the industrial 
development of the nation, Cochran (1969, p. 146) raises the follow­
ing im portant general point:
By modem standards the Civil War was still unmechanized. It 
w as fought with rifles, bayonets, and sabers by men on horse­
back. Artillery was more used than  in previous wars, b u t was 
still a  relatively minor consum er of iron and steel. The railroad 
w as brought into use, bu t the building of military lines offset only
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a  small percentage of the over-all drop from the prewar level of 
civilian railroad construction. Had all of these things not been 
true, the Confederacy with its  small industrial development 
could never have fought through four years of increasingly 
effective blockade.
On this same point, Hogan (1971, p. 14) writes:
One might assum e that the Civil War would have given consider­
able im petus to the iron Industry of the country, yet th is w as by 
no m eans the case. The industry, located principally in the 
northern states... depended on the southern  sta tes for a  relative­
ly sizeable share of its m arket, and this was lost during the war 
years. Expansion of the nation's railroads was curtailed and rail 
dem and declined sharply. The m arket was not replaced as 
might be expected by war-time activity since the conflict was 
carried out on a  modest scale in  comparison with twentieth 
century wars. In fact, ordnance requirem ents were so limited 
th a t it was not until 1863 th a t pig iron production recovered to 
the 1860 level.2
While, directly, the war had little Immediate effect on the course 
of industrialization, it did change the political climate of the nation In 
favor of the emerging urban Industrial capitalist class. If the Civil War
2 Cochran argues th a t according to all Indications, the Civil War had  the 
effect of retarding "a curve of production th a t was tending to rise a t a  
high rate" before the war (1969, p. 142). With specific regard to pig 
iron production, Cochran (1969, p. 142) relates the following:
Pig-iron production in tons, perhaps the m ost significant 
commodify index of nineteenth century American industrial 
growth, is available year-by-year from 1854 on. Taking total 
production for five year periods, output increased 9 per cent 
between the block of years from 1856 to 1860 and the block 
from 1861 to 1865. That even this slight Increase m ight not 
have been registered except for the fact th a t 1857 to 1860 were 
years of interm ittent depression is indicated by an  81 per cent 
Increase over the war years in  the block of years from 1866 to 
1870. If annual production is taken a t five-year Intervals, s ta rt­
ing In 1850, the increase is 24  per cen t from 1850 to 1855; 17 
per cent from 1855 to 1860; 1 per cent from 1860 to 1865; and 
100 per cent from 1865 to 1870. While there is no figure avail­
able for 1845, the period from 1840 to 1850 shows 97 per cent 
increase In shipm ents, while for the period 1870 to 1880 the 
Increase was 130 per cent.
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in America affected industrialization, it did so for reasons th a t had to 
do with the political assertion of the interests of industrial/wage-labor 
capital over those of agricultural/slave-labor wealth, both of which by 
m id-century were locked In bitter competition for dominance over 
control of the state to advance those interests. The most Important 
aspect of the war was th a t it represented a  change in the "tone" of the 
American economy th a t is, its industrialization. Northern victory 
represented in essence the political victory of the industrial capitalist 
class over the "southern slave owning oligarchy" for undisputed 
hegemony within the domestic economic order (Baran and Sweezy 
1966, p. 252) and for the right to call on sta te power for security in 
the international context.
The Civil War and Nation-Building: From "King Cotton" to 
"The Gleaming Metal on Which American Settlem ent Advanced"
An examination of the interests of Northern industrial capital 
and Southern planters reveals where those interests collided. In 
general it can be said th a t the Interests of these two major factions 
within the domestic owning class were not split over the issue of 
slavery. Baran and Sweezy's (1966) work as well as  the works of 
others (cf. Bogart 1930; Beard and Beard 1960; Cochran 1969; and 
Moore 1966, to nam e a  few) argue convincingly th a t the "point" of the 
Civil War was not the abolition of slavery, bu t th a t "the abolition of 
slavery was a  by-product of the struggle, not its purpose" (Baran and 
Sweezy 1966, p. 252). The conflict between "free states" and "slave 
states" was in actuality a  conflict between states where wealth accum ­
ulation was based on the exploitation of "free" or wage labor with those
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where wealth accum ulation was based on the exploitation of slave 
labor. In one sense the Civil War can be viewed as a  conflict between 
owning factions, each aspiring to control regionally discrete "econo­
mies" existing within the sam e nation and struggling over rights to 
create the nation-state in  their own image.
In fact Barrington Moore, Jr. (1966, p. 114) asks: "Slave 
societies do not have the sam e political form as those based on free 
labor. But...is tha t any reason why they have to flgjit?" In general, his 
answer to th is question is "No, they do not have to fight." Kaufman 
(1982, p. xxv) comments:
If there is any agreement among those writing on antebellum 
history, it is tha t the Civil War was not the resu lt of inexorable 
economic forces. The tariff, a  national bank, a  national 
transportation system, and other m atters were all negotiable if 
the party  system had been capable of managing the  conflicting 
interests and achieving a  workable national unity.
In fact, there is no inherent inconsistency between a  slave agricultural 
and a  wage-labor industrial economy. In the early stages of industri­
alization in America, which was fueled by the growth of the domestic 
textile industry, northern industrialists benefited from the  southern 
m arket for finished products as well a s  from the source of cheap 
cotton th a t the southern agrarian economy provided.
Moore continues (1966, p. 114, em phasis added):
One m ight sta rt w ith a general notion to the effect th a t there is 
an inherent conflict between slavery and the capitalist system of 
formally free wage labor. fHowever.l...cotton produced bv slave 
labor plaved a decisive role in the growth not only of American 
capitalism bu t of English  ranitaHsm ton. Capitalists had no 
objection to obtaining goods produced by slavery a s  long as a  
profit could be made by working them  up and reselling them.
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There is no inherent conflict between slavery and wage-labor systems 
of production. However, a t a  time when it was in the interests of 
Northern industrialists to challenge the power of southern  plantation 
owners, ideological appeals to the abolition of slavery were made. "As 
long as the South had th is rich source of cheap labor, its interests 
[through the  state] would be served" (Smith 1981, p. 336).3 The Civil 
War and the  reconstruction period represent the processes of 
political-economic transform ation from the domination of agricultural 
capital served by industrial capital to the domination of Industrial 
capital served by agriculture.4
3 Smith (1981, p.337) goes on to elaborate the ideological use of 
abolitionism in the struggle between industrialists and slave owners.
It w as In the m aterial Interest of northern industrialists to break 
the power of southern planters and agriculturalists. Ready to use 
in the  struggle were the northern  businessm an's set of ideas and 
beliefs. A free contract freely entered into by two equal hum an 
beings was their notion of how they were doing business. If they 
then  used this ideology to discredit the South, it was all the 
better for unfree workers who had been oppressed by th a t very 
"peculiar" institution of slavery.
4 Genovese's (1961, p. 159) comparison of this period to the lessons of 
modem colonialism is Insightful.
If there  is one lesson to be learned from the experience of both 
developed and undeveloped countries, it is th a t industrialization 
is unthinkable without an  agrarian revolution which shatters the 
old regime in the countryside. While the peasantry  remains tied 
to the  land, burdened with debt, and limited to minimal p u r­
chasing power, the labor recruitm ent and m arket preconditions 
for extensive m anufacturing cannot emerge. "Land reform"--that 
is, agrarian revolution—constitutes the essential first step in the 
creation of an urban  working class, the reorganization of agricul­
ture to  feed growing cities, and the development of a  home 
m arket.
If, as according to Barrington Moore (1966, p. 136), It is correct to 
regard post-Civil War sharecroppers as  a class of peasants in American 
society, then  the Civil War, in a  very real sense, was ju s t  such an
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If, as has been effectively argued by various writers, the war was 
not essentially fought over the Issue of the abolition of slavery, a  
stronger interpretation of the meaning of the w ar can be developed by 
looking a t it from the point of view of capitalist competition—in 
particular, competition over m arkets and rights in the state to create 
conditions conducive to particular forms of production. From this 
point of view, the Civil War can be viewed in two complementary ways: 
as a  political conflict between northern industrial wage-labor capital 
against southern slave-owning landed wealth, and as a  war of American 
industrial capital against British industrial capital.
In pre-Civil War America, "different kinds of capital came to 
dom inate the different geographical regions of the country" (Smith 
1981, p. 143)— plantation capital in the South, industrial capital in the 
North, and in the expanding West, non-slave-owning landholders.5
agrarian revolution in American history. Also, here, the term  "agrarian 
revolution" is w hat is essentially m eant by the term  "Reconstruction," a  
term  used in traditional accounts of the post-war period.
5 Since, by the outbreak of the war, W estern landowners had  entered 
into an  alliance with Northern industrialists against Southern slave­
holders, I will no t discuss the history of the W esterners' dem ands on 
the state. Suffice it to say th a t Western agricultural influence had  
begun to wane since the end of the Jacksonian era. Moore (1966, p. 
115-116) states.
The expansion of the country westward made it seem for a  
moment, under President Jackson in the 1830's, th a t the 
principles of agrarian democracy, in practice an  absolute 
minimum of central authority and a  tendency to favor debtors 
over creditors, had won a  perm anent victory....Even in Jackson 's 
own time, however, agrarian democracy had severe difficulties. 
Two closely related developments were to destroy it: the 
further growth of industrial capitalism in the Northeast and the 
establishm ent of an export m arket for Southern cotton.
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Each kind of capital and therefore each geographical region required 
different federal-level state policies. The interests of Southern 
planters and Northern Industrialists, by virtue of the  contradictory 
nature of their respective forms of property ownership, differed with 
respect to the issue of the organization of relations to domestic and 
foreign markets.
According to Parker (1969, p. 136):
The Industrializing regions a t this time had two major needs: 
sufficiently large m arkets to perm it economies of scale in 
transport and urban services, and sufficient saving to perm it the 
use of resources in building canals, rail lines, cities, plants, and 
equipm ent.
For Northern industrialists, th is  m eant the complete integration of the 
national m arket through the proliferation of railroads and, especially, 
through the building of the transcontinental railroad. In addition. 
Northern industrial capitalists had pushed for the establishm ent of a  
Federal Reserve System which would facilitate saving and mobility of 
finance capital.
In addition to conflicts over the domestic economic situation. 
Northern industrialists and Southern p lanters differed over the 
national economic relation with Britain. Britain was the South 's most 
im portant export m arket for cotton. Britain, with its highly developed 
textile Industry, was not only the biggest competitor of such domestic 
manufacturing centers as Lowell, M assachusetts, and  Manchester, New 
Hampshire, but it was the favored custom er of Southern raw  cotton
Western landowners had allied themselves with industrialists against 
Southern slave owners who were interested in expanding the 
plantation economy westward and and bringing w estern lands under 
cotton production in  the wake of the Mexican American War.
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producers. Barrington Moore, J r . (1966, p. 116) illustrates th is point 
as follows:
By 1849, sixty-four percent of the cotton crop went abroad, 
m ainly to England. From 1840 to the time of the Civil War,
G reat Britain drew from the Southern sta tes four-fifths of ail her 
cotton imports.
American m anufacturers were on the periphery of the plantation 
economy. Their position was such th a t in supplying finished products 
to agriculture they supported Southern planters in  their dealings with 
Northern industry 's biggest competitor.
If Northern industrial capitalists hoped to escape the influence 
of Southern power in the domestic economy, they no t only needed 
domestic conditions conducive to  interstate investm ent and trade, bu t 
they needed protection by the sta te  from the influence of British capi­
tal in the domestic m arket. Southern planters resisted the Imple­
m entation of any of the aforementioned policies. With particular 
regard to the issue of m arket protection, Bogart (1930, p. 483) 
observes:
The planting economy w as based upon territorial specialization, 
which involved exchange with other regions. It was to their 
interests to have complete freedom of trade, and after 1816 they 
consistently opposed the policy of protection advocated by the 
growing m anufacturing Interests of the north.
Secession of the Southern states was followed by w ar when growing
influence of the Northern states in the federal government eroded the
ability of Southern representatives to advance the interests of the
plantation economy.
The formation of the Confederacy represented the withdrawal of
a national elite faction from one nation-state where competition with
an  emerging Industrial elite was becoming more and  more difficult in
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order to form an  Independent national system  which would see to the 
support of the plantation economy (hopefully with the support of 
Britain). The relationship between Southern planters and British 
industrialists was of such significance th a t it is  no wonder tha t the 
Union's m ost im portant strategy in fighting the war was the  estab­
lishm ent of a  complete naval blockade of Southern states' access to 
Atlantic shipping routes.6
Reconstruction was, in  essence, the process of rebuilding the 
post-war nation In favor of industrialization and the dem ands of the 
interests of industrial capital. The war was followed by a  massive wave 
of urbanization in the northern and, to some extent, in southern  
states. This, along with new immigration legislation, propelled the 
process of proletarianization through the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. In addition, the economic landscape of the 
nation was re-created as industrial promoters began to '"Bring the 
mills to the cotton!"' and Birmingham, Alabama, became "’the 
Pittsburgh of the South'" (Beard and Beard 1960, p. 286).
Among the greatest achievements on behalf of industrial 
capitalists of the post-war period was the establishm ent of the Federal 
Reserve System, the approval and building of the Transcontinental 
Railroad, and the implementation of effective m easures of protection 
against competition from British industry. Among those who stood to 
benefit the m ost from these m easures, especially in land grants for 
railroad building and in protection from im ports of cheaper British
6 In one sense, the establishm ent of protectionist policies in  the post­
war period represent the peace-time extension of the m ilitary strategy 
of blockade.
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m anufactured goods, were "crucial segm ents of Northern Society" 
(Moore 1966, p. 143), Including railroad companies and the iron arid 
steel interests of Pennsylvania. In the three years immediately follow­
ing the war, 1865-1868, railroad interests and iron and steel m anu­
facturers wielded a great deal of influence in the government, and 
through their representation by the group of Radical Republicans, 
"mounted an  offensive against the plantation system" (Moore 1966, p. 
142) and, in their support of import regulation, defense of the home 
m arket.
An im portant step in forming the steel industry  was the securing 
of the domestic m arket from incursions of British capital in the post- 
Civil War period. Whether or not the American m arket would be 
primarily an  outlet for British exports, or a  m arket under the control 
of domestic iron and steel producers, was, for a  time a t least, some­
thing of an  open question. Winning control of the domestic m arket 
was a  precondition to the formation of the American industry, and this 
in tu rn  would have a strong influence in its subsequent development. 
Thus, the establishm ent of protectionist policies in  law was a  direct 
extension of pre-war designs of an emerging industrial capitalist class 
in the United States and was bom  of the "free trade" versus tariff 
debates which dominated political economic discourse (cf. Kaufman 
1982).
The Issue of Protectionism in General in the Nineteenth Century
The United States was im portant to British capitalists in the 
1800s for two essential reasons. The United States w as an  im portant 
foreign m arket for British goods. In fact, Britain’s well-being as a
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capitalist industrial power was tied closely to its ability to control 
foreign m arkets. This is a  fact noted by Eric Hobsbawm In h is work, 
Industry  and Empire (1969, p. 136, em phasis added):
In the major industries the foreign m arket played...[a]...decisive 
role. This is most obvious in cotton, which exported over half 
the total value of its output a t the beginning of the nineteenth 
century and almost four fifths a t the end, and iron and steel 
which relied on overseas m arkets for about forty percent of its 
gross production from the m id-nineteenth century.
With particular regard to the relationship between Britain and  the
United States, Potter (1969, p. 15) notes the central "importance to
Britain of American supplies of primary produce," such as cotton and
wheat, and "the significance for British producers of American
m arkets."
Besides the importance of America as an  outlet for British goods, 
control of the American m arket was viewed by British m anufacturers 
as  vital in impeding the assertion of an  American capitalist class 
increasingly growing in strength. Control of the American m arket was 
necessary to keep American capitalists out of competition w ith the 
British, since a t  this time, the U.S. was emerging no t only by Itself bu t 
along with a  competing group of capitalist Industrial powers, e.g., 
Germany. Essentially, the rise of the American Industrial capitalist 
class was threatening to undo British control of the United States 
m arket, re-established with the end of the War of 1812. With the 
Treaty of Ghent of 1815, "Cheap British m anufactured goods soon 
strangled the infant American industries and created economic havoc" 
(Kaufman 1982, p. 41).
In this period and within the context of international capitalist 
competition, economic in terests and political rivalry (I.e., rivalry
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between nation-states) became m utually identifiable. This is w hat is 
m ost significantly m eant by the description of the period as the "age of 
imperialism," the integration of state and economic policy. Hobsbawm 
comments (1969, p. 131, em phasis added):
One further consequence of the era  of the G reat Depression, tha t 
is of the emergence of a  competing group of industrial and 
economically advanced powers, m ust be noted. It is the fusion of 
political and economical rivalry, the fusion of private enterprise 
with government backing, which is already visible in the  growth 
of protectionism and imperialist friction. Increasingly business, 
in one wav or another, called on the state not only to give it a 
free hand, b u t to save i t .7
If th is was true from Britain's point of view, it was equally true 
from the point of view of American capitalists in general and those
7 The meaning of imperialism as the integration of state and private 
enterprise interests is evident in, and starkly illustrated by th is  quote 
from Cecil Rhodes (1895) provided by Beaud (1983, p. 139):
I was in the E ast End of London yesterday and attended a  meet­
ing of the unemployed. I listened to the wild speeches, which 
were ju s t a  ciy  for "bread," ’bread," and on my way home I pon­
dered over the scene and I became more th an  ever convinced of 
the importance of imperialism....My cherished idea is a  solution 
for the social problem, i.e., in order to save the 40,000,000 
inhabitants of the United Kingdom from a  bloody civil war, we 
colonial statesm en m ust acquire new lands for settling the su r­
plus population, to provide new m arkets for the goods produced 
in the factories and mines. The Empire, as I have always said, is 
a  bread and bu tte r question. If you w ant to avoid civil war, you 
m ust become imperialists.
And, further, from Ju les Ferry: '"Colonial policy is the  daughter of 
industrial policy"1 (from Beaud 1983, p. 140).
Imperialism represents the unity of sta te policy and national 
capitalist class interests. This unity  Is expressed no t only in sta te  
policies concerning dominated areas, b u t also in sta te  policies relevant 
to the establishm ent and protection of domestic m arkets. S tate 
policies both advance capitalist interests in  the establishm ent of 
m arkets, and In the  protection of m arkets from the advances of 
foreign capital.
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engaged in Iron and steel production In the second half of the nine­
teenth century. Both British capitalists and American capitalists were 
calling on their governments to save them. The former sought state 
policies which supported international "free trade" and m ade empire a  
"bread and butter" issue. The latter called upon the state to support 
the protection of the expanding domestic m arket from foreign con­
trol. Here, "free trade" is understood as a  state policy and an  ideology 
of a  national capitalist class interested In maintaining hegemonic 
domination of foreign m arkets by establishing an  environment wherein 
comparative advantages can be readily asserted. Protectionism, on the 
other hand, reflects a  national capitalist class aspiring to hegemony by 
creating an  environment wherein its weaknesses or disadvantages can 
be counteracted. Potter (1969, p. 48) sta tes the following concerning 
the importance of the issue of protectionism in the middle of the 
nineteenth century:
The imposition of the highly protective tariff of 1864, more than  
any other single act, announced the severance by the U.S.A of 
her ancient commercial links with the old world and constituted 
a  declaration of American economic independence.
In the arena of international capitalist competition, the con­
frontation of American and British capitalist interests Is evident in the 
following statem ents cited by Hogan (1971 p. 173, em phasis added). 
First, from Lord Brougham's (1816) speech to Parliament:
It is well worth while to incur a  loss upon the first exportation, 
in order by the glut to stifle in  the cradle those m anufacturers in 
the United S tates which the war has forced into existence 
contrary to the n atural course of things.
Secondly, and closer to the period under discussion, in a  report of a
British Parliam entary Commission in  1854:
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The labouring classes generally, in the m anufacturing districts of 
this country and especially in  the iron and coal districts, are very 
little aware of the extent to which they are often indebted for 
their being employed a t all to the Immense losses which their 
employers voluntarily incur in bad times in order to destroy 
foreign m arkets....The large capitals of this country are the great 
instrum ents of warfare against competing capitals of foreign 
countries, and the most essential instrum ents now rem aining by 
which our manufacturing supremacy can be maintained. 
(Emphasis added.)
American supporters of protectionism turned to statem ents 
such  as these in arguing for establishm ent of tariffs which they con­
sidered necessary in order to neutralize aggressive policies of British 
firms. Those arguing on behalf of protectionism also claimed th a t 
British designs on the American m arket led to the "degradation of the 
British workingman" and cited various studies by British commen­
ta tors pointing to increased "pauperism in England" (Hogan 1971, p. 
173-174).8
Protection of the American Iron and Steel Market: The Morill Tariff 
The Morill Tariff, established in 1861, set im port duties on iron 
products. These were: for pig iron, $9.00 per ton; for iron rails, 
$12.00 per ton; and, in 1862, the rate for iron rails w as raised to 
$13.50 per ton (Hogan 1971, p. 174).9 American m anufacturers.
8 A further example of this is the following cited by Hogan (1971, p. 
174), Supporters of protectionism cite a  May 29, 1875, article which 
appeared in London Iron which found th a t women worked "unceas­
ingly a t the forge twelve or thirteen hours a day for from six shillings 
to seven shillings a  week."
9 Moore (1966, p. 150) states,
The Morrill Tariff of 1861 was the beginning of a  sharp  upward climb 
in tariff rates from 20 percent of value to 47 percent, more than  
double the rates prevailing in 1860. Designed a t first to raise revenues 
for the wartime Union treasury, it established protectionism deeply in 
American economic policies.
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citing Information from British sources which showed th a t British 
im ports had increased since 1866 a t the sam e time th a t American 
production decreased, called for higher tariffs in  1867,10 The 
American Iron and Steel Association assessed the situation this way;
The steel m anufacturer is suffering severly from the effects of 
foreign competition, the importation la s t year am ounting to
21,308 net tons, about 53 percent of the quantity consumed in 
the country. Our steel works, as well as  our iron works have 
ample facilities for supplying the dem and for their products and 
it is without doubt, the policy as well as  the duty of the 
Government to give them an  opportunity to do so .11
In 1871, a  new tariff was established; however, contrary to the 
desires of American m anufacturers, it set a  reduced rate on imported 
pig iron to $7.00 per ton. In their Annual Report for 1871, the 
American Iron and Steel Association called th is m easure "'unwise, and 
injurious to the general interests of the country'" (Hogan 1971, p.
174). In this same report, the Association continued to argue th a t the 
government’s duty was to establish and m aintain protectionist m eas­
ures and added th a t ineffective tariffs would necessitate industrywide 
reductions in order to prevent,
Hundreds of thousands of workingmen...[from] being thrown into 
idleness or into agriculture, thus overstocking the m arkets for
10 British imports in 1866 were 312,500 net tons of iron and steel 
combined. In 1867, British Board of Trade information showed th a t 
imports into the U.S. had increased to 433,724 net tons of iron and
21,308 net tons of steel (Hogan 1971, p. 174).
11 This statem ent is from the Annual Statistical Report for 1867 
quoted in Hogan (1971, p. 174). It is a comment by American steel 
m anufacturers concerning not only the perceived condition of Ameri­
can production in the face of competition from Britain b u t demon­
strates as well the ideological reliance on competition by certain 
segments of the capitalist class in  the justification of the unity of sta te 
policy and economic interest.
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farm products, and leaving the country to the mercy of foreign­
ers for needed supplies of m anufactured goods. (Quoted in 
Hogan 1971, p. 175.)
However, by 1872 it became apparent to supporters of protec­
tionism  th a t even the lower rates were adequate to "preserve the 
major portion of the domestic m arket to the American producer" 
(Hogan 1971, p. 176). The m anufacturers themselves confirmed this 
assessm ent in the 1872 Annual Report of the American Iron and Steel 
Association which contained this resolution:
RESOLVED—That this Association attributes the general 
prosperity of the iron trade of the country to the tariff policy of 
the Government, which has fostered home industry  and enabled 
many branches of m anufacturers to attain a  position rendering 
them  independent to foreign rivalry. (Quoted in Hogan, 1971, p. 
176).
The growth of the American iron and steel industry  from 1860 
to 1880 was closely tied to the expansion of the railroads and the 
m arket for rails. Among construction, machinery, shipbuilding, 
agriculture, oil and gas, and the container Industry, the railroads stood 
out as  the foremost steel consuming industry. Railroad expansion 
occurred rapidly in  the period following the Civil War, m arked 
especially by the completion of the transcontinental railroad In 1869. 
In the decade from 1870 to 1880 there was a  75 percent increase In 
railroad mileage from 52,922 miles to 93,267 miles. Throughout the 
1860s rails were m ade primarily from iron. In the 1870s the demand 
for steel rails, for new  lines and to replace iron rails, increased. In the 
United States, "virtually all Bessemer steel produced...was converted 
into rails" (Hogan 1971, p.114).
The Importance of steel rail production to the accelerated 
growth of the United States steel industry is illustrated by a particular
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example from M atthew Josephson (1962, p. 109) concerning Andrew 
Carnegie's "flagship" rail rolling facility, the Edgar Thomson Works, 
established in 1875:
With inimitable tact Carnegie decided to nam e the mills after his 
largest prospective customer, the head of the Pennsylvania 
Railroad, the  "J. Edgar Thomson Works."
Great Britain began exporting steel rails Into the United States 
in 1862 for the Pennsylvania Railroad. With the discovery of a  source 
of iron ore suitable for the production of Bessemer steel in 1867, near 
Steelton, Pennsylvania, large scale production of steel rails in the  U.S. 
became possible. "The Pennsylvania Steel Company w as organized 
there to build a  Bessemer plant. The Pennsylvania Railroad subscribed 
to a  little more th a n  one third of its capital stock" (Hogan 1971, p. 
115).
The demand for steel rails was great, bu t it w as also subject to 
severe fluctuations as periods of rapid railroad expansion were 
followed by periods of slowdown. Steel producers rushed to supply 
the m arket, m aking for a very unstable and  intensely competitive 
situation.12
12 The Instability of the rail situation and  its  relation to trajectory of 
steel industry  development is Illustrated in  the following from Michel 
Beaud (1983, p. 118). First,
In the United States the  length of completed railroad lines in­
creased by 5 0  percent between 1869 and 1873; when specula­
tion, scarcity of labor power, and a  rise in prices combined, 
profitability fell, railroad companies went bankrupt, banks failed, 
and  there w as a frantic stock exchange panic. Since railroad 
construction was an essential outlet for the production of cast 
iron, the price of cast iron  fell by 27 percent between 1872 and 
1875. Unemployment rose, wages fell, and the  crisis reached 
textiles and th e  building trades. In England exports fell by 25 
percent between 1872 an d  1875; the  num ber of bankruptcies 
Increased (7,490 in 1873, 13,130 in  1879); unem ployment
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While domestic steel producing capacity expanded to meet the 
dem ands of the railroads, it remained necessaiy for some years to 
supplem ent domestically produced rails with British imports (Hogan 
1971, p. 113). But in the early 1870s, American m anufacturers began 
to call for the establishm ent of tariffs against the importation of British 
imported steel—m uch as they had done earlier against the importation 
of British iron—which a t th a t time could be produced a t lower cost 
than  American rails.
Prom 1867 to 1870 there was a  decline in  the price of British 
steel rails a t American ports. American steel m anufacturing interests 
urged Congress to increase the duty on steel imports and claimed tha t 
British producers were m anipulating prices in  an  attem pt to interfere 
with the production of steel rails by American firms. On Jan u ary  1, 
1871, the duly was set a t $28.00 per ton. With this, the production of
extended and prices fell. Surplus production capacities were 
enormous: while forge owners in  1873 were able to  produce 2.5 
million tons of rails, consumption fell to 500,000 tons and their 
price dropped by 60 percent between 1872 and 1881.
Secondly,
[By 1884] The construction of railroads in the United States, 
which had in  fact started up again (4,300 Ion in 1878, bu t 
18,600 km in 1882), gave way to the "railroad panic": only 
6,300 km of railroad lines were constructed in 1884. The rail­
road companies were caught between rising construction costs 
and the competition they engaged in among themselves. The 
price of Union Pacific stock collapsed, and this was followed by 
the collapse of several other railroad securities. Banks failed and 
there was a  slowdown in industrial activity, with bankruptcies, 
more unemployment, and wage reductions (from 15 to 22 per­
cent in metallurgy, from 25 to 30  percent in  textiles). During 
th is crisis the Carnegie group grew stronger, particularly 
through purchasing competing factories at low prices.
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steel rails, which w as negligible prior to 1870, Increased by 100 
percent (Hogan 1971, p. 178).13
From 1879 to 1880, vast Increases in railroad production would 
necessitate an increase in imports and, during the same period, prices 
for domestically produced rails would increase. But the protectionist 
policies concerning steel rails, along with decreasing prices for basic 
steel products due to the "economizing movement" of steel companies 
in the last three decades of the nineteenth century, vastly improved 
the situation of American steel firms (Hogan 1971, pp. 178-179). 
Clearly, the protectionist m easures urged by steel m anufacturers in 
the post-Civil War period established the American steel m arket as the 
domain of American firms, and, by limiting the role of British 
suppliers, had an  influence on the formation of capital In America 
around the production of steel.
The Transition from Iron to Steel Production 
and the Confrontation_between Labor and Capital
With the domestic m arket secure for American producers, the 
United S tates steel industry came into Its own and eventually 
surpassed Great Britain's by the last decade of the century. The 
turning point was the year 1890 when "the U.S. had passed England—
13 Domestic steel rail production for 1871 was 38,500 net tons; for 
1872, 94,070 net tons; for 1874, 144,944 net tons; and, for the 
period from 1875 to 1878, production doubled to 1.5 million tons. 
There was a parallel decline in imports for the same period. For 
example, imports for 1872 were 149,786 net tons; for 1874, 100,486 
net tons; and between 1875 and 1878, there were less than  18,000 
net tons imported (Hogan 1971, p. 178).
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permanently" in the  production of steel ingots.14 The period from the 
late 1880s through the 1890s w as a  period of intensified transition 
from iron to steel production, and  therefore a  period also of dism an­
tling iron facilities. Brody (1960, p. 8) gives the following brief 
account exemplary of trends growing in strength in  the last twenty 
years of the nineteenth century:
The course of the Republic Iron and Steel Company, a merger of 
twenty-seven iron mills w ith a  capacity of over a  million tons 
indicated th e  extent to w hich puddling [the craft of stirring 
molten ore into wrought iron] seemed inconsistent with pros­
perity. The company, shortly after being formed in 1899, began 
abandoning the iron mills, erecting in their stead a large steel 
plant at Youngstown.
Companies pursuing so-called economizing efforts were making 
the transition to steel production a t a  rapid pace. In general, produc­
tivity was rising as  a  consequence, a t the same time th a t downward 
pressure on wages w as becoming more apparent. Here are two brief 
examples of th is trend, both from information on the Cambria Steel 
Company (a non-union firm). A "laborer first class" (unskilled occu-
14 The following figures comparing production of steel Ingots for each 
nation  (000,000 tons) are quoted by B um  (1961, p. 82), from the 
Report of the Tariff Commission.
For the United Kingdom: in 1889 production w as 3.57; 1890, 3.58: 
1893, 2.95; 1894, 3.11; 1895, 3.26; and in 1896 production w as 4.13 
hundred thousand tons.
For the United S tates: production was in 1889, 3.39; 1890, 4.28; 
1893, 4.02; 1894, 4.41; 1895, 6.11; and, in 1896, 5.28 hundred 
thousand tons.
In th is transitional year of 1890, Carnegie also w as successful in pre­
venting the organization of the Duquesne works by the Amalgamated 
Association of Iron and Steel Workers. Also, 1892 was the year when 
for the first time domestic production of steel surpassed  tha t of iron. 
It was also the year of the Homestead Steel Strike.
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patlon) working a t a  blast furnace earned, for a  twelve h o u r day, $1.10 
in 1880, $1.04 in  1885, $1.00 in  1890 and 1895. A "rail mill roller" 
(skilled occupation) earned, per hundred tons, $6.10 in  1880, $4.23 
in 1885, $4.61 in 1890, and $3.18 in 1895.15
The shift from Iron production to more mechanized steel pro­
duction was cheapening both skilled and unskilled labor as  it progres­
sively undermined the necessity of each. This process w as embedded 
in an d  intensified by the dismantling of iron works. Skilled labor was 
cheapened not only because mechanization w as making it  less vital to 
production, bu t because the dismantling of iron works w as releasing a  
su rp lu s of labor to the labor m arket.
Certainly, th e  transition to steel production brought with it 
changes in the n a tu re  of labor-use. For instance, Brody (1960, p. 8) 
states:
The largest iron producer, Jones and Laughlins, h ad  operated 
110 puddling furnaces. In 1884 the firm built a  five ton con­
verter, then  two more in 1890, and began reducing its iron 
production. It closed down thirty-three furnaces in  February 
1892 because iron was being "crowded out." Its employees were 
advised to seek work elsewhere. Soon after, the Carnegie Com­
pany began shutting down its eighty four furnaces. The basic 
steel companies, all iron m anufacturers in  1890, employed 
hardly a puddler among them  in 1900.
15 These figures are  from Report on Immigration. VIII quoted in Brody 
(1960, pp. 44-45). Brody (1960, p. 45) sta tes th a t "wages declined 
under the pressure of mechanization."
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Iron Production and Labor Organization: Craft. Craft Unionism, and 
the  Formation of the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel 
W orkers
The Amagamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers had its 
origins in the period when iron production was predom inant and steel 
w as produced on a  very limited basis. Politically, the organization 
viewed itself, as  did other craft unions, as an  association of craftsmen 
bound by tradition and whose influence was felt to rest on the 
possession and control of scarce knowledge and skills. In this case, 
such  skills were those connected w ith the production of wrought iron. 
The nature of the production of wrought iron w as such th a t attem pts 
to mechanize it were largely unsuccessful, dem onstrating its depen­
dence on highly skilled labor. The technical problems of iron produc­
tion prevented the establishm ent of "economies of scale" since the 
"character" of the material itself limited the size of puddling furnaces 
and required a  great degree of direct m anipulation on the part of the 
workers. Iron production was highly resistan t to mechanization and 
strongly tied to craft labor.16 In the production of iron.
The procedures were entirely m anual. The puddler agitated 
small batches of molten pig iron and cinder until the purified 
metal crystallized into bajls--"coming into nature," It was called. 
The succeeding squeezing and rolling operations were likewise 
m anual (Brody 1960, p. 8).
16 In his The Iron Puddler: Mv Life in the Rolling Mills and W hat Came 
It, Davis (1922, pp. 30, 91, and 110-111) describes the craft of the 
iron puddler. Trade secrets were passed on from father to son as "a 
legacy of great value, and were never told to persons outside the 
family." He calls the craft a "mental act," one of "good guessing," 
where the "artist and sculptor m ust have the sam e sense of 
proportion." It was this highly intuitive nature of iron puddling which 
required the experience of the artisan  th a t made the process resistant 
to mechanization. (James J . Davis was later to become Secretary of 
Labor in  the Harding Administration.)
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So, these skilled laborers, using the facilities of the capitalist, m ain­
tained considerable control over the process of production because 
they possessed the "recipe" for producing iron and, through their 
organizations, had control over access to th a t knowledge, and some 
influence as to how it was to be utilized.
Up until about the 1890s, wages were paid according to a  
tonnage rate where skilled workers were paid according to ou tpu t on 
a sliding scale. T hat is. wages for skilled labor were se t according to 
the m arket price for iron, fluctuating a t or above an  established wage 
floor. For example, the sliding scale rate for puddling in  1865 was 
$4.00 to $9.00 per 2,240 pounds of purified iron "as the price of iron 
went from 2 1 /2  cents to 8 1 /2  cents per pound" (Hogan 1971, p. 85).
The sliding scale and the tonnage rate should no t be confused 
with w hat we would today call "piece work" since the sliding scale was 
also attached to a  "contract system," where employers were in effect 
"contracting out" Jobs to skilled craftsmen for a  price set by the 
m ark e t.17 Katherine Stone comments as follows (1974, pp. 117-118, 
em phasis added):
The sliding scale was actually an arrangem ent for sharing the 
profits between two partners in production, the skilled workers 
and the steel masters...(where! the division of labor and the pace 
of work was decided by the workers themselves. Thus, th e
17 This reflected, as  Ware (1924, p. xiv) points out, the term s of a  labor 
contract where,
...renum eration of the [skilled] m echanic was ’price'. It referred 
to his product rather th an  to his labor, for it was his product 
th a t he sold....The term 'wage' tha t (eventually! displaced 'price' 
as the Industrial Revolution advanced had formerly applied only 
to day labor, and the extension of the term  to the skilled worker 
was regarded by him as a  symbol of a  deeper change.
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sliding scale and the contrac t system defined th e relationship 
between capital and labor in  the nineteenth century.
The sliding scale and the contingency of wages on m arket price 
reflected among these skilled workers a  feeling of partnership  be­
tween capital and labor (cf. Ware 1924, pp. xviii-xix and Bridges 1986, 
p. 159). This feeling of partnership was reciprocated by capitalists, a t 
least during the period when production and therefore accum ulation 
depended on skilled labor. In h is Autobiography (quoted by Stone 
1974, p. 117), Andrew Carnegie said about the sliding scale 
arrangem ent: "It is the solution to the capital and labor problem 
because it really makes them partners--alike in  prosperity and 
adversity."
Further evidence of the influence th a t skilled laborers had over 
the production process is found in  the arrangem ent where puddlers 
and those in other skilled occupations had discretionary power in 
hiring their own unskilled help, who were not paid by the tonnage 
rate, bu t by the day. Unskilled workers would be paid out of the wages 
of skilled workers (and sometimes the company would add an incre­
m ent to the pay of unskilled workers) (Montgomery 1976, p. 488).
So, for example, in Pittsburgh in  1878, a puddler received $5 .00 /ton  
and out of th is paid a  helper 1 /3  with an additional 5% paid by the 
company (Hogan 1971, p. 85).
The labor force in the industry was divided into a  two-tiered 
structure of highly skilled and organized craftsm en on the one hand, 
and  unskilled, unorganized wage-laborers on the  other. When com­
panies became interested in undermining the influence of unions in 
the transition from iron to steel production, they could p it unskilled
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labor against skilled labor, as for example, in the Wheeling Strike (to 
be discussed below).
Early labor organization was of skilled workers on a  highly 
localized basis and centered on issues connected with tonnage rates. 
One of the earliest conflicts took place in  1842 when boilers in 
Pittsburgh rolling mills staged an unsuccessful strike against wage 
cuts. Hogan (1971, p. 85) states:
At the beginning of th a t year, wages paid for boiling were $5.50 
per ton, with $3.50 paid for puddling. This represented a 
substan tia l reduction from 1837 levels when boilers received 
$7.00 per ton and puddlers $4.25. The strike, called in 
February, 1842, which followed a  further reduction in boilers’ 
ra tes to $5.00 per ton, lasted until Ju ly  9 of th a t year when 
w orkers conceded.
In subsequent years, skilled workers in the iron trade began to 
form craft associations. Their purpose was to formalize relations 
between skilled workers and  the mills. One of the more successful of 
these associations was the Sons of Vulcan, established In secrecy in 
1858 by Pittsburgh iron puddlers. "By 1876, the Sons of Vulcan had 
become one of the strongest unions In the United States" (Hogan 
1971, p. 86). The most significant accomplishments of the Sons of 
Vulcan Included: successful resistance to wage-reductions in the face 
of pressure created by the post-Civil War Depression; formal adoption 
of the sliding scale itself, for the first time in Pittsburgh according to 
the Memorandum of Agreement of 1865 (the sliding scale would 
eventually be accepted on an  industrywide basis); and recognition of 
the union throughout the iron puddling trade (Hogan 1971, p. 86; 
Stone 1974, p. 117; and Brooks 1940, p. 21).
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O ther of the more prom inent craft-oriented labor unions 
established In the mid-1800s included the following: first, in 1861, 
the Associated Brotherhood of Iron and Steel Heaters, Rollers and 
Roughers was formed by rollers in the rail mills of Chicago. Brooks 
(1940, p. 22) observes:
During the 'sixties, locals were established in other iron centers, 
and  in 1872 the union extended its jurisdiction to other rolled 
products in addition to rails....[And, in] 1875...a lodge [was] 
established in Pittsburgh.
Secondly, the Iron and Steel Roll Hands of the United S tates was
formed in  Chicago in  1874. This union was unique since it organized
not only skilled workers, b u t all workers around the rolls, including
unskilled workers (Hogan 1971, p. 88).
In 1876 these three unions, along with the United Nailers of
America, were consolidated into the Amalgamated Association of Iron
and Steel Workers. Hogan (1971, p. 89) comments:
At the time the  Amalgamated Association was formed the steel 
industry  was still poised on the threshold of Its development, 
the Amalgamated Association was alm ost exclusively an  iron 
workers union with 85% of Its total membership coming from 
the Sons of Vulcan.
Wheeling.JVest Virginia, and Homestead. Pennsylvania: Capital’s 
Victory over Labor in the Transition from Iron to Steel Production
The Wheeling Strike of 1885-1886 and the Homestead Strike of
1892 are significant events in the history of the development of the
steel industry. The importance of each lay In w hat they represent of
the changing nature of relations between capital and labor since the
late 1870s and the implications they hold for subsequent development
of the industry  for the rem ainder of the nineteenth century.
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In one sense, the strikes are manifestations of the struggle 
between labor and capital over control of the production process, i.e., 
the craft and skill of the laborer against the progressive mechanization 
and centralization of steel production. In another sense, the strikes 
represent events expressing the desire of capitalists to free them ­
selves from dependence on craft labor in order to build a  degree of 
predictability and control over the process of production w ithin the 
very volatile climate of capitalist competition and m arket relations at 
the time. From the 1870s to the end of the century, discretionary 
control over production passed into the hands of capital. For capital, 
gaining control over production, "dealing labor out" of decision making 
over the production process, was a  precondition to getting control 
over m arkets through centralization and  concentration. Labor power 
in the form of craft as a  scarce commodity was increasingly converted 
to a more readily available and replaceable commodity.
In essence, the problem for capital was the transform ation of its 
labor force from one suited for the production of Iron to one suited for 
the production of steel. The transition of capital from iron production 
to steel production necessitated the conversion of the iron producing 
labor force into a steel producing labor force, am ounting to the 
conversion of a  craft labor force to a  progressively non-craft, i.e., 
deskilled labor force. The Wheeling and Homstead strikes are events 
in the political struggle over this transition.
The Wheeling Strike of 1885-1886: Craft as Political Power and its 
Circumvention in the Transition to Steel Production. The traditional
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basis of worker political power In the Iron Industry w as the control 
th a t workers held over the craft of Iron production. Control over skills 
could be translated Into rights over the process itself; rights, th a t is, 
relevant to decision making over various aspects of production includ­
ing output, pace of work, and quantity of labor, among other things (cf. 
Montgomery 1976, p. 488). The relationship between capital and 
labor w as embedded in an  ideology of partnership between direct 
producers and owners of the m eans of production. The Wheeling 
Strike of 1885-1886 and the Homestead Strike of 1892 dem onstrate 
the operation of forces th a t were changing the relationship between 
capital and labor, manifested as  it was In conflicts between the unions 
and mill operators. The owning in terests were becoming decidedly 
anti-union as the shift from iron to steel offered them  a  way to break 
their dependence on skilled labor and gain unshared control over 
production, and in so doing p u t themselves In a better position to 
w rest control of m arkets. The events th a t took place in Wheeling 
from 1885-1886 stand as an example, or as  a prelude, to the fall of 
craft unionism  and the erosion of labor's political power in the 
transition from iron to steel.
The Wheeling Strike involved a conflict between nailers, 
puddlers, and mill operators in the district which led the nation in  
ou tpu t of wrought iron nails. In Wheeling (Hogan 1971, p. 228):
Nailers held an  enviable position,...Like their community s tan d ­
ing, their earnings were high for, during the 1880s under a  
contract wage system, a  nailer made $12 to $20 per day. A 
skilled craftsm an with carefully guarded trade secrets, he 
seldom, if ever, performed the m anual operations connected 
with nailmaking, bu t rather, subcontracted these to a group 
which he supervised. Contract workers received substantially
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less th an  a nailer; a  feeder for example, who worked under him 
on a  percentage basis, received about $2 per day.
Companies In the  Wheeling district began to produce nails from
steel, and in the process closed down m any of the puddling furnaces.
Puddlers, as  the m ost Influential craft group within the  Amalgamated
Association, wanted the wage scale increased by 20% for producing
steel as opposed to wrought iron nails. Their argum ent was th a t steel
w as a  harder material than  iron; therefore, th e  process of nailmaking
had become more difficult. Hogan points ou t tha t the puddlers in  the
union advanced this argum ent in  an  attem pt to discourage steel
production and encourage a re tu rn  to iron production (1971, p. 228).
Apparently, the tactic was to use the wage scale for nailers to make
steel fabricated nails less economical (or a t least to make it as costly as
making nails from Iron). The nailers, however, were against this since
they believed tha t such  a  demand would prom pt an unnecessary
confrontation with mill interests.
The nailers paid the heaviest per capita dues in the  Association 
and received small recognition in the union councils and the 
distribution of offices. Rather than risk  their industry  position 
to protect the jobs of the puddlers. th e  nailers withdrew from 
the Amalgamated Association by Ju n e  1, 1885, an d  revived the 
United Nailers of America (Hogan 1971, p. 228).
With the wage scale agreem ent due to expire, the mill concerns
proposed a  reduced scale for 1885-1886, claiming th a t th is would
allow the resum ption of iron puddling in competition w ith steel.
E ither way the mills would win since the wages of puddlers would
have to come down to compete w ith less expensive steel-produced
nails. The lower scale was rejected and the Amalgamated Association
proposed higher rates for certain other trades.
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In their dealings w ith the nailers, the companies sought a  
reduction of rates from 21 cents to 19 cents per keg of common nails, 
arguing tha t the nailers in the eastern mills, which were largely non­
union, received lower rates. On Ju n e  1, 1885, both  the Amalgamated 
Association and the United Nailers went on strike (Hogan 1971, pp. 
228-229).
The mill operators got around any further discussion with the 
unions during the strike by, first, hiring heaters and  rollers from the 
outside (against the Amalgamated Association); and, secondly, by 
inviting and agreeing to train  feeders as  nailers (against the United 
Nailers). These tactics led to some violent reprisals from strikers, but 
eventually, the nailers were compelled to agree to a  compromise and 
the production of nails with steel wire became firmly established in 
Wheeling "and nailers as a  class of skilled workers gradually disap­
peared from the scene" (Hogan 1971, p. 229).
Capital and Labor in Homestead: Carnegie, the Amalgamated Associ­
ation. and Union Breaking. 1889-1892. At the time of the Wheeling 
Strike, in 1886, Andrew Carnegie (1886, p. 119) wrote this abou t the 
workers’ right to organize unions in "An Employer's View of the Labor 
Question":
The right of workingmen to combine and to form trade-unions is 
no less sacred than  the right of the m anufacturer to enter into 
associations and conferences with his fellows and  sooner or later 
m ust be conceded. Indeed, it gives one bu t a  poor opinion of the 
American workman if he permits himself to be deprived of a 
right which his fellow in England has conquered long since. My 
experience has been th a t trade unions upon the  whole are 
beneficial to both labor and capital.
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Carnegie's very "friendly" view of labor is  rem iniscent of and 
typical of the times in  the industry  when production was very much 
dependent on skilled labor. In fact, the craft associations and  unions 
of skilled laborers were generally viewed by the operators of mills to 
act as a kind of stabilizing force where competition between capitals 
was fierce and m arkets were unpredictable. Four major stabilizing 
influences of the Amalgamated Association can be identified: (1) it 
participated in  the negotiation of uniform wage scales for w estern 
mills; (2) it negotiated the equalization of hours, output, and  working 
conditions; (3) it "kept in check independent m inded iron workers"; 
and, most importantly, (4) it "guaranteed union mills a supply of 
scarce puddlers and rollers" (Brody I960, p. 50).
Yet, a s  steel production intensified, the posture of capital toward 
labor became decidedly anti-union. A situation h ad  emerged where 
mills west of the Alleghenies were generally unionized and those east 
were more resistan t to unions. Partially, this is because when firms 
previously engaged in iron production were shifting to steel produc­
tion, unions were generally accepted in the new steel making depart­
m ents of the mills. B ut the steel mills were less likely to be open to 
union organization. For example, one of Carnegie's biggest competi­
tors, the Cambria Steel Company of Johnstown, Pennsylvania, had  
successfully resisted the organization of its works and had ru n  non­
union since the early 1870s. The Cambria Company had also entered 
steel-making earlier through its incorporation of th e  Gautier Steel 
Company as a  distinct subsidiary. As a  result, th e  facilities of the  
Gautier Company were moved from Jersey City, New Jersey, to Johns­
town. By 1881 Gautier Steel became the complete property of Cam-
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bria. Through this acquisition and its resistance to unionization, 
Cambria becam e an im portant force in  the production of steel.18
Cam bria's success in  the area of labor control w as no small part 
of its established leadership in iron and steel production. The com­
pany, free of the competition of other iron and steelmaklng facilities 
in  the region, was in essence able to hold its mill and  mine workforces 
as something of a "captive population" by dominating as It did the 
landscape and  daily lives of its workers. It controlled stores, high­
ways, schools, housing, an d  even paid its  workers' wages in company 
issued currency. Described by Gutm an (1976, p. 327) as "a kind of 
industrial feudalism," workers could, for example, be evicted from 
their homes with as little a s  ten days' notice, and "the discharged 
worker was listed publicly as  'not employable' by the Cambria Iron 
Works" (Gutman 1976, p. 334) for falling to fulfill the  terms of the 
labor contract as set down by the company. Gutm an (1976, p. 331) 
offers the following w hich exemplifies th e  company’s  power:
Jo h n  Tomlinson, th e  deputy commissioner of th e  Pennsylvania 
B ureau of Labor Statistics, concluded that the "state of tilings" 
was "a very great anomaly in the  m idst of a free country." He 
declared that the operators had created "absolute personal 
government in the m idst of a republic."
18 In the immediate post-Civil War years, the Cambria Iron Works was 
a  leader of th e  nation in production. Quoting the New York Times of 
1874, G utm an (1976, pp. 320-321) s ta tes  tha t they were "'the finest 
works in the country and one of the glories of Pennsylvania'." A 
national leader in the production of wrought iron rails in 1871, 
Cambria w as also one of the  first Bessemer steelmaklng facilities in  the 
country. Hogan (1971, p. 93) comments.
In the  mid-1870’s the  plant [Cambria], was one of the largest, if 
not th e  largest iron and  steel mill in  the country. In 1876, it set 
a record for rail production with 103,743 net tons of rails.
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Furtherm ore, the labor contract of 1874 for the Cambria Iron Works Is 
quoted as stating:
...Any person...known to belong to any secret association or open 
combination whose aim is to control wages or stop the works, or 
any p a rt thereof, shall be promptly and finally discharged.... 
Persons quitting work, or inducing or attem pting to induce 
others to quit work...shall forfeit whatever wages may be due...to 
such persons absolutely.
Against th is background of intolerance for labor organization, 
and  the situation of dependency which characterized the relationship 
of worker to company, Cambria was successfully able to suppress union 
activity. With the coming of the Depression of 1873 and the subse­
quent deterioration of the  rail market, the Cambria Company,
...adjusted to the situation by lowering costs, cutting production, 
and laying off workers. Wages dropped. At first, they were cu t 
10 percent, and th e n  in mid-November a  further cu t of 21 per­
cent w as announced. The sliding scale of the coal miners was 
revised downward. Finally, the company paid the entire new 
wage in store goods and credit ra ther than  in cash. Company 
officials advised dissatisfied m en to find other jobs, and told the 
rest to accept the new  wage or face unemployment. The Cam­
bria Iron Works th u s  sought to w eather the early m onths of the 
depression (Gutman 1976, pp. 331-332).
When workers responded to this situation with revitalized union
activity and strike threats, the company was able to finally defeat
unionization through a  combination of lockouts in 1873-1874 and the
procurem ent of raw m aterials from outside sources. The Cambria Iron
Company h ad  w hat Carnegie did not—not only the best and most
organizationally integrated facilities, b u t a  completely non-union
workforce. The Carnegie Company and the other basic iron and steel
producers would not have both of these things for another eighteen
years.
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In the Pittsburgh district mills, the  Amalgamated Association 
successfully organized Carnegie's Homestead mills as  well as the mills 
of Jo n e s  and Laughlin. By 1889 there were seven lodges active in the 
Homestead works (Brooks 1940, p. 23), and Homestead had become 
the strong center of the Amalgamated Association a t  th a t time. As 
Stone (1974, p. 121) comments, "...it is no wonder th a t the battle 
between capital and labor would shape up  there." The strike of 1892 
would be, in effect, the "last stand" of th e  Amalgamated in the basic 
steel industry.
Carnegie’s stated attitude towards the union had  begun to 
change, reflecting changing conditions in  the steel industry. At first. 
Carnegie complained tha t since the union had failed to organize the 
whole industry, the  Homestead mills were a t a  d istinct competitive 
disadvantage (Brooks 1940, p. 25). Contrary to the  1886 statem ent of 
its key founder, th e  Carnegie Steel Company began to pursue a  
program  of anti-union actions. First, in 1885,
Machinery a t  the Edgar Thomson Works...displaced 57 of the 69 
m en on the heating furnaces, 51 of the 63 m en on the rail-mill 
train, and similar num bers elsewhere. The two lodges [of the 
A.A.I.S.W.1 a t  the plant dissolved as  a  result, b u t the union did not 
complain (Brody 1960, p. 51).
Secondly, in 1890, again, the year th a t the U.S. industry su r­
passed Great Britain in ou tpu t and export of steel, the  Carnegie Com­
pany successfully prevented unionization of the Duquesne works by 
bringing in inexperienced help. The similarities between these two 
cases (the Edgar Thomson an d  Duquesne Works) and  the situation that 
developed in Wheeling in 1885-1886 are strikingly apparent. It 
seems th a t capital had settled on a new labor relations strategy. The
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essence of this strategy, based on the increase of steel production, and 
therefore mechanization of production, is captured in  the following 
statem ent from Charles Schwab of U.S. Steel Corporation, in looking 
back a t th is period:
In 1901, Charles Schwab observed th a t the relation of skills to 
union strength had been greatly exaggerated. He could take a 
green hand—say an  Intelligent farmworker—and make a  melter 
of him  in six or eight weeks. Strike tactics therefore changed 
from quiescence to importing strikebreakers (Brody 1960, p. 
58).
By all estimations, in 1892, the industry was probably only about half 
unionized.
It is after the union left the  Edgar Thomson works and before 
the events a t the Duquesne works that the conflict th a t would lead to 
the Homestead Strike of 1892 really began. In May of 1889, Carnegie 
and his Steel Company openly declared an  antiunion policy. In the 
same year, the company proposed these term s to the new labor agree­
m ent (Brooks 1940, p. 25). F irs t, the company called for wage reduc­
tion for skilled workers. Secondly, the company proposed th a t the 
contract be terminated in January. Contracts usually came up for 
renegotiation in June . The significance of th is is th a t the union w as in 
a  better bargaining position in the sum m er when production levels 
were higher. Thirdly, contracts were to be negotiated and signed by 
the Individual workers. This final proposal would give the company 
leeway to bypass the union completely in the negotiation process.
The union refused to accept such term s and on Ju ly  1, 1889, 
went out on strike. There was a  great deal of sympathy for the strike 
in all of Carnegie's establishm ents, including support from railroad 
workers and  those in  the coking facilities. The strike could have
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closed Carnegie down completely. At Homestead, the strike ended in 
a somewhat em barassing way for the company. It is described by 
Brody (1960, p. 58) as follows:
The company sent one hundred deputy sheriffs to take 
possession of the works. The strikers, no less astute, disarmed 
them , and shipped them  back to Pittsburgh m inus coats and 
caps. No violence accompanied th is tentative effort, and  the 
company retreated.
Carnegie Steel abandoned its demands, and the strike ended in 
a victory for the union. B ut there is some doubt over whether or not it 
was a  decisive union victory. Brooks (1940, p. 26) calls the strike "a 
clear victory for the union." Stone (1974, p. 118) states, "At 
Carnegie's Homestead mill, a  contract was won in 1889 th a t gave 
workers authority over every aspect of production there."
Brody (1960, p. 52) argues th a t while the strike was a  victory for 
the u n ion -after all they did win a  contract—it could not stop or 
reverse the process of concession-taking th a t had been going on for 
some time. In fact, in the resolution of the strike of 1889, the union 
gave up  some im portant rights. W hat had the union lost by then  and in 
1889?
• The Amalgamated Association gave up attem pts to negotiate standard 
wage scales. Union lodges negotiated with particular mills.
• ’The Association accepted the principle th a t increased ou tpu t 
through mechanical advance necessitated rate adjustments." In 
essence, for a union whose traditional basis of influence had been 
control of skill, the Amalgamated Association agreed to the conditions 
of its own demise.
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• Following the 1889 conflict the union gave up responsibility for 
hiring and paying unskilled helpers to the m anagem ent of the mills, 
and, along with this, gave up its right to determine hours.
• Finally, because of increased mechanization in steel p lants, the union 
lost any  influence in setting ou tpu t limitations. In this, and in the loss 
over influence in decisions concerning deployment of unskilled labor 
especially, one m ust question Stone's assertion that the union had 
achieved "authority over every aspect of production." In fact, it seems 
th a t the  union, and  therefore the skilled workers, were losing 
authority.
Another factor which Brody discusses, one th a t Brooks and 
Stone seem  to neglect in discussing the strike of 1889, is the steadily 
deteriorating position of the union even during the strike. Other firms 
in the industry withheld the signing of contracts for the duration of 
the strike. Also, after the strike, wage cuts throughout the industry 
generally matched those established a t the Carnegie mills. This is a  
pattern  th a t would be repeated after 1892. Brody (1960, p. 57) 
observes tha t during the 1889 strike a t Homestead,
A Jones and Laughlin official stated: "This company will make no 
term s with its m en until there is a  settlem ent a t Homestead." It 
could not pay higher wages than  its chief rival.
So. while the union had  lost its ability to influence the establishm ent
of standard, industrywide wage scales, mill operators gained the ability
to depress wages on an  industrywide basis.
W hat was won in  the strike was the survival of the union, and, in
the wake of the strike's success, "membership increased by half...and
the balance in the treasury rose to $146,000" (Brody 1960, p. 54).
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Also won was a  three-year contract, due to ru n  out on Ju n e  30, 1892. 
The stage was se t for the strike of th a t year.
Between 1889 and 1892, the situation in Carnegie's Pittsburgh 
district had  changed in an  Important way. Keeping the union  out of 
the Duquesne works (1890) and the breakdown of the union a t the 
Edgar Thomson works combined to give the Steel Company,
The special advantage of a  m ulti-plant operation which was only
partly  unionized; Carnegie could count on some production no
m atter w hat happened a t Homestead (Brody 1960, p . 59).
The Carnegie Company had been able to create something which in 
the m odem  period has come to be called "parallel production."19 
Bluestone and Harrison (1982, p. 166) say about parallel production:
"A strike or other form of disruption a t the original shop can be met by 
redirecting more production to the non-union facility...and it also 
strengthens the hand of management back in the union shop." Because 
it could potentially move production between sites, the political 
position of the company had been strengthened. Hogan (1971, p.
248) indicates in the following statem ent th a t such a  strategy was 
effective. "Despite the duration of the strike and its costs, the 
Carnegie Steel Company made a  substantial ne t profit of about $4 
million during the year." With this the company became more 
intolerant of the union. J.H . Bridge in his History of the Carnegie Steel 
Corporation sum s up  the attitude of the company toward the  union in 
this statem ent; "Every detail of the great p lant was subject to the
19 Adam (1975, p. 94) describes this as "multi-sourcing." B arnet and 
Muller (1974, p. 309) also discuss the political impacts of "multiple 
sourcing" upon labor which allows corporations to protect themselves 
from strikes as a m easure of independence from any one p lan t's  labor 
force is achieved.
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Interference of some busybody representing the  Amalgamated 
Association" (1903, pp. 201-202).20
In 1892 America led Britain, steel production led iron produc­
tion nationally, and Carnegie's company led the steel industry. At 
Homestead the contract with the Amalgamated Association was due to 
expire on Ju n e  30 of th a t year. On the eve of the  coming conflict, 
Carnegie left for a trip to Scotland, and  his chairman, Henry Clay 
Frick, was to deal with the  union. Before leaving, Carnegie gave in­
structions to Frick to "roll up  a large lot of plates ahead, which can be 
finished, should the works be stopped for a  time" (Brody 1960, p. 55).
In essence, the term s offered by the com pany to th e  Amalga­
m ated Association in th a t year were no t different from those offered in 
1889. The company called for wage reductions for 325 skilled work­
ers, and delivered its term s to the union  as an  ultim atum . The union 
h ad  to accept the company's terms by  Ju n e  24 or else the  company 
would begin to write individual contracts (Brody 1960, p. 53; Brooks 
1940, p. 27; and Hogan 1971, p. 231). The union was willing to m ake 
wage concessions, bu t agreement could not be reached over the level 
of cu ts th a t were necessary. However, it should be pointed out that 
while the conflict between the union and  the company w as stated to 
be over wages, from the point of view of the company, "the real point 
a t  issue in the 1892 dispute was the very life of the Amalgamated 
Association and  of unionism  in general" (Hogan 1971, p. 231). Where 
once the union had been seen (e.g., by Carnegie) as  a stabilizing force
20 Quoted also in Stone (1974, pp. 118-119).
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In production, it was now seen as an  obstacle. Brody (1960, pp. 52- 
53) comments:
In the course of its experience in  the puddling mills, the Amal­
gamated Association had accumulated an  extensive stock of rules 
to protect its members. The regulations were carried over into 
the steel plants. The Memorandum of Agreement for the 
Homestead works, for instance, contained fifty-eight pages of 
"footnotes" defining and limiting the rules of work of 
Amalgamated men.21
The company wanted nothing to do with the union any longer since
the existence of the Amalgamated Association in the steel mills
impeded the reduction of labor costs made possible by advancing
mechanization of steel production. Carnegie saw the destruction of
the union as the "'chance to reorganize the whole affair'" (Brody,
1960, p. 53). In the Pittsburgh Post. Ju ly  8, 1892, Frick was a  little
more b lunt in his summ ary of the company's intentions. He stated
them  in these term s (Hogan 1971, p. 231):
I can say with the greatest em phasis th a t under no circum­
stances will we have any further dealings with the Amalgamated 
Association as an organization. This is final.
Throughout the steel industry a t the time, the Carnegie Com­
pany was viewed as fighting the good fight against the Amalgamated 
Association. For example,
During the Homestead Strike, John  Gates [American Steel and 
Wire] had assured the Carnegie Company of his willingness to 
postpone the fulfillment of its contract until after the struggle 
with the Amalgamated: "Fight them  to a  finish with hard gloves, 
and give them  no quarter after you get them  in a  com er and we 
will take the rods in  1894 if necessary" (Brody 1960, p. 57, 
quoting Gates's communication to J.C. Fleming, August 9, 1892).
21 See also Stone (1974) for the attitude of mill operators toward these 
rules.
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The strike was apparently consolidating capitalists as  they rallied 
around Carnegie.
The Amalgamated Association's refusal to accept the  company's 
term s preceded its defeat a t Homestead in 1892 and the 
"dislodgement" of the  Amalgamated from the rest of the  basic steel 
industry proceeded rapidly.22 Also, the union failed in its subsequent 
battle w ith the company in the courts. By November 20, 1892, the 
union w as banished from Homestead and the Amalgamated Association 
was driven from basic steel production.
After the Carnegie Company's victory a t Homestead, other 
companies followed the lead. For example, after Homestead,
The superintendent a t the Joliet steel mill [of Jo n es and 
Laughlin] handed the m en an  ultimatum: unless they took a  one- 
th ird  slice, he would s ta rt up  nonunion. The Association 
accepted...."The steel mills are getting away from us," lamented 
President (of the  A.A.I.S.W.) Shaffer....By 1910, the Association
22 The events of the strike shaped up as follows (Brooks 1940, pp. 27- 
28; and Brody 1960, p. 58):
As the expiration date of the contract approached, the company 
announced tha t it would have no further dealings with the  union 
beginning on the first of July. Frick ordered the construction of a  
fence topped with barbed wire around the whole of the Homestead 
works and on 30 Ju n e , the mill's workforce was locked ou t of the 
plant. Frick planned to reopen the plant on 6 Ju ly  with nonunion 
workers so, three hundred Pinkerton guards were brought in and 
landed by river barge a t Homestead (F^ick had  contacted the Pinker­
ton agency on 24 June). The strikers had heard of Frick's plans, and, 
determined to keep the plant closed to strikebreakers, awaited the 
arrival of the barges carrying the Pinkertons who were being brought 
In a t night. Armed hostilities broke out between the strikers and the 
hired guards, leaving seven strikers and three Pinkertons dead with 
m any other casualitles on both sides. The Pinkertons were forced to 
abandon Homestead.
The defeat of the Pinkertons, however, prompted the 
deployment of the Pennsylvania state militia. With this, the 
Homestead works were reopened and started up  with a  nonunion 
workforce. The strike, for all practiced purposes, was over.
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listed b u t one small open-hearth plant under contract (Brody 
1960, pp. 57 and  60).
The union would continue in the  organization of mills producing 
certain finished steel products where skill still rem ained an  im portant 
factor, especially in the production of sheet and tin plate. The union, 
in  fact, retreated to these mills, and, as  de-unionization of basic steel 
continued through the 1890s, the Amalgamated Association urged 
displaced skilled workers to seek employment in these other indus­
tries.23 At the opening of the twentieth century, the union had organ­
ized three-fourths of the sheet mills and  all tin plate mills except one, 
and it became officially the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, 
and Tin Workers (Brody 1960, p. 60).
The Repercussions of the Homestead Strike of 1892. In the afterm ath 
of the 1892 strike, severe cuts in wages were announced in the 
Carnegie Company. In 1893, an official of the company stated (quoted 
in Brody 1960, p. 42; and Brecher 1972, p. 63):
With this new [wage] scale in force the firm will be in a  position 
to compete more successfully th an  ever before, and will probably 
have a  material advantage over m any of its competitors in cost 
sheets.
This is representative of a general trend in the industry. For 
example, a t the time this new wage scale was announced in the 
Carnegie Company, others responded to Carnegie's bid to out-compete 
other producers and break out of the pack. At Cambria,
23 The Amagamated Association would effectively be banished from 
these facilities as well w ith the formation of trusts and entrenchm ent 
of their Industrial position. For example, Garraty (1960, p. 8) sta tes 
th a t during the years 1900 to 1901, American Sheet Steel Company 
sh u t down nine out its twenty union mills while "all seven of the 
company's non-union mills were operating full tilt."
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Powell Stackhouse [of Cambria's management}...recalled, "We 
were looking everywhere to reduce our costs, and  labor got its 
share of it....We got them down low. We had to" (Brody 1960, p. 
42).
In 1893, wages fell an  average of 25% throughout the industry. 
Also, between 1890 and  1910, labor costs as an  aspect of total 
m anufacturing costs fell from 22.5% a t the same time th a t productivity 
doubled in steel p lants and increased three times in the blast furnaces. 
As Hogan (1971, p. 233) observes:
The low-cost attitude of the companies naturally  affected the 
steelworkers, for they too represented an  item of cost. Every 
attem pt was m ade to multiply their productivity in  relation to 
the ir income.
Labor had  gone in twenty years from scarce resource to a  mere factor 
in production.
All of this took place before the backdrop of actual and th rea t­
ened closure of facilities. A pool of strikebreakers was created in one 
sense through the closure of iron facilities and puddling furnaces. The 
threatened plant closure came into its  own during th is period as a 
political tool in the discipline of labor forces. This is illustrated in the 
following quote from a  correspondence between William Edenhom  to 
John  Lambert of Consolidated Steel and Wire Company, 19 February, 
1897 (Brody 1960, p. 42):
The American Wire Company about two weeks ago laid before its 
wire drawers the ultim atum  of a  ten percent reduction or an  
indefinite shut-dow n of its works. The men took the reduction 
and the works are running.
This strategy of control would continue into the twentieth century. In
1913, Jo h n  Topping of Republic Steel said: "When you sh u t down and
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they get hungry, they are anxious to take any terms" (Brody 1960, p. 
41).
Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter I have presented a  framework for discussing the 
development of the steel industry in the United S tates during the 
second half of the nineteenth century. The importance of the link 
between the conditions of capitalist competition on th e  one hand  and 
the conditions of capitalist production, i.e., of labor control, on the 
other hand is emphasized. This framework is useful in  discussing the 
particular development of the steel industry  against the  historical 
conditions of capitalist industrialization globally, as well as in the 
domestic arena, and in Illuminating the significance of the major labor 
struggles in the Industry during these three decades.
Three Contexts of Capitalist Competition
The American steel industry arose within three realm s of capi­
talist competition. First, in general, the rise of the steel industry can 
be explained as an  outcome of the successful assertion of the interests 
of Northern industrial capital over those of Southern agricultural capi­
tal, with the latter linked to the interests of British industrial capital. 
This competition, the historical expression of which culminated in  the 
Civil War, was between factions of the domestic owning class, repre­
senting different forms of capital ownership over rights to make 
dem ands on the sta te to protect and advance those in terests.24
24 In this way, the Civil War was the end result of the process of capi­
ta list nation-building. Wallerstein (1976, p. 33) defines a  nation-state 
as "a territorial un it whose rulers seek...to make it a  national society."
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Secondly, Northern victory in  the war created the political 
conditions (e.g., the establishm ent of protectionist measures) for the 
advancement of United States industrial capital since the state could 
be called upon  more easily to support its in terests over those of any 
other national capitalism, particularly those of the capitalist class of 
Great Britain. The preservation of the Union and  the establishm ent of 
protectionist barriers m eant the security of the  domestic m arket for 
American industrial capitalists from threats to its  position from both 
inside and outside of th is market.
Thirdly, in the domestic sphere, the protection of th e  American 
m arket from foreign capital led to a  rush  on the  part of American 
producers to gain control over th e  domestic m arket. For example, the 
revised Morrill Tariff in  1871 preceded a  rapid growth in  the 
domestic production of steel rails which previously had been virtually 
nonexistent. Domestic m anufacturers vied w ith each o ther to meet 
the  dem ands of the m arket for steel products. In an atm osphere of 
intense competition between Individual firms, iron-m aking facilities 
were being sh u t down and investm ent was shifted towards the 
production of steel. The creation of the United States as  a n  industrial 
capitalist nation, and the  security of its m arket from British designs on 
it, left American capitalists, particularly those invested in steel, to 
fight it out w ith each other at home.
When it becam e apparent to the "southern slave owning oligarchy" (cf. 
Baran and Sweezy 1966, p. 252 above) tha t they  could no longer 
depend on the  existing state to secure them w ithin the domestic 
order, they attem pted to  withdraw and  form a  new national society the 
political struc tu re  of which would be more single-mlndedly dedicated 
to  the preservation of the  plantation system.
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Capitalist Competition and Labor Control: "Partners-Alike In 
Prosperity and Adversity" to "Busyfaodies Representing the 
Amalgamated Association"
The major means by which individual capitals secure their com­
petitive position is through the successful and progressive devaluation 
of labor through mechanization and centralization of processes (cf. 
Castells 1980, p. 18, above). Capital seeks not only to achieve undis­
puted control over m arkets, bu t undisputed control over the condi­
tions of production. At th is particular time, such  control necessitated 
the underm ining of the importance of craft labor. The ability to 
control m arkets is, in fact, inextricably tied to the ability to control 
production, which in tu rn  rests on the control of labor.
It is in relation to the highly competitive situation In American 
capitalism and particularly in steel production th a t the major labor 
struggles of the nineteenth century beginning with the "Great Up­
heaval" m ust be understood, and with them, both the Wheeling Strike 
of 1885-1886 and the Homestead Strike of 1892. In his assessm ent 
of the Homestead Strike of 1892, Brecher (1972, p. 62) states:
In the final analysis, the strikers were defeated by the new 
technology of the steel industry. In the earlier days, it had  been 
impossible to run  the mills w ithout the skilled men of the 
Amalgamated, and so all that was necessary to defeat an  employ­
er was "to withhold our skills from them  until such time as they 
agree." B ut with the increasing mechanization of the mills 
[made possible in the first place by the natu re  of steel produc­
tion against tha t of Iron], employers could s ta rt up with new men 
and only a  nucleus of experienced workers. The new giant cor­
porations with m any plants could easily shift work from a  struck 
plant to an  unstruck one and th u s  be relatively unscathed by the 
strike.
A similar process was seen to operate a t Wheeling six years earlier.
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W hen viewed in  this light, the events a t Wheeling and Home­
stead represent the culmination of the process in w hich capital 
wrested political control over production from labor and  the resis­
tance of labor to its subsum ption under capital. In h is  definition of 
alienated labor, Edwards (1979, p. 147) sta tes that labor alienation, in 
one im portant sense, is the process under which "workers are forced 
to work according to capitalist criteria." If craft and skill represent 
political control over production by laborers—i.e., the extent to which 
production is carried out according to "criteria" set by  workers—then  
the break-up of the Amalgamated Association, an association of craft 
workers, represented the loss by labor of the ability to make any such 
claims.
In the steel Industry in 1892 labor w as finally transformed from 
scarce and  valuable skill to replaceable commodity and  object of 
control. Steel m asters went from being concerned w ith preserving 
and securing their source of valuable labor to being concerned with 
controlling it. Labor power in the  form of craft In general, and iron 
puddling in  particular, lost its character as  the "carrier of skills and 
experience, developed through time" (Shaw 1978, p. 16).
It w as during the  1880s, the  time of conflict between capital and 
craft labor, tha t Frederick Winslow Taylor began his "experiments" in 
scientific m anagem ent a t the Midvale Steel Company. In 1898, Taylor 
was hired by Bethlehem Steel to organize the  company's facilities 
according to the principles of scientific m anagem ent (Hessen 1972, 
pp. 343-346). Although strict application of scientific m anagem ent 
met with little success in the steel industry, interest In them  by Beth­
lehem and other producers in the  age of craft destruction indicates
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the desire on the part of steel m anufacturing Interests to dictate every 
aspect of production to its labor force.25 According to Shefter (1986, 
p. 273),
Employers chafed under the restrictions th a t unions placed 
upon their ability to control and deploy their labor force and 
m any sought to overcome these restrictions by adopting the 
changes in organization of production advocated by Frederick W. 
Taylor....
The Wheeling and Homestead Strikes dem onstrate the  capacity 
gained by capital to underm ine the political influence of labor over the 
production process in the transition of iron to steel production, and 
th is was facilitated by the disinvestment of iron and investm ent in 
steel production. With the defeat of the Amalgamated Association in 
basic steel production, "labor conditions were dictated in great part by 
minimum cost requirements" (Hogan 1971, p. 233). By extending 
control over the production process through the disorganization of 
labor, the conditions for the intensified organization of rap ita l were
25 In fact, one of the problems of scientific management, a t least with 
respect to the Bethlehem case, was th a t Taylor was too successful. 
Hessen (1972, pp. 343-344) states:
Taylor first applied h is time-and-motion study m ethods to the 
handling of raw m aterials in the Bethlehem yards; he devised 
procedures whereby only 140 men would be needed to do work 
which previously required more th an  400. However, Bethle­
hem 's owners were displeased with Taylor's new system. "They 
did not wish me, as they said, to depopulate South Bethlehem," 
Taylor later wrote. "They owned all the  houses in South Bethle­
hem and the company stores, and w hen they saw th a t we [Taylor 
and his assistants] were cutting the labor force down to about 
one-fourth, they did no t w ant it."
In this case the company's desire to dictate every aspect of workers’ 
lives inside the factory clashed with their equally im portant and 
profitable desire to dictate workers' lives outside the factory as well.
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created. The foundation was laid for the great m ergers of the 1890s, 
and with them the centralization and concentration of capital in the 
steel industry  leading to the formation of the United States Steel 
Corporation in 1901.
CHAPTER IV:
STEEL AND MONOPOLY I: TRUST FORMATION, CENTRALIZATION, 
FACTORY CLOSURES, AND THE "LONG MARCH" TO 71 BROADWAY
Introduction
The original formation of the steel lndustiy  from 1865 to about 
1892 was accompanied by the dissolution of America's iron industry. 
The next phase of this development, the  phase of monopoly formation 
in steel, from the 1870s to its culmination in the formation of the 
United States Steel Corporation would be accompanied by the con­
tinuing closure not only of iron facilities bu t of steel making facilities 
also.
This chapter is a  discussion of the  development of the steel in­
dustry  in the post-Homestead period, from the 1890s to the formation 
of United States Steel Corporation in 1901, emphasizing the historical 
relationship between the formation of the  great tru s ts  in the steel 
industry and factory closures. The abandonment, dismantling, and 
relocation of plants in this period of rapid  and massive industrializa­
tion are placed in the forefront through a  survey of the dom inant 
tru s ts  which were eventually brought together to form United States 
Steel Corporation including the Carnegie Steel Company and the com­
panies of the Moore and Morgan Groups. Carnegie Steel, Morgan's 
Federal Steel, and Moore's National Steel were the  largest and  most 
integrated of the basic steel producers. Gates's American Steel and 
Wire Company and Shelby Steel Tube Company, leading steel fabrica­
tion concerns incorporated into U.S. Steel, are also discussed along
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with American Bridge Company and National Tube Company of the 
Morgan Group and Moore's American Tin Plate Company, American 
Steel Hoop Company, and American Steel Plate Company.
The building of the American steel industry  was accompanied 
both by factory closures in the United States as  firms centralized 
production and m arkets, and by the dism antling of steel making facili­
ties in England especially steel fabricating facilities like those for 
making tin  plate which were shipped to this country. Therefore, the 
central focus of this chapter is the extent to which the transform ation 
of the industry involved a  process similar both "mechanically" and in 
the logic of its development to w hat is now called deindustrialization.
The developments taking place during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries in world, and particularly, American capital­
ism have been described as comprising a capitalist revolution. The 
m ost im portant aspects of this revolution are identified as the in­
creasing ability of capitalist firms to concentrate control over indus­
trial production and distribution (cf. Berle 1954, p. 25, and Bar an  and 
Sweezy 1966, p. 34). Thus, this capitalist revolution was also neces­
sarily a  corporate revolution as companies centralized organizational 
command and integrated production a t  an unprecented level and rate 
(Bryant and DethlofF 1983, p. 169, and Hacker 1968, p. 438). The 
events leading up  to the formation of the United States Steel Corpora­
tion and its role in the subsequent development of the steel industry 
and capitalism in the United States was part of th is dual revolution. In 
turn , factory closures are part of the formation of United States Steel. 
Therefore, examination of this late nineteenth century example can 
dem onstrate the im portance of factory closures in the process of in-
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dustiia l and corporate growth domestically ju s t  as  sociological writings 
focusing on the  post-1945 period reveal their im portance in  domestic 
industrial decline.
In this chapter, then , we consider the role of the factory closure 
in the extension and intensification of control over production through 
the process of monopolization, I.e., a s  firms develop along the  dimen­
sions of horizontal, vertical, and spatial integration. Historically, this 
occurred, as in  the case of the steel industry, through the develop­
m ent of organizational forms culminating in the rise of the holding 
company as a  tactic of control. This facilitated the command of single 
corporate adm inistrations over larger geographically defined markets, 
coordination of production from raw  material processing to distribu­
tion of finished goods, and  brought together previously competing 
firms engaged in similar processes.
The term s horizontal, vertical, and spatial, applied in  th is 
context refer to the points a t which capitalist firm s compete with one 
another while the term integration is synonomous with control. Thus, 
for example, we may speak of independent firms engaged in  competi­
tion horizontally, vertically, and spatially versus their integration at 
these points where previously competing firms lose independent 
identity or are transform ed into subcompanies or divisions of single 
corporations through mergers. The history of the  development of the 
steel industry in  the United States dem onstrates a n  essential contra­
diction concerning the natu re  of m arket relations under capitalism, 
the contradiction between competition and control.
Capitalist competition takes place horizontally across products, 
vertically through stages of production processes, and spatially over
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geographically defined m arkets. In other words, competition between 
capitalist enterprises occurs between firms producing and selling 
sim ilar commodities, firms which are engaged in  processes located on 
longer chains of production, and between firms over rights to produce 
and sell commodities within given areas (cf. W allerstein 1983, p. 29). 
However, while capitalism  ever tends toward competition between 
individual capitals since interest is always defined particularistically in 
term s of profit, the ability of any one capital (e.g., firm) to accumulate 
profit—to self-expand—circumvents the ability of others to do the same 
(Marx, 1967/1894, pp. 173-199; Foley 1986, p. 94; Mandel 1968, pp. 
162-166). Therefore, the driving force in relationships between 
capitalist firms is not toward competition b u t toward overcoming 
competition, toward control—horizontally over products, vertically 
over processes, and spatially over geographically defined markets. 
Firms, and, operating within them, capitalists and their represen­
tatives. are suspended between the tendency toward competition and 
the necessity of establishing control.
This quest for integration—th a t is, control over production—is 
carried out in a  variety of social and organizational contexts. For ex­
ample. a t the level of relations between capitalist national states, state 
policies more or less represent the in terests of domestic capitalist 
classes, or a t least the m ost powerful or im portant factions thereof.1
1 I am  speaking in very general term s here. However, I recognize that 
the issue is m uch more complicated th an  I have presented it. There 
is an  ongoing debate in social science over the nature of the state in 
capitalist society (cf. Brown 1986; Miliband 1969; Poulantzas 1975; 
O'Connor 1973; Szymanski 1978; Wolfe 1977; and others). Within 
Marxism In particular, there is argum ent over the degree of relative 
autonom y between sta te processes and those of class. Skocpol (1980, 
pp. 161-178) explains th is debate between neo-M arxist theories of the
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Protectionist policies, as we have seen, contribute to the security of 
the domestic market. The corollary of protectionism Is Imperialism 
where sta te  policies support the quest for control over production and 
m arkets outside of the immediate domestic context (Barone 1985, p.
state as  centered around the works of Miliband and Poulantzas. Mili­
band (1969), arguing against Mill's (1956) theory of th e  power elite, 
claims th a t the state is an  instrum ental extension of the  class interests 
of the bourgeoisie operating as its political wing and recruiting its 
functionaries from the capitalist class itself. Poulantzas (1975) argues 
th a t the state is more autonom ous th an  is claimed by Miliband and 
functions to represent the interests of the entire capitalist class. It is 
contained within the larger context of capitalist society which deter­
mines the logic of its operation regardless of from where its function­
aries are recruited. My purpose here is not to resolve th is debate b u t 
to emphasize what each side shares in common. For my purposes, I 
recognize, as does Brown (1986, pp. 95-96), tha t both Miliband's and 
Poulantzas's ideas are variations on the theme expressed by Marx and 
Engels (1848/1972, p. 33) th a t "The executive of the m odem  sta te is 
bu t a  committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bour­
geoisie." Where they differ is not on the point tha t th is is so, b u t on 
how it is so. Therbom (1978, p. 28) offers a  definition of the state 
which is critically opposed to both Miliband's and Poulantzas's: "The 
state should be regarded neither a  specific institution nor as an 
instrum ent, b u t as a relation—a materialized concentration of the class 
relations of a  given society." This is to say, as does Oilman (1976, pp. 
212 and 217), th a t the sta te  is really a  "facet of the class relation" 
which "represents the domination of one class over another." The 
state Is neither instrum ent nor institution separate b u t supportive of 
class domination. But, sta te  and class are Inseparable aspects of capi­
talist society. The state is itself an expression of class, of "national 
power of capital over labor" (Marx 1870/1935, p. 142) and of national 
capitalisms against each other. Also in  opposition to Miliband and 
Poulantzas, Skocpol (1979, p. 29) defends a  more Weberian or w hat 
she calls "organizational” or "realist" view of the state where she claims 
tha t while the state exists in a larger institutional setting, part of 
which Includes class divided relations, th e  state also h as  its own in ­
terests which it seeks to advance against all others. In such  a view, 
the state is ultimately autonom ous and develops apart from or inci­
dentally to class processes (cf. Skocpol 1979, p. 178). The basis of the 
so-called "realist" perspective is the definitional separation of the pol­
itical and economic realm s and therefore it constitutes a  denial of the 
interrelationship between polity and economy which Block (1978, p.
3) asserts is implicit in the development and existence of capitalist 
society.
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81). Policies of the  state also regulate the capitalist struggle between 
individual capitals within the national context, as, for example, in the 
case of an ti-trust and other kinds of policies.
At the level of the firm, the quest for horizontal, vertical, and 
spatial control over production takes place through organizational 
developments like those of interfirm relations from the pool, to the 
tru st, to the holding company. Each of these progressively extends 
and intensifies control over products, processes, and m arkets. In 
sum , th is  chapter is a  consideration of the role of the factory closure 
in th is  overall development. It Is against th is th a t the concept of 
deindustrialization as it has currently influenced sociological discus­
sions m ust be reconsidered. My purpose is to highlight the role of 
p lant closures in the process of the building of the steel industry  as 
opposed to their role in its dismantling as is emphasized in current 
sociological treatm ents of the issue. I will do th is by placing the 
factory closure w ithin the context of tru s t formation and monopoliza­
tion in  the domestic steel industry.
The Steel Industry in the Late Nineteenth Centurv: 
Concentration and Centralization of Production
The birth of the steel industry  took place am idst the abandon­
m ent of Iron production and, with it, of ironmaking facilities. In the 
last stage of its transition from iron to steel production, Hogan (1971, 
p. 300) states:
The Directory to the Iron and Steel Works of the United States 
for 1896 Included the following statem ent: The m ost notable 
abandonm ent of [iron] puddling furnaces tha t has taken place in 
recent years has occurred a t the American Works of Jo n es and 
Laughlin, Ltd. In 1894, this firm reported 92 single puddling 
furnaces as still forming part of its plant; in  the present edition
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only 15 single puddling furnaces are reported and on February 8 
the last of these furnaces was dismantled.
As seen in the previous chapter, th is course of disinvestm ent of iron 
production and shutdown of iron making facilities was part of a  larger, 
industrywide trend of the sim ultaneous movement away from craft 
based labor accompanied by the destruction of Ironmaking facilities 
and  the movement of capital into steel production.
On the world and national economic stages, the close of the 
nineteenth century was a  time of unprecedented capital centralization. 
In relations between capitalist states, imperialism and protectionism 
were aspects of this as two expressions of the sam e process through 
which world m arkets become divided among capitalist powers (Lenin 
1917/1975, p. 105). The drive toward consolidation in the steel 
industry  was, of course, p a rt of a  general trend toward monopolization 
taking place in the national economy, and across other core econo­
mies a t the sam e time as "rivalry between the great national capital­
ism s hardened" (Beaud 1983, p. 131) and the "Age of Finance Capital" 
began, i.e., the progressive merging of Industrial capital w ith and 
through banking capital (Lenin 1917/1975, p. 105). Within nations, 
large scale industrial and financial combinations were formed and 
corporations were ever becoming world actors even as their nations 
were becoming Imperialist powers.
The German economy was dominated by th e  likes of th e  Krupps 
in steel, AEG and Siemens in the electrical industry, and the  
Deutsche, Dresdner, and Diskonto Banks in finance (Beaud 1983, pp. 
136-137, and National Industrial Conference Board 1931, pp. 79-105). 
In Britain, typical of the period from 1880-1918, 655 independent
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industrial firms were merged into 74 corporations. Also in Britain 
from 1880-1913, 250 private banks were consolidated into 48 and 
120 jo in t stock banks into 43. In the "brave new world" of monopoly 
capitalism, whole branches of American industry were dominated by 
trusts, for example: 50 percent of textile production, 54 percent of 
glass-making, 60 percent of paper and book production, 62 percent of 
food, and 72 percent of liquor, 77 percent of nonferrous m etals, and 
81 percent of chemical production. Similar developments occurred in 
iron and steel where 84 percent of all production, including basic and 
fabricated steel production was controlled and organized by trusts 
(Beaud 1983, pp. 136-137). By 1901, 60 percent of all iron and steel 
production would be accounted for by the United States Steel 
Corporation alone. In the first decades of the twentieth century, the 
United States became the leader among capitalist nations in  all 
aspects of steel production. As a nation, the steel output of the United 
States reached 31,300,874 tons, more than  the combined outpu ts of 
Great Britain and Germany, and by themselves, the  mills of Pittsburgh 
accounted for one quarter of the world's total ou tpu t of steel (Cotter 
1916, p. 8). As Greer (1979, p. 51) states, "massive industrialization 
was the order of the day."
The domination of the American economy by tru sts  reflects the 
situation described by Mandel (1968, p. 403):
The num ber of trusts, which was only 23 in 1890 and 38 in 
1896, reached 257 in 1904, the annual capitalization of m er­
gers, which had never exceeded 240 million dollars, reached 
710 million in 1898, and 2,244 million in 1899. Out of 339 
mergers which took place in th is period, 156 gave rise to 
definite degree of monopoly power.
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The consolidation of the steel industry  in America had been 
taking place since the end of the Civil War. Two significant events in 
the late 1880s and early 1890s were the formation of the Illinois Steel 
Company in 1889, followed three years la ter by the reorganization of 
Carnegie Steel as Carnegie Steel Company, Ltd., a  holding company 
which controlled natu ra l gas wells, coal lands and coke processing 
facilities, iron ore lands, b last furnaces, steel mills, railroads, steam ­
ship and barge lines, ore docks, and merchandising stores. Firms 
were widening and deepening their control over all aspects of steel 
production. Integration of production necessitated organizational 
integration, and as  a  consequence, in the steel industry  as in other 
industries, the independent firm was being obliterated by monop­
olization and giving way to the tru s t and holding company.
During this period, the rate of tru s t formation in the steel 
industry  was intense. In a mere three years from 1898 to 1900, the 
vast majority of America's steel making and finishing capacity came 
under the control of trusts. In 1898, allied holding companies of the 
Morgan Group, whose Federal Steel Company itself incorporated 
Illinois Steel, were formed, American Bridge Company and National 
Tube Company also came under control of Morgan interests. National 
Steel, American Hoop Steel, American Tin Plate, and  American Sheet 
Steel of the Moore Group of allied holding companies all came on to 
the scene between 1898 and 1899 (Temin 1964, p. 191). Also In 
1899, Jo h n  W. Gates established the American Steel and Wire 
Company, and in 1900 Shelby Steel Tube Company underwent a  major 
reorganization which gave it is final form as  an  independent company 
before its  merger into United States Steel. When the dust had settled
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after th is first wave of consolidation, more th a n  half of the total steel 
making capacity of the nation came under the direction of th is  handful 
of companies (Cotter 1916, pp. 21-28; Hogan2 1971, p. 464; and 
Hacker 1968, pp. 436-437). This process of intense industrialization, 
corporate growth, expansion, and capital formation was accompanied 
by a  parallel process involving factoiy shutdowns, abandonment, 
dism antled facilities, and disinvestment.3
Capitalist Competition and Combination
The major developments taking place in the iron and steel 
industry  of the late nineteenth century were the centralization and 
consolidation of control over production and m arkets by fewer and 
fewer companies. The oligopolization of the industry also brought with 
it territorial concentration. Where the industry  was once scattered 
and decentralized, it was becoming more concentrated in steel
2 Hogan cites Report of the Commissioner of Corporations on  the Steel 
Industry. Part I. 1911. United States Departm ent of Commerce and 
Labor, Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office. See also Ger­
trude G. Schroeder (1953, pp. 36-38).
3 "Machinery, comparatively new, was scrapped to make room  for 
more m odem  equipment" (Cotter 1916, p. 7). Similar steel Industry 
developments were occurring elsewhere In the major capitalist coun­
tries as well. For example, the German steel industry was undergoing 
a  similar centralization of steel production involving development 
toward m ass production of steel accompanied by scrapping of plants 
(cf. National Industrial Conference Board 1931, p. 82). See also Walk­
er's (1906, pp. 353-398) tum -of-the-century account of the  German 
Steel Syndicate, a state-recognized monopoly. This study compares 
concentration of German steel production to the  development of the 
United States Steel Corporation. In 1926, the Verelntigte S tahl- 
werker. A.G. (United Steelworks Corporation) w as formed in  Germany 
through a combination of the largest steel manufacturing an d  mining 
tru s ts  of Germany (National Industrial Conference Board 1931, p. 82).
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producing districts in  and around Pittsburgh, Chicago, Cleveland, and 
Youngstown.
In the 1880s the iron and steel industry was comprised of many 
small companies w ith production capacities of 3,000-15,000 net tons 
of iron and steel products. There were also about a  dozen or so 
m edium  sized companies w ith capacities of from 15,000-75,000 net 
tons along with a  handful of large companies w ith capacities of more 
than  75,000 net tons (Hogan 1971, p. 235).4 From 1880-1890 there 
were still several hundred small companies, and  before the tu rn  of 
the twentieth century, the American steel industry  was m ade up of 
about 500 separate and competing firms (Schroeder 1953, p. 36). But 
by 1892, "Large companies had  grown considerably as several had ex­
panded their capacity beyond 250,000 net tons and two, Carnegie 
Steel and  Illinois Steel, boasted 1 million tons of steelmaking capacity" 
(Hogan 1971, p. 235; see also Schroeder 1953, p. 36). The larger size 
of companies and the vast increases in production capacity of inde­
pendent producers characteristic of the post-Homestead period both 
reflected and necessitated concentration of m arkets, centralization of
4 These large companies were located both east and  west of the  Alle­
gheny M ountains (four east, five west with two of these in the  Chicago 
area). Of steel companies with over 100,000 tons of capacity, those 
east of the Allegheny M ountains included; (1) Albany Renselaer Iron 
and Steel, 180,000 tons capacity; (2) Lackawana Iron and Steel Com­
pany, 168,000 tons; (3) Bethlehem Steel Company, 135,000 tons; and
(4) Pennsylvania Steel Company, 250,000 tons. Those west of the 
Allegheny M ountains were: (1) Cambria Steel Company, 200,000 tons; 
(2) Edgar Thomson Steel Works, 450,000 tons; (3) Cleveland Rolling 
Mill Company, 110,000 tons; (4) Joliet Steel Works, 150,000 tons; 
and, (5) North Chicago Rolling Mill Company, 200,000 tons.
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capital under particular firms, and  with these, the proliferation and 
refinement of corporate organizational structure .5
Domestically, the  drive toward consolidation can be accounted 
for with reference to two immediate and interrelated conditions, each 
having a  bearing, as recognized by Hogan (1971, p. 236), on the 
process of monopoly formation in  the  steel industry. F irst is the 
"oversupply problem," definitive of the intra-industry competitive 
situation within the domestic economy, and in the steel industry 
resulting in a  period of low demand through the decade from 1890- 
1899 (Temin 1964, p. 188). Thus, consolidation as a  broad strategy of 
m arket control and corporate combination as a  tactic to achieve it 
were responses rooted in a "desire by many companies to fortify 
themselves against the instability of the market" (Hogan 1971, p. 236). 
In the iron and steel industry this oversupply/under-dem and problem 
reflected the situation were American furnaces were increasing in 
capacity and outstripping the ability of existing m arkets to absorb 
surplus. Such a problem resulted from intense competition between 
small firms trying to break  free of the constraints of local m arkets, so 
combination was pursued by many firms as a  way to stabilize produc­
tion and marketing and end "ruinous competition" (Bryant and Deth- 
loff 1983, p. 169, and Heilbroner and  Singer 1984, pp. 200-2046).
5 Along these lines, Chandler (1962, p. 14, and 1977, p. 451) dis­
cusses the need of establishing corporate organizations more capable 
of coordinating activities, for example by replacing single, general 
adm inistrative offices w ith subdivisions coordinated by a  central office. 
As firms increase geographic scope and command over production, 
they develop wider and deeper organizational structures.
6 Heilbroner and Singer (1984, p. 200) refer to th is statem ent by J.P . 
Morgan which, as they say, captures the "spirit of the age," "I like a
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Even though the tenets of Social Darwinism were extolled as the 
highest virtues, competition was viewed by the capitalists of the 
"Gilded Age" a s  destructive.
Secondly, the oversupply problem was compounded by fluctua­
tions in the economy, especially regarding inter-industry relations. 
Specifically w ith regard to the domestic steel industry, the fortunes of 
steel producers were closely tied to conditions in the railroad Industry 
and  especially in fluctuations in the m arket for rails. For example,
...when poor harvests in 1881 reduced the prosperity of the rail­
roads, the  iron and  steel industry w as so adversely affected by 
the decline in rail purchases th a t Bessemer rail prices declined 
from $60 to $50 during the first few m onths of the next year 
(Hogan 1971, p. 236).
Basically, the  drive toward centralization and concentration in Ameri­
can industry in  general, and in the iron and steel industry  in particu­
lar, was tied to the importance of combination as a  "buffer" against 
competition and  fluctuations in prices created by restricted m arkets 
(Hogan 1971, p. 237). The importance of combination in the steel 
industry as a  solution to m arket "vagaries" is further illustrated by the 
fact tha t rail prices from the late nineteenth through the opening of 
the twentieth century fluctuated wildy. From 1880 to 1901, the 
monthly average price for rails could vary anywhere from between
little competition, b u t I like combination better." Cotter (1916, p. 10) 
comments th a t,
The frequent and prolonged periods of depression had  forced 
upon steel makers the conviction tha t some way of combining to 
prevent their recurrence was desirable, even necessary, if the 
United States was to keep and increase its lead in  the m anufac­
ture of the metal m ost needed by the age. Between the years 
1890 and  1900 combinations in the industry  were as thick as 
the leaves of Vallambrosa.
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$16.50 to $85 per ton. It was no t until the formation of the United 
S tates Steel Corporation in 1901 th a t rail prices were held steady 
staying around $28 per ton until about 1916 (Heilbroner and Singer 
1984, p. 204 and Terain 1964, p. 192).
Thus, the nature and conditions of capitalist competition and 
the  resultant state of m arkets in the last decades of the 1800s 
provided the  Impetus to the consolidation and the rise of big business 
since restricted profits made expansion necessaiy. "Production was 
forced to a  new and wider scale...the time w as ripe for consolidation" 
(Edwards 1979, p. 42) as firms sought organizational solutions to the 
problems of accumulation that they faced.
Tactics of Combination in the Late Nineteenth Century; Vertical and 
Horizontal Integration as Organizational Solutions to "Ruinous 
Competition"
Because of the volatile natu re  of competition, capitalists form 
monopolies to protect themselves. E rnest Mandel (1968, p. 401) 
h a s  noted, "In order to  protect, m aintain or increase the ir rate of 
profit, capitalist enterprises arrive a t  understandings or enter into 
agreements to collaborate which take a great variety of forms."
Hogan (1971, pp. 237-238), among other com m entators, Identifies 
th ree basic forms of combination into which firms entered in the late 
n ineteenth century and  which were most im portant in the  specific 
case of the formation of the American steel industry  prior to the es­
tablishm ent of the United States Steel Corporation in 1901. These 
were the pool, the tru s t , and the holding com pany. Mandel (1968, p. 
401) draws a  distinction between pools and so-called gentlemen's 
agreements. According to his typology, gentlemen's agreements are
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voluntary in nature and refer to agreements between producers "not to 
sell below certain prices or in certain areas." The sam e is true of 
pools, yet they are distinguishable from gentlemen's agreements 
insofar as m arket sharing between producers is more specifically 
defined. That is, "They envisage...a definite division of the market" 
(Mandel 1968, pp. 401-402), for example, the rail pool allotted 
definite control over percentage shares of the m arket to firms based 
on capacity (Warren 1972, p. 99, and cf. Berglund 1907, pp. 34-35).
It m ust be understood th a t while the difference between the pool 
and the trust, for example, is definitely one of kind, tha t between the 
pool and  the gentlemen’s agreement is only of degree, each describing 
a fairly informal community of in terest between separate producers.7
In the 1870s, the "pool" or "gentleman's agreement" was an  
im portant way of establishing minimum prices, dividing markets, and 
coordinating production. Pools were easy to establish and provided 
checks on competition a t the same time tha t businesses could be 
managed independently. These were widely used during the period 
when industry  was m ost decentralized. In steel, there were pools for 
producers of every kind of steel product, e.g., the rail pool, wire pool, 
nail pool, plate pool, etc. (Ripley 1916, pp. xiii-xvi; Cotter 1916, p. 5; 
Temin 1964, p. 175; Hogan 1971, pp. 237-238; and Heilbroner and 
Singer 1984, pp. 196-197).
7 See Jones 's  (1926, pp. 7-8) work on the nature of tru s t formation in 
the early twentieth century. Jones m akes even more refined distinc­
tions between "the gentlemen's agreement; ...the speculative pool; 
...the regulation of ou tpu t pool; ...the division of the field pool; ...the 
selling agency; ...and the patent pool."
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Pools were usually established during periods of crisis b u t fell 
apart w hen conditions would improve—they were Informal and so not 
very reliable.8 During times when price agreem ent was most neces­
sary, such  as during periods of low demand, nothing prevented 
individual parties to such agreements from trying to break out If they 
could achieve some advantage th a t could be translated into profitability 
(cf. D urand 1920, p. 13, and Ripley 1916, pp. v-xxxlli). In fact It ap ­
peared th a t parties to these agreem ents would look for the right time 
to leave them  and in th is way attem pt to surpass their competition.
For example, Carnegie pulled his company out of the  rail pool follow­
ing the Homestead Strike after achieving an  advantage of labor control, 
a relatively lower wage bill, and economy of production through mech­
anization, and with these, the opportunity to lower the price of rails by 
$5 per ton (Brody 1960, pp. 6 and 51, and Hacker p. 345). Pools 
variably increased coordination between companies, and since they 
were formed around single products they describe a  type of horizontal 
relationship between firms, b u t not integration.
In the 1880s, the tru s t form emerged w ith the  "invention" of the 
S tandard  Oil Company in the 1870s. The replacem ent of pools by 
tru s ts  represented a  shift to direct control of production and m arkets
8 Cotter (1916, pp. 5-6), for example, relates the following:
According to the statem ents of m en who themselves took p art in 
pools, it was no uncommon thing for a m anufacturer to station a  
salesm an outside the building where a  pool conference was 
being held and, as  soon as a  price settlement w as reached, to 
stroll casually over to a window and by prearranged signal indi­
cate to him the level agreed on, whereupon the  salesm an would 
proceed to undercu t the price which his employer was even 
then  pledging himself to m aintain.
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by firms as competitors were brought under the command of single 
companies. T rusts were formed when stockholders of competing 
companies tu rned  over voting stock to trustees in exchange for certif­
icates which entitled them  to receive in terest b u t not to vote (Hogan 
1971, p. 238; Jo n es 1926, p. 20; and Heilbroner and Singer 1984, p. 
199).
In 1890, the an ti-trust anim us of the working and middle class 
reform movement led to the passage of the Sherm an Anti-Trust Act9 
which prohibited consolidation of companies "in restrain t of trade." 
The law was variably enforced and ignored owing to the ambiguity of
9 Edwards (1979, pp. 65-66) argues th a t the an ti-tru st reform move­
m ent in the la tter part of the 1800s and early 1900s had  its origin in 
the nature of class relations a t  the time. Middle-class reformers and 
certain factions of the working-class, such a s  those represented by 
conservative labor unions, sought through the an ti-trust movement to 
challenge the power of the biggest capitalists and largest consolida­
tions. There is another side to the class character of an ti-tru st policy 
Illustrated by the fact that the Pullman Strike was broken in 1894 
through the th rea t of the use of state military force and the enforce­
m ent of the Sherm an Anti-Trust Act (Brecher 1972, p. 66; and Beaud 
1983, p. 128). "Forty five strike leaders were indicted in  Federal 
Court for violating the Sherm an Anti-Trust Act" (Brecher 1972, p.
66), the union and the strike found to be in restraint of trade. On 
another occassion, the Supreme Court in 1908 found the Danbury 
H atters to be in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act for organizing 
a  boycott which they concluded was in restra in t of trade. With refer­
ence to the sam e case, lower courts found th a t any national union, to 
the extent th a t it represented all workers, constituted a  monopoly and 
w as therefore illegal (Hays 1957, p. 67). A nti-trust policy was there­
fore sim ultaneously an outcome of resistance to the power of big capi­
tal and used against those challenging th is power. Wolff (1965, p. 4) 
notes th a t under capitalism there are two contradictory sets of ethics. 
One states a belief in the "combination of capital...as in accordance 
with natural law" and the other views "combination of labor as a con­
spiracy." The use of such laws as the Sherm an Anti-Trust Act against 
labor unions m akes this contradiction salient. See also Gregory's 
(1946, pp. 200-222) discussion concerning the use of federal 
authority to limit union power.
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its language concerning w hat actually constitutes restraint of trade. 
This was compounded by the fact th a t the Supreme Court not only 
obligated itself to prove "monopolistic in tent or attainm ent," b u t also 
the more difficult legal task  of interpreting such  in tent as constituting 
'good' or 'bad' restraint (Ripley 1916, p. 495, and cf. Gregory 1946, p. 
201). But it was not ju s t  problems of interpretation of the law th a t led 
to the variability of its application, and these legal difficulties need to 
be placed in political context. Edwards (1979, p. 65) addresses this 
issue in his account:
The an ti-trust campaign would not have been possible if it had 
not reflected the needs of a broad m ulticlass opposition to the 
corporations. Enforcement required mobilizing the powers of 
government against the biggest capitalists. Yet the sta te is 
merely an  arena in which class relations take an  explicitly 
"political" form, and it would certainly be wrong to suggest tha t 
the sta te  during the transition period was not dominated by the 
capitalist class. Nonetheless, conflict w ithin the capitalist class 
created a  situation in which the state apparatus gained a  relative 
degree of autonomy, and other groups (professionals and 
intellectuals, for example) were able to play a  greater role in 
determining sta te policies.
The establishm ent of an ti-trust policy w as th u s an  outcome of Inter-
and intra-class political dynamics. Here, Edwards asserts th a t its
enforcement, or lack of enforcement, was an  outcome of the general
defense of the interests of big capital. This Is further supported by the
fact th a t laws like the Sherm an Anti-Trust Act and the Clayton Anti-
T ru st Act, which prohibited interlocking directorates, did little to
stem  the tide of corporate consolidation and the merger movement
(Edwards 1979, p. 66; and Bryant and Dethloff 1983, p. 169). As
noted by Beard and Beard (1960, p. 311), the Sherm an Anti-Trust Act
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of 1890 "was neither imposing nor effective. For a  long time presi­
dents allowed it to sleep on the books."
However ineffective an ti-trust legislation was in curbing the 
appetite of g iant enterprises, Edwards (1979, p. 66) also observes th a t 
such  policies of the state a t least added "an element of uncertainty to 
the operations of big corporations" Insofar as  their directors, a t least 
for a  time, had  to consider whether or no t certain corporate merger 
activities would bring them  under the scrutiny of the sta te  and the 
public.10 Bryant and Dethloff (1983, pp. 169-170) note th a t this 
situation led to a  search for a  more legally acceptable way of building 
corporations.
The solution was to move away from the traditional tru s t form of 
combination to th a t of the holding company form in the post-1890 
period where a  single firm held a  controlling share of the securities of 
subordinate firms. Bryant and Dethloff (1983, p. 169) describe the 
holding company, to which the word tru s t came to be generically ap­
plied, as an especially im portant concentration strategy after the New 
Jersey  leg isla tu re  passed an  incorporation act favoring it In 1889.
10 Edwards (1979, pp. 67-68) notes th a t World War I gave corporate 
capitalists "a context in which public support and the power of the 
sta te  could be swung decisively on their side." To the extent th a t any 
an ti-tru st actions were taken against corporations, these happened 
before the war. After the war, no dissolutions were handed down by 
U.S. courts especially since the needs of war mobilization provided an  
ideological atm osphere wherein monopoly size, by virtue of command 
over production th a t th is implied, came to be associated with national 
security. In 1920, even though the m arket share of the U.S. Steel 
Corporation had a t one point reached 80 percent, the Supreme Court 
refused to dissolve it. "The Court decided th a t mere size did not 
violate the Sherm an and Clayton Anti-Trust Acts" (Bryant and Dethloff 
1983, p. 170).
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New Jersey  law provided legal support for the direct merger of com­
panies since it allowed one corporation to itself own the stock of 
another—a  practice previously not allowed during the age of the tradi­
tional tru s t (Hlelbroner and Singer 1984, p. 200). As a  consequence, 
it was under the laws of this state tha t m any of the mergers of the 
1890s took place. By 1904, 170 of the 318 largest combinations were 
incorporated in  New Jersey, which collected im portant revenue 
through incorporation fees, and required a  minimal connection with 
the chartering firm such as rental of desk space in the  state, display of 
a  corporate sign, and submission of a pro forma annual report. Soon 
after this, New Yorfc, Delaware, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Maine, 
North Dakota, and Nevada established similar incorporation laws in 
order to reap the benefits of being what Ripley called a  "charter-barter 
state" (1916, pp. xvii-xx; see also Moody 1904, pp. 453-467, and 
Hacker 1968, p. 425).
From 1897 to 1903, the Interval covering the formation of the 
United States Steel Corporation, Hogan (1971, pp. 238-239) states:
In this six-year period, the num ber of combinations rose from 
12 to 305 with an  increase in aggregate capital from under $1 
billion to nearly $7 billion. By 1904, these firms controlled 
nearly two fifths of the capital invested In m anufacturing in the 
United States.
Between 1898 and 1900, 11 large mergers in the steel industry in ­
volving nearly 200 previously independent companies took place. 
Financial backing for m ost of these was provided by three great tru sts  
headed by Andrew Carnegie, J.P . Morgan and W.H. Moore. Mergers, 
besides making for greater opportunities to accum ulate profits, facil­
itated combination vertically and horizontally since corporations could
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directly own competing companies and the companies of suppliers, 
finishers, and distributors, therefore integrating product lines, coor­
dinating processes, and securing markets. The transition from the 
pool to the holding company, from temporary truces in times of 
trouble to mergers, represented the passage from price competition 
to competition between capitals over direct control of all aspects of 
production—th a t is, from price competition to competition over 
control of capital. Monopolization is not a process which eliminates 
competition b u t it is one wherein firms attem pt to eliminate competi­
tors. Again with reference to the year 1904, the 318 combinations 
centralized control over 5,288 separate factories (Brody 1980, p. 8). 
The history of the steel industry provides an example of the central 
role played by abandonment, dismantling, and shutdow n of factories as 
an aspect of th is extensive control in the processes of monopolization 
and industrialization.
Factory Closures and the Rise of the 
Steel Industry: Competition and Control
This section begins a  discussion of the formation of the great 
steel tru s ts  which, separately, dominated steel production in the 
United S tates until their merger into the United S tates Steel Corpo­
ration in 1901. The Steel Corporation and its constituent tru s ts  were 
themselves products of a great deal of merger activity (Herman 1981, 
p. 83), and, it is understood, were bom  of the Merger Movement 
which lasted from the 1890s to the tu rn  of the century and beyond. 
The focus here is on the development of the domestic steel industry 
prior to the formation of United S tates Steel Corporation and the
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integral role of factory closures in this development. In the areas of 
basic and fabricated steel production, total and partial, temporary and 
perm anent abandonm ent, dismantling, and closure of factories can be 
situated in the process whereby firms sought to overcome competition 
by extending horizontally and vertically through mergers their control 
over products, processes, and m arkets.
In the process of steel industry  formation, and as firms extended 
their control over production and  struggled over control of m arkets-- 
locally, interregionally, and internationally—plants were left idle. 
Several examples stand out and  these will be emphasized. The estab­
lishm ent of Carnegie Steel Company's command over steel production 
in Pittsburgh involved the idling of the Homestead Works in 1883 and 
the Edgar Thomson Works in  1884. Subsequent competition between 
Carnegie Steel and  the Illinois Steel Company for control of western 
steel production and resources led at one time to the idling of m ost of 
the steel plants in  the Chicago area, until Illinois Steel was merged 
into Morgan's Federal Steel Company. Internationally, American tin 
plate production provides an  example of an  Industry which rose to 
pre-eminence in a  climate of protectionism and where indus­
trialization in the  domestic context was accompanied by "runaway 
shops" and capital flight from G reat Britain. In this period of rapid 
and massive industrialization culminating in the formation of the 
United States Steel Corporation, Moore's American Tin Plate Company 
came to dominate this area of steel fabrication by buying and shutting 
down the plants of competitors. Similarly, Shelby Seamless Steel 
Tube Company, a  tru s t which eventually came to control nearly ninety 
percent of all tube production in  the United States, established its
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position in part by buying and then  shutting down or dism antling the 
plants of competing m anufacturers. Also, in the  quest to b reak  its 
dependence on basic steel producers, American Steel and Wire 
Company, which controlled seventy-five percent of the nation 's wire 
making capacity, a t one time closed one-third of its plants.
In these and other instances, idled capacity, dism antled 
facilities, abandoned plants and shutdowns en ter into the process of 
capitalist competition horizontally, vertically, and  spatially. If factory 
closures have played a  role in the building of the steel industry, i.e., in 
industrialization, in the domestic context, then the way such  events 
are currently conceptualized in sociology m ust be questioned. In 
beginning this re-evaluation we tu rn  to the history of factory closure In 
the formation of the United States steel industry.
Carnegie Acquires the Homestead Works: Idled Plants 
and the Labor Issue within Capitalis t Competition
The favored position of the Carnegie Steel Company, anchored as 
it was around the Edgar Thomson Works, at Braddock, Pennsylvania, 
was accomplished during the 1880s and 1890s through rapid  hori­
zontal and vertical growth. Horizontally, Carnegie was able to acquire 
the steel mills of competitors in the Pittsburgh area. The two most 
im portant acquisitions were those of the Homestead Works in  1883 
and the Duquesne Works in 1889. Vertically, Carnegie established 
control over sources of raw m aterials and transportation facilities.
The Steel Company's most im portant link was that established 
with H.C. Frick and Company in 1882 (Hacker 1968, p. 346, and 
Hogan 1971, pp. 243-244). Through the company’s ties w ith Frick,
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Carnegie Company had virtual command over the Connellsville coal 
fields, coke processing, and transportation .11 For a  time, the link 
between Frick and Company and the Edgar Thomson Works made the 
Carnegie Company the undisputed leader in  the Pittsburgh steel 
district.
Carnegie Company's control over steel production in Pittsburgh 
began with the acquisition of the plants of competitors in the area, 
first w ith the acquisition of the Homestead Works in  1883 and the 
Duquesne Works in 1889. In 1879, a group of Pittsburgh industrial­
is ts—combining the independent mill companies of Park Brothers and 
Company; Hussey, Wills and Company; Singer Nimich and Company; 
Cresent Steel Works; Solar Iron and Steel Works; and Superior Mill, 
all of which were located in Pittsburgh—organized the  Pittsburgh 
Bessemer Steel Company, Ltd. a t  Homestead, Pennsylvania, for the 
production of rails and structural shapes. The Pittsburgh Bessemer 
Steel Company, concerned with the production of finished steel 
products, had no capacity for making basic steel and depended largely 
upon Carnegie's Edgar Thomson Works for its steel input. Since the 
Edgar Thomson works were closely allied w ith and a  major supplier of
11 In 1871, Frick and Company of Connellsville, Pennsylvania, owned 
300 acres of coal lands in Connellsville, an  area known for the high 
quality of its coal and its suitability for making pig iron used in steel 
production. Frick also held fifty of the four hundred total coking ovens 
in the Connellsville area and, in  addition, became heavily involved in 
the Mount Pleasant and Broad Fork Railroad. By 1872, Frick owned 
200 coke ovens (Hogan 1971, p  243) and so had become established 
as a leader in the mining, processing, and transportation of coke. In 
1882, the Carnegie Company acquired a  minority in terest in the Frick 
Company, which by th a t time owned 3,000 acres of coal lands (Hacker 
pu ts the num ber a t  5,000 acres) and 1,026 ovens producing 6,000 
tons of coke per day (Hogan 1971, p. 244; and Hacker 1968, p. 346).
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rails to Pennsylvania Railroad, Pittsburgh Bessemer's orders for steel 
were cut off and the new company set out to break its dependence on 
Carnegie once and for all by moving into basic steel production Itself 
(Hogan 1971, p. 244; Temin 1964, pp. 179-180; Brooks 1940, p. 23; 
and  Bridge 1903, p. 151).
In 1880, Andrew Kloman of Superior Mill began construction of 
a basic steel producing facility a t Homestead. At the sam e time the 
Pittsburgh Bessemer Steel Company began construction of a  plant 
adjacent to Kloman's which was completed In 1881 (Hogan 1971, p. 
244). Upon his death, the Kloman works were immediately bought 
and subsequently p u t into operation by Pittsburgh Bessemer (Bridge 
1903, p. 152). It was these facilities a t Homestead which were later 
to fall into Carnegie's hands.
Soon, the plant a t Homestead would prove a  competitive threat 
to the Edgar Thomson Works (Hogan 1971, p. 245, and  Temin 1964, 
p. 180). Bridge (1903, p. 245) commented that.
Councils of w ar were held once more on Braddock's Field;12 for 
it looked as if the prosperity which had hung so lovingly over the 
Edgar Thompson works had  now crossed the river and alighted 
upon the rival enterprise a t Homestead.
But, perhaps fortunately for Carnegie, Pittsburgh Bessemer's opera­
tions a t Homestead were, in Hogan's (1971, p. 245) term s, "beset with 
labor troubles," which in the end contributed to the passage of the 
Homestead Works to Carnegie.
12 The reference, apparently, is to General Braddock's defeat in the 
first battle of the French and Indian War In 1755. The wilderness 
conflict was fought in w hat was then  Pennsylvania's western frontier.
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It is generally recognized, w ith varying degrees of em phasis on 
the Issue, th a t the failure of the Homestead Works under the com­
mand of Pittsburgh Bessemer and its eventual acquisition by Carnegie 
Company was an  outcome of the sta te  of labor relations which 
predominated at the plant. It Is held tha t the downfall of Pittsburgh 
Bessemer coincided w ith a strike against the ownership of the com­
pany upon the opening of the Homestead Works in 1882 over the issue 
of unionization (Temin 1964, pp. 180-181; Hogan 1971, p. 245;
Bridge 1903, p. 153-154; Fitch 1911, pp. 108-109; Casson 1907, p. 
I l l ;  and Hendrick 1932, p. 301).
The accounts of the acquisition of the Homestead Works by 
Carnegie Company suggest tha t the issue of labor relations between a  
firm and workforce enters into the  process of capitalist competition. 
Temin (1964, p. 180-181) correctly places labor difficulties a t Home­
stead along with the relation of Pittsburgh Bessemer to other steel 
producers in explaining the failure of the company. First, Pittsburgh 
Bessemer was excluded from participation in the Bessemer Associa­
tion, an  affiliation of rail producing companies which consciously 
attem pted to restrict the growth of competitors (Temin 1964, p.
179). Carnegie's refusal to fill the orders of Pittsburgh Bessemer from 
the Edgar Thomson Works was an  aspect of th is relationship.
Secondly, the antagonistic relationship between Pittsburgh 
Bessemer and the Bessemer Association made it  difficult for the new 
company to acquire patents and so was forced into using a  less effi­
cient and costlier steel making process which placed it a t a  disadvan­
tage in relation to Its competitors. Temin (1964, p. 181) argues tha t 
these factors, the exclusion of Pittsburgh Bessemer from the Associa­
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tion and patent restrictions account most strongly for the downfall of 
the company. He therefore de-emphasizes the importance of labor 
relations and emphasizes instead factors associated with capitalist 
competition. Hogan (1971, p. 245), relying on Bridge's (1903) ac­
count, attributes the failure of Pittsburgh Bessemer almost exclusively 
to the volatile nature of the relationship between the company and its 
workforce. However, relations between labor and  capital and capital­
ists w ith each other cannot properly be considered two separate areas 
of concern. If the labor situation a t Homestead in 1882 is considered 
in relation to tha t a t Carnegie's Edgar Thomson Works and Carnegie's 
own reflections on the labor issue in the years before the Homestead 
Strike of 1892, then it is apparent th a t the issue of labor relations it­
self en ters into the cycle of capitalist competition as does, therefore, 
the issue of idled plants. When one firm has established and m ain­
tained stable labor relations relative to other firms, then the first is in 
a competitively advantageous position. In this process, factory closure 
is an aspect of labor control.
Of greatest consideration here are the openly anti-union policies 
of Pittsburgh Bessemer Steel Company which Bridge (1903, p. 153) 
describes as "unreasonable and arbitrary" and "ever tending to open 
conflict w ith the workm en.” Upon opening the Homestead Works, 
Pittsburgh Bessemer ordered its workers to sign contracts wherein 
they would agree to have no associations with labor organizations 
(Hogan 1971, p. 245; and  Pitch 1911, p. 109). According to Bridge's 
(1903, p. 154) account:
Most of the men were members of the Amalgamated Association
of Iron and Steel Workers; and  on the 1st of January, 1882,
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these refused to sign the agreement, and were locked out. After 
the works had been Idle a  week, the  company gave notice th a t 
the m en could not re tu rn  to work, even if they signed the 
agreement, unless they would accept a  reduction of wages. This 
intensified the bitterness of the workmen; and the Amalgamated 
Association took cognizance of the dispute.13
Nearby stood the Edgar Thomson Works which w as started up
non-union in  1875. However, in 1882, unionization became an  issue
there as well b u t Carnegie offered no resistance to the establishm ent
of Amalgamated Association lodges in these  works, referring to the
Union as a  "fair and reasonable body," and "union activity in  Braddock
...was never of a  sort to alarm  employers" (Fitch 1911, pp. 88-89 and
111). At the Homestead Works of Pittsburgh Bessemer, the lockout,
along with work stoppages orchestrated by the union, and other
m anifestations of labor-management conflict interrupted production
through January , February, and most of March of th a t year (Fitch 1911,
p. 109, and Bridge 1903, p. 154). In a  climate of falling prices and
profits in steel production, the stockholders of P ittsburgh Bessemer
Steel wanted ou t of Homestead.
Carnegie seized the opportunity to acquire a  m odem  plant a t low
cost and a t the same time eliminate an im portant rival from the field.
In 1883, the Pittsburgh Bessemer Steel Company was consolidated
with the Carnegie Company and its Homestead works taken over in
the process (Hogan 1971, p. 245; Hacker 1968, p. 346; and  Fitch
1911, p. 88-89). "The price paid was the cost of the plant, with
reasonable allowance for increased land values" (Bridge 1903, p. 159).
13 Because Pittsburgh Bessemer could no t economize technically, as an  
outcome of its patent problems and its relation to the Bessemer Asso­
ciation, the staunchly anti-union stance of the firm and its attem pt to 
economize on wages logically follows.
166
When Carnegie took control of the plant, It was taken out of rail pro­
duction, converted to the production of structu ral shapes, and reno­
vated to include those things th a t patent restrictions had prevented 
Pittsburgh Bessemer from building into the plant. In the process, the 
Homestead works were idled by Carnegie Company for several years 
until these changes were completed (Temin 1964, p. 181; and Wolff 
1965, p. 58).
This history of labor conflict a t Homestead, which led up  to Car­
negie’s taking control of the Homestead works, clarifies Carnegie’s 
favorable, pre-1892 view of labor and the right of workers to organize 
to which we alluded in the previous chapter. In his Forum  article of 
1886, Carnegie states, "A strike or a  lockout is, in itself, a  ridiculous 
affair" (Carnegie 1886, p. 115) and th a t the right to organize is a basic 
right w hich employers m ust concede to employees, bu t, for labor’s 
part.
It is not the intelligent workman, who knows th a t labor w ithout 
his brother capital is helpless, b u t the b la tan t ignorant man, who 
regards capital as  the natural enemy of labor, who does so m uch 
to em bitter the relations between employer and employed; and 
the power of th is ignorant demagogue arises chiefly from lack of 
proper organization among the m en through which their real 
voice can be expressed (Carnegie 1886, p. 119).
For Carnegie, this "real voice” is th a t of a  labor force organized in a
climate w here employers recognize workers' rights to organize. It is a
voice of reason, where the laborer "will be found m uch readier to
accept reduced compensation w hen business is depressed" (Carnegie
1886, p. 119).
As long as the rivals of the Steel Company were "beset with labor 
difficulties," Carnegie’s  stated philosophy would be one of enlightened
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partnership w ith regard to labor relations. But, as was seen in the 
discussion of the Homestead Strikes of 1888 and  1892, w hen com­
petitors were sufficiently absorbed by the Steel Company to permit 
m ulti-plant operations with advancing mechanization of production 
underm ining the political influence of craft-based labor power, 
Carnegie turned from such lofty ideas. This is apparent in  the Steel 
Company's clearly anti-union position of the late nineteenth century.
In fact, unionization a t the Edgar Thomson Works w as quite 
short lived and in 1884, it was announced th a t the works would be 
closed indefinitely while new m achinery was being installed in the 
factory a t Braddock. This would p u t 1,600 workers out of work until 
the mill reopened and permanently do away w ith 300 jobs (Fitch 
1911, pp. 112-113; and Brody 1960, p. 51). Concerning these events, 
Fitch (1911, p. 113) observed:
The company seemed to be in  no hurry to start the mill.
Andrew Carnegie, in an  interview, said th a t the workmen were 
to blame for the suspension. "They allow other Bessemer mills 
to work a t  less wages than  we pay." He referred to a  mill In 
Harrisburg which w as selling rails a t $27. "We cannot do it, and 
m ust close rather th a n  sell rails a t less th a n  cost....I do not know 
when they (Braddock and Homestead] will be started, b u t not 
until the rail m arket improves and we can  sell a t a  profit, or 
until the Amalgamated Association gains control of the  other 
mills in the country and makes better wages in those 
establishm ents."
Fearing discharge, many of the workers left the Amalgamated Associa­
tion and when the Edgar Thomson Works were finally reopened in 
1885, the year before Carnegie's article appeared in Forum , it started 
up with reduced labor force, a t up to fifty percent reduction in wages, 
and with its two lodges of the Amalgamated Association disbanded 
(Fitch 1911, pp. 113-114).
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Threatened and actual closure of factories places workers In 
competition w ith each other and w ith workers a t  other locations over 
wages and jobs. This situation can be ideologically deflected against 
dem ands imposed by the  current conditions of competition between 
capitalists (cf. Slaughter 1983, p. 41). The shutdow n of th e  Edgar 
Thomson Works is an example of the place of factory closures within 
the process of job destruction and its impact on the political standing 
of labor unions.
In 1886, the same group of investors w hich organized Pittsburgh 
Bessemer also organized the Duquesne Steel Company, since by then 
the patents which they had originally been denied, had ru n  out (Temin 
1964, p. 182). This company, later known as Allegheny Bessemer 
Steel, was organized for reasons sim ilar to those which lead to the 
original formation of Pittsburgh Bessemer. This time, the company 
w as excluded from membership in the rail pool, the first one of which 
was established in 1887 and of which Carnegie Company w as a  leading 
member (Warren 1973, p. 96). Allegheny Bessemer also failed and 
eventually would be purchased by Carnegie Company for similar 
reasons (Bridge 1903, p. 175).
When Allegheny Bessemer Steel went into operation in  1889, it 
posed an immediate th rea t to the competitive position of the  Carnegie 
Steel Company and the Edgar Thomson Works because of its Innova­
tive rail-making process with which it could undersell the works at 
Braddock (Wolff 1965, pp. 58-59). It is described by Hogan (1971, pp. 
246):
In place of reducing the steel ingot to a  bloom and th en  reheat­
ing it before it was rolled down to rail, the new company rolled
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rails directly from ingot without the  Intermediate process 
employed by Carnegie and other rail m akers...and as a  conse­
quence, rails could be sold cheaper than those made by the  
conventional method.
In response, Carnegie issued statem ents to railroad companies voicing 
concern over the dangers of w hat he called the "direct rolling 
process," claiming tha t it produced inferior rails and  would lead to a 
greater num ber of train derailments. Railroads were fairly successfully 
persuaded against the purchase of Duquesne rails (Hogan 1971, p.
246; Hacker 1968, p. 350; Temin 1964, p. 182; Wolff 1965, p. 58; 
and Bridge 1903, pp. 176-177).14
Poor sales combined with labor difficulties for the managem ent 
of the Duquesne works eventually led to the sale of the  company to 
Carnegie Steel for a  very favorable price. When Carnegie acquired 
Duquesne Steel, direct rolling was adopted In all of h is rail producing 
facilities—th a t is, Carnegie adopted w hat he had publlcally objected to 
before the acquisition of the Duquesne works. Eventually, direct roll­
ing became an  Industrywide practice (Bridge 1903, p. 176). The p u r­
chase of Duquesne In 1890 left the Carnegie Steel Company w ithout a 
rail competitor in  its territory, and the Duquesne Works were ru n  by 
Carnegie with great success (Hogan 1971, p. 247; an d  Bridge 1903, p. 
179).
The Duquesne Works were bought the year following the first 
round of labor disputes at Homestead In 1889. It remained a  non-
14 Cotter (1916, p. 6) noted, with the nostalgia one feels for the days of 
piracy on the high seas, "In the fierce and  bitter struggle tha t w as the 
steel trade, only the most daring or the m ost unscrupulous m anu­
facturer could survive...." This episode also calls into question Temln’s 
(1964, p. 182) conclusion th a t the story of Pittsburgh Bessemer 
dem onstrates the Importance of "exclusive patent ownership."
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union shop and Its addition gave the Carnegie Company a  multi-plant 
organization large enough to contribute to the resolution of the Home­
stead Strike of 1892 in its favor and which banished organized labor 
from basic steel production.
Carnegie Steel Company. Illinois Steel, and Morgan's Federal 
Steel Company: Idled Plants and Interregional Competition
The first large consolidation in  the steel industry  took place in 
May of 1889 with the formation of the Illinois Steel Company. Illinois 
Steel was a  merger of Chicago area steel companies formed in re­
sponse to Carnegie's integrated operation and monopolistic domi­
nance of Pittsburgh which was seen as powerful enough to potentially 
"disrupt the m arket through independent action" (Temin 1964, p. 
191). This holding com pany consolidated North Chicago Rolling Mill 
Company, Union Steel Company, and  Joliet Steel Company (Temin 
1964, p. 191; and Hogan 1971, pp. 239-240). The consolidation of 
these three previously Independent and competing concerns gave 
Illinois Steel an  im portant m easure of horizontal control over basic 
steel production, access to the expanding western m arket, and with 
its vertical command over coal and coke lands the company dominated 
the steel industry in the Chicago area. The Illinois Steel Company 
coordinated the operation of five p lants (Hogan 1971, p. 240) 
Including:
• North Works a t Chicago (established 1857);
• South Works at Chicago (established 1880);
• Milwaukee Works a t Milwaukee (established 1868);
• Joliet Works a t Joliet, Illinois (established 1868); and
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• Union W orks a t Chicago (established 1863).
The size of the firm Is indicated by th e  combined properties of these 
plants, w hich included 14 blast furnaces, one iron rolling mill, four 
Bessemer steel plants an d  mills which produced rails, beams, m er­
chant iron and steel, nails and iron rods. This gave the Illinois Steel 
Company a  capacity of 975,000 tons and  it employed 10,000 workers, 
putting the  firm, in term s of size and capacity, on a n  equal footing 
with Carnegie Company.
In 1892, the Illinois Steel Company underwent a  massive "mod­
ernization" of its plant, including the addition of plate and structural 
steel mill capacity. On th e  first of Ju ly  of the same year—the day the 
Homestead Strike began—Carnegie Steel Company underwent a  major 
reorganization and was transformed into a  holding company. Carnegie 
Steel Company, Ltd., w hich consolidated all of the Carnegie in terests 
under one centralized organizational framework. Bridge (1903, p.
254), w ithout clarification, notes as "something more th an  a  coinci­
dence" th a t th is reorganization went in to  effect on th e  first day of the 
strike. However, it is apparent tha t the  reorganization of the firm and 
the conversion of the workforce from a  craft based to an  industrial one 
were complementary aspects of the process in which Carnegie Com­
pany was expanding the scale of its production, and, a s  stated by one 
of Carnegie's partners, "The Amalgamated placed a  tax  on improve­
ments. therefore the Amalgamated had  to go (Brody 1960, p. 54; Wolff 
1965, p. 82; Brecher 1972, p. 54; and cf. Brody 1980, pp. 7-9).
Having established control over steel production in Pittsburgh,
Carnegie w as preparing to take Horace Greely's advice and "Go West!," 
thereby challenging Illinois Steel's com mand of Chicago.
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Carnegie's challenge to the w est began in 1893, a  year of 
depression in the steel industry. Carnegie Company was no t affected, 
however, to the extent th a t other producers were. Nationally, rail 
production was down 26.7 percent. Carnegie's Edgar Thomson Works 
suffered only a  20.3 percent decline, bu t in Illinois, output was down 
48.3 percent and,
...there were times when every mill in the  Chicago a rea  was idle. 
Union rail mill did not work a t  all th a t year. North Works was 
laid off during the last half, Joliet ran for only six weeks, and the 
South Chicago Works...operated for only eight and a  half m onths 
(Warren 1972, pp. 96-97).
Throughout the mid-1890s, this situation continued for Illinois Steel
and the w ith it, the Chicago m arket was open to Carnegie Steel
Company.
Having achieved production cost lower th an  any o ther producer 
could m atch, Carnegie left the rail pool and it subsequently collapsed 
(Jones 1926, p. 9; Brody 1960, p. 6; Carr and Taplin 1962, p. 171; 
and W arren 1972, p. 96).15 From 1892 to about 1896, Carnegie Com­
pany was engaged in an  acquisition drive directed a t improving its 
level of vertical command over processes and expanding Its sphere of 
influence into western m arkets. Carnegie acquired railroads, steam ­
ship lines, and five-sixths of the stock of Oliver Mining Company 
which gave him  access to Great Lakes Iron ore fields and transporta­
tion (Hacker 1968, p. 351; and Hogan 1971, pp. 248-249), directly 
challenging access of w estern producers to these resources.
15 Although the rail pool was re-established before the end of 1893, it 
was never again effective (Warren 1972, p. 97).
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The Carnegie Company's m ost im portant association was estab­
lished in 1896 when the firm entered a  lease agreement with Lake 
Superior Consolidated Iron Mines (LSCIM), an  iron ore mining and 
transportation concern owned primarily by Rockefeller Standard Oil 
interests. The agreement was Important to both  Carnegie and 
Rockefeller concerns, b u t especially gave the former access to vital 
supplies of high grade Lake Superior iron ore. since in addition to its 
ore docks a t Ashtabula, Ohio, LSCIM held interests in eleven mining 
companies in  the Mesabe region of Lake Superior. Through the verti­
cal merger of ore and coal mining and processing concerns, direct 
control over transportation concerns, and the association with Rocke­
feller, Carnegie Company became the largest single un it in the steel 
Industry (Hogan 1971, pp. 253-254) and could compete directly with 
western m anufacturers over inputs necessary for steel production 
(Warren 1971, p. 104). i 6
In spite of an  agreement between Carnegie Company and Illinois 
Steel to the effect th a t Carnegie would limit itself to its eastern 
m arket, competition was carried into the territory of Chicago mills 
(Brody 1960, p. 7; and W arren 1972, p. 99). A price war ensued In 
earnest. W arren (1972, pp. 99-100) describes events of 1897:
Illinois rail production was 40.1 per cent u p  on 1896 b u t tha t of 
Allegheny County [Pennsylvania, where Carnegie's mills were 
located] w ent up by 76.3 per cent. Connecting through to the
16 Carnegie Company's advantage in th is area was such th a t freight 
costs of ore and coke to Pittsburgh am ounted to $3.65 per ton of pig 
iron, while shipm ent of these things to Chicago am ounted to $3.79 
per ton of pig iron. Contributing to Carnegie's favorable position was 
the relationship with H.C. Frick Coke Company which allowed the 
Steel Company to circumvent the open market (Warren 1972, p. 104).
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lakes by the Bessemer and Lake Erie Railroad, Carnegie could 
deliver cheaply in  the north-west when the Great Lakes naviga­
tion was open, and  in the south-west when the Ohio w as high. 
However, it sold mostly east of Indiana. Illinois Steel a t  this 
time m arketed 95 per cent or more of its  product w est of this 
Une, according to a  later estimate of E.H. Gary. He also reck­
oned th a t it could not compete with Carnegie more th an  100 
miles east of its mills, if as far as that. Some Carnegie rails were 
sold in Chicago for $18 a  ton, below the price which Illinois 
Steel could m eet if proper accounting practices were followed, 
while Carnegie claimed tha t it made a  profit a t $16 a  ton. Gary 
reckoned tha t if these conditions had continued Illinois would 
have been driven out of business, and recalled tha t only very 
narrowly did it escape receivership, the papers indeed having 
been drawn up.
The response to Carnegie's incursion into the rail m arket of Chicago 
was the formation, with the financial backing of J.P . Morgan, of the 
Federal Steel Company In 1898 (Warren 1972, p. 106).
Federal Steel was one of the allied holding companies of the 
Morgan group which in addition to Federal included American Bridge 
Company and National Tube Company. Federal Steel was a  merger of 
six companies, the m ost im portant of which w as the Illinois Steel 
Company (Hacker 1968, p. 396). Elbert Gary viewed the m erger as 
necessary In order to Improve the competitive position of Illinois Steel 
in relation to Carnegie since it would allow m uch more integrated 
operation by combining basic steel production with control over 
sources of raw  materials. The formation of Federal Steel and  Its 
enhanced performance as  an  outcome of integrated operation led to 
something of a  "stalemate" in the west. Although Federal Steel did not 
outsell Carnegie Company, it did lead to an  agreement where, "Federal 
should have half the rail orders they [the two companies] were jointly 
able to secure." The more equal competitive footing of Federal, by
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virtue of its more integrated operation, led to the establishm ent of a  
tem porary truce between the two steel trusts .
Federal Steel was similar to Carnegie Steel since both were con­
cerned with the production of basic steel goods for sale to producers 
of finished products. Unlike Carnegie Company which had  production 
concentrated in Pittsburgh, Federal Steel’s facilities were more geo­
graphically dispersed. Illinois Steel had operations in Chicago, 
Milwaukee, and Joliet. Lorain Steel's plant was located a t Lorain, Ohio. 
Johnson Company's plant was a t Johnstown, Pennsylvania. Besides 
these producers of basic and semi-flnished products, Federal held iron 
ore properties, railroads, and steam ship and barge lines (Hogan 1971, 
pp. 265-267; and Cotter 1916, pp. 21-22). So, the com pany was, like 
Carnegie Company, integrated vertically from raw  m aterial acquisition, 
processing, and transportation to basic steel production. The major 
difference between Carnegie Company and the Morgan Group of steel 
concerns was tha t Morgan began to organize vertically beyond basic 
steel, by establishing the American Bridge Company and National Tube 
Company. While Carnegie's organization relied on supplying steel 
fabricators with basic and semi-flnished steel, these holding 
companies of the Morgan Group were directly involved in finished 
steel production and gave Morgan a  more diversified operation.
Even though th is was the case, locational difficulties prevented 
American Bridge and National Tube, for the time being, from direct 
integration into the sam e company, and while these three companies 
were affiliated through Morgan banking connections, they  remained 
nominally separate holding companies. Federal Steel w as located 
more westerly and its  plants were somewhat geographically scattered.
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making it difficult for the basic steel producer to supply its  other 
companies. For example, the plants of American Bridge Company 
were located mostly in the east leaving it dependent on eastern 
producers, foremost among which was the Carnegie Steel Company. 
The same was true  for National Tube Company, where the location of 
its mills made it difficult for the company to receive its  supply from 
Federal Steel.
In this case, though, the response of the company was to begin 
to bring National Tube into production of its  own "skelp" or semi­
finished steel used in tube making. From the beginning, National 
Tube had capacity a t many of its facilities for full, vertically integrated 
production, from ore processing to finished products.
The Morgan syndicate bu ilt National Tube Company around the 
National Tube Works Company which it merged with twelve of the 
nation's other steel tube concerns. National Tube Works Company was 
itself established by Flagler Brothers Company of Boston, founded in 
1869 for production of boiler tube. As the demand for products to 
supply the oil industry increased, the company decided in 1872 to 
construct a  new  plant more centrally located in relation to iron ore, 
coal, and oil districts. The National Tube Works Company was then 
located at McKeesport, Pennsylvania. With the establishm ent of 
National Tube Works, "the Boston plant continued to operate on a  par­
tial basis, bu t as more sections of the new plan t were opened equiva­
len t facilities a t  Boston were closed" (Hogan 1971, p. 275). National 
Tube Works of the  National Tube Company was, therefore, originally 
created through the "systematic disinvestment"--to use Bluestone and
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H arrison's (1982, p. 6) terminology--and eventual shutdow n of the 
works of Flagler Brothers.
National Tube was one of the largest tube concerns In the entire 
world, controlling 75 percent of the nation 's welded tube capacity. Its 
organization of almost half of the nation's previously competing tube 
concerns,17 along with its integrated operations, denied Carnegie of an 
im portant m arket in supplying this area of finished steel production 
(Wendt and Kogan 1948, p. 185; and Hogan 1971, pp. 272-279) even 
though most of National Tube's facilities, including the  National Tube 
Works, were located in the Pittsburgh distric t (Cotter 1916, p. 24).
So, while Carnegie continued to have access to Chicago, Federal Steel, 
like Illinois Steel, continued to face problems supplying the eastern  
m arket and even many of its  related steel fabrication concerns like 
those of the American Bridge Company. However, the  Morgan Group 
was able to some extent limit Carnegie Company's free rein in P itts­
burgh by gaining control over a  network of steel tube factories in th a t 
area, through National Tube Company, w hich could provide their own
17 M ost of these companies in  1889 were supplying Standard Oil, 
which was the largest single purchaser of pipe and tube  products.
With the  formation of National Tube Company, Morgan controlled most 
of domestic production and a  large share of die foreign market.
Wendt and Kogan (1948, p. 185) put National Tube's command over 
production of "the country's iron piping and  tubing" a t 85 percent. In 
any case, Hogan (1971 p. 279) states.
The new company...supplied pipe for the oil fields of Russia, 
Bulgaria, Java, and Canada; irrigation pipe for Australia and South 
Africa; and hydraulic equipment for m ines and industrial works 
throughout the world.
We can  conclude th a t the company’s control over tube production was 
indeed significant. Whether it was seventy-five or eighty-five percent 
is really not crucial.
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inpu t of basic steel. At least with regard to the specific example of 
National Tube Works, the creation of a  vertically integrated organiza­
tion was established through a  process synonymous with deindustriali­
zation. This w as also true, as will be seen in other, larger contexts 
illustrated in the  late nineteenth and  early twentieth century histories 
of the  Moore Group of steel companies, American Steel and  Wire 
Company, and Shelby Seamless Steel Tube Company.
Abandoned Plants. Dism antled Facilities, and Capital 
Flight In  International and  Domestic Competition
What w as true of Morgan's National Tube Company w as also in­
dicative of general developmental trends in the American steel indus­
try  of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Specifically, 
organization of production vertically, especially in  the area of steel fab­
rication, became a  way for companies to loosen dependence on other 
steel producers. Also, the building of horizontal organization, through 
acquisition and a t times shutdown of competing plants, established 
command of firm s over specific areas of production. Not the least 
exemplaiy of these trends w as the history of the third largest of the 
nineteenth century corporate actors in  the steel industry, namely, the 
combined concerns of the Moore Group of steel companies.
The Moore steel concerns included, similar to the Morgan 
Group, nominally independent holding companies: American Tin 
Plate Company, American Steel Hoop Company, American Sheet Steel 
Company, and National Steel Company. All of these were incorporated 
between 1898 and 1899, and  all incorporated previously competing 
firms in their respective areas of production In order to "limit bitter
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and destructive competition" (Hogan 1971, p. 292) and  unstable 
prices connected with such volatile competitive conditions. Unlike 
Morgan's Federal, National Steel Company, a  producer of basic steel, 
was the  last of the Moore concerns to be established, and Tin Plate, 
Steel Hoop, and Sheet Steel companies provided National with exclu­
sive m arkets bringing basic steel production together with production 
of finished goods. National Steel was established for the purpose of 
releasing all of the  Moore companies from dependence on both 
Carnegie and Federal for inpu ts of semi-flnished steel (Cotter 1916, p. 
23; Knox 1944, p. 25; Wendt and Kogan 1948, p. 185; and Hogan 
1971, pp. 287-89 and 292}.
National Steel, in comparison to Carnegie Company and Federal 
Steel, had  a fairly geographically centralized position. Its 18 b last fur­
naces, six steel works, and rolling mills were located primarily in Ohio 
(Columbus, Youngstown, Bellalre, and Bridgeport) and Pennsylvania, 
west of Pittsburgh (Sharon and New Castle). While not as geographic­
ally concentrated as  Carnegie Steel, National did not face the location­
al difficulties of Federal Steel. In fact, the company became less geo­
graphically dispersed when its Zanesville, Ohio, b last furnace closed In 
1900 and as its Columbus Works of Uniontown, Pennsylvania, w as 
gradually dismantled from 1899 to 1901 and parts of the plant were 
shipped to and used in other National Steel factories a t  other locations 
(Hogan 1971, pp. 287-88). This took place in a m anner similar to that 
of National Tube Works. Also, like Carnegie and Federal, National 
Steel w as a  well integrated basic steel producer which had among its 
holdings complete and partial interests in railroads, transportation
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companies, ore docks. Iron and coal mining concerns, and coke 
companies (Cotter 1916, p. 23; and Hogan 1971, pp. 288-289).
The organization of National Steel Company gave each of the 
other Moore companies, all of which made finished steel products, a  
secure source of semi-flnished steel free of outside control over its 
inputs. However, each of the Moore companies shared similarities 
w ith  Morgan's National Tube Company Insofar as  each independently 
h ad  some control over all aspects of their respective areas of produc­
tion. For example, typical of the Moore Group, American Steel Hoop 
Company w as horizontally well integrated since th is  holding company 
brought together nine previously competing firms and operated a  total 
of 15 plants. In addition, Steel Hoop established vertical control over 
railroads, ore and limestone properties, and a  dock company. It also 
owned shares of five sou thern  "ginneries" which were chief consumers 
of its  cotton ties (Cotter 1916, p. 23; and Hogan 1971, pp. 296-299).
Another holding company w ithin the Moore Group, American 
Sheet Steel, brought together 30 companies and operated 164 sheet 
mills located primarily in Ohio and Pennsylvania within reach of 
National Steel. In addition, American Sheet Steel operated a  handful 
of basic steel making facilities and twenty coal mining properties. It 
also held all of the outstanding stock issue of McKeesport Terminal 
Railroad Company, Versailles Fuel Gas Company (27 gas wells), and 
Apollo Gas Company (110 gas wells). It also owned part of the  stock of 
M anufacturers' Gas and Oil Company (Indiana well sites and gas and oil 
fields) in partnership with Republic Iron and Steel Company and Con­
sum er's Paper Company (Cotter 1916, pp. 23-24; and  Hogan 1971, pp. 
292-296). Sheet Steel commanded 70 percent of the nation 's sheet
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steel capacity by 1900, and, like these other tru s ts , came to dominate 
its respective area of production w ithin the national arena (Hogan 
1971, pp. 295-296 and passim : Knox 1944, p. 22; Boore 1951, pp. 
60-61; and Wendt and Kogan 1948, p. 149).
But, the most im portant of the Moore Group of companies was 
American Tin Plate, by virtue of its size as well as the developmental 
processes illustrative of its growth. The rise of the  American tin  plate 
industry and th a t of American Tin Plate Company in particular raises 
issues concerning the international and  domestic aspects of factory 
closures. Current sociological treatm ents of factory closures which 
discuss such events in term s of the deindustrialization process, 
especially concerning the United States, emphasize the dism antling of 
industry as capital leaves the country for foreign shores. In the 1890s 
and In the example of the American tin  plate industry, we see how 
industrial growth and monopolization in the United States was accom­
panied by a  parallel decline In tin plate plate production in Great 
Britain and the flight of capital from Wales to th is nation. The dein­
dustrialization of Wales, with respect to its tin plate industry, w as a 
precondition for the industrialization of the United States, with 
respect to its tin plate industry. Yet, the formation of the American 
industry  was itself accompanied by the closure of American mills. This 
illustrates the proposition th a t factory closures are  part of the cycle of 
deindustrialization and of industrialization as well.
Tin plate production in  America had been taking place since the 
end of the 1850s. However, producers were unable to meet w ith 
m uch success since tin plate production was a m uch costlier enter­
prise than  it was In Wales. The industrialization of England prior to
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1875 produced a vast empire and an  advanced technology. At the 
heart of British Industrial capitalism w as Wales, along with the o ther 
regions of the "Celtic fringe.” Wales w as known as  a  coal, iron, and, 
particularly, as a  tin plate producing region after its  progressive con­
version to an  "industrial enclave" of the  British Em pire (Khleif 1975, 
pp. 15 and 23; Hechter 1975, pp. 143-150; and cf. Pounds 1959, p.
82 and Khleif 1980). Until about 1890, most tin  p late was therefore 
imported from Welsh factories which needed the United States 
m arket for about 70 percent of its total production (Knox 1944, p. 10; 
and Carr and Taplin 1962, p. 121). Prior to 1890, there were two 
"waves" of American tin  plate production. In 1872, tin  plate was first 
produced In the United S tates in commercial quantities "in 
anticipation of a  tariff initiated in 1875" (Hogan 1971, p. 348).
By 1876, success of Welsh producers in lowering the price of tin 
plate forced American tin  plate factories to close. American produc­
tion resum ed only after Welsh prices rose in the 1880s, but American 
factories were shu t down shortly thereafter when W elsh prices fell 
once again. The advantage of Welsh industry rested no t only on tech ­
nical economy of British industry established in the mid-1800s b u t 
also on the  low price a t which labor could be procured owing to its 
colonial relationship w ith Great Britain (cf. Hechter 1975). With 
Welsh access to the American market, American producers, in com ­
petition w ith cheaper imports, were subject to periodic crises and  
closure of factories. Such closures of American mills can be accounted 
for with reference to the same dynamics which led to  the closure o f 
Chicago area  mills in the face of "foreign competition" and cheaper 
"foreign imports" from Carnegie's Pittsburgh, discussed above. In th is
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way. international capitalist competition is another form of in ter­
regional capitalist competition b u t one which takes place across 
national boundaries, i.e., its extra-state expression (cf. Smith 1981, p. 
229). Relevant to this process of periodic plant closure, Mandel 
(1972, p. 121) explained th a t the dynamics of capitalist competition 
lead to a  "self-reproducing increase in capital being laid idle" a s  the 
struggle for control over m arkets lead to their relative contraction. 
Also, Davis (1933, p. 115) observed th a t th is  process implies the 
necessity of "periodic shut-downs during which a  large part of 
accum ulated capital is wasted and rendered valueless."
One im portant lesson of this period in  the h istory  of American 
tin  plate m anufacture is th a t "protectionism" means among other 
th ings not merely protection from inexpensive foreign goods, bu t, 
more fundamentally, protection of a faction of a domestic capitalist 
class from tha t of a  foreign capitalist class which is in  a  position to 
more easily exploit its labor. Again, referring to the Carnegie example, 
relations between capital and labor forces enters into the cycle of 
capitalist competition. In 1890, the year the McKinley Tariff w ent 
into effect, this statem ent appeared in an  editorial of the  Bulletin of 
the American Iron and Steel Association a s  part of the  campaign for 
the tariff. It is quoted in Hogan's (1971, p . 349) account.
...It is against the cheap hand labor of Wales, therefore, as well as 
against the cheap labor employed in producing iron and steel 
sheets, th a t American capital and labor need to be protected if 
we would build up an American tinplate industry. How cheaply 
hand labor in  Wales m ay be obtained can easily be inferred from 
the frank adm ission by th e  London Iron and Steel Trades Jo u r ­
nal for April 12, 1880. T hat paper then  said: 'The great ob­
stacle to tinplate making on a  large scale in the S tates is th e  
entire absence of CHEAP FEMALE LABOR, so necessary in  the 
industry, and  so abundant in Wales, b u t if the enormous du ty  of
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12s. a  box [12s. per hundred pounds] Is adopted possibly the 
labor difficulty m ay be got over."
In th is statem ent. American producers recognized the ability of
foreign capitalists to more effectively exploit labor, and this, they
further recognized, placed them  a t a  competitive disadvantage. The
implication here is tha t a  tariff could counteract the lack of American
producers of access to cheap, i.e., female and Welsh, labor. The state
stepped in, lending political support to the expansion of capital—as it
had in the post-Civil War establishm ent of the Morrill Tariff which
aided producers of basic steel.
The establishm ent of the McKinley Tariff in  1890 brought
American m anufacturers back into tin  plate production and created
severe competition in the domestic m arket since mills tha t had  been
idled before the institution of the tariff were brought back into
production and new mills were being built.18 With passage of the
McKinley Tariff in 1890,19
18 Knox (1944, p. 13) states:
It was w ith pride and satisfaction tha t the community of 
Demmler, Pa., saw its mill, the United S tates Iron & Tin Plate 
M anufacturing Company, industriously s ta rt producing tin  plate 
in 1890, undoubtedly with some of the equipm ent which it had 
been forced to sh u t down 13 years before.
19 The protection of the McKinley Tariff of 1890 was an  im portant 
factor in the development of the tin  plate industry in  the United 
States. It did little, however, to help the basic steel industry since it 
was largely unnecessary. American factories, especially Carnegie's, 
outproduced the best British mills and a  level of technical and labor 
economy had been achieved which made it impossible for European, 
especially British, producers to compete with cheap domestic rails. 
By th is  time, all the "protection" American steel m akers needed was 
the freight cost of importing steel from Europe. Regarding the rela­
tionship between American and European steel m akers. "Passage of 
the McKinley Tariff Act of 1890 w as like shooting a  corpse" (Wolff 
1965, pp. 60-61). On th is issue see also Pierce (1907, pp. 33-34).
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Domestic tinplate m anufacture grew prolifically and immediately 
penetrated the British m arket here. British im ports dropped 
from 327,882 net tons in  1891 to 300,688 net tons In 1892, 
and each successive year saw a  further decline. In 1896, for the 
first time. United States production (179,605 net tons) was 
greater than  British im ports (133,471 net tons). By 1898, the 
British had been effectively severed from their American m arket 
(Hogan 1971, p. 351).20
When the McKinley Tariff went into effect in 1891, 20 plants began 
producing tin  plate and ten more tin plate factories were under con­
struction (Knox 1944, p. 12). The world center of tin  plate produc­
tion was shifting from Wales to the United States.
For the first few years of the 1890s, American production of tin  
plate was carried out using Welsh techniques and, more importantly, 
tin  plate mills dismantled and Imported from Wales. Also, owing to 
the undiversified nature of the Welsh colonial economy and its vulner­
ability to changes in m arkets, a  great many Welsh laborers, with little 
other choice, followed tin plate capital and emigrated to the United 
States in search of work (Hogan 1971, p. 351, and cf. Hechter 1972, 
p. 169; Khleif 1975, p. 23; and Cooke and Rees 1981, p. 285, on the 
undiversifled nature of the Welsh economy).21 Howard A. Knox's 
(1944) book, Development of the American Tin Plate Industry, in­
cludes as its  frontispiece an  illustration showing the tradem ark of the 
American Tin Plate Company of Elwood, Indiana, 1891—later incor­
2° See also W arren (1972, p. 215) on the McKinley Tarriff and the rise 
of domestic tin  plate production.
21 Prior to 1850, the first wave of Welsh immigration came with agri­
cultural dislocation which accompanied the industrialization of Wales 
(Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982, p. 16). In the post-1890 period, the 
immigration of Welsh people accompanied industrial dislocation 
created by the loss of a  significant portion of the Welsh tin  plate 
industry.
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porated into Moore’s American Tin Plate Company. In a graphic 
depiction of capital flight, the tradem ark shows the British lion as  
helpless prey gripped in  the talons of the American eagle. Knox's 
caption reads: "The American eagle carrying the British lion symbol­
izes the replacem ent of Welsh tin plate by the American product."22
Carr and Taplin’s (1962. p. 117) account on conditions in  British 
tin  plate m anufacture for this period states;
In 1890 there were 519 mills operating, on an  average more 
efficient and with higher capacity [in comparison to those of the 
previous decade]. Many new mills had been built during the 
decade. In the past--notably In 1880-81—capacity had tem po­
rarily outrun demand, but the level of trade had soon caught up. 
This time it was different: the American m arket, to which 
everyone had looked for the next revival w hen times were bad, 
was fading away apparently for good....By mid-1896 the num ber 
of tinplate mills a t work in the United Kingdom had fallen to 
308 and  was still falling.
The tariff barrier and the resultant revitalization of American tin  plate
production led to a ne t loss of least 211 mills in Wales during th is six-
year period. The British were being separated from their American
m arket by American capital. The rise of tin plate production in  the
United S tates brought w ith it dism antled Welsh mills and their export
to and relocation in the United S tates in a  m anner consistent w ith the
definition of the process of deindustrialization (cf. Harrison and Blue-
stone 1982, p. 300). As the American market faded away, so did much
of the Welsh tin  plate industry.
22 Development of the American Tin Plate Industry w as published by 
United S tates Steel Corporation. Knox was "Assistant to Manager of 
Sales" for the tin plate division of Camegie-Illinois Steel Corporation at 
the time. The American Tin Plate Company of Elwood, Indiana, w as 
the  company around which the American Tin Plate Company of New 
Jersey  was formed.
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The severing of the British from their American m arket was fu r­
th e r boosted by the establishm ent of the Dingley Tariff in  1897 (Hogan 
1971, p. 292; and  Pierce 1907, p. 35). The protection of the Ameri­
can m arket brought severe competition to the domestic tin  plate 
industiy  which was then dominated by m any small firms originally 
established to take advantage of the m arket freed from British 
com petition.
In 1898, W.H. Moore, a  promoter of mergers, sought to form a 
large consolidation of the nation 's tin plate producers (Hacker 1968, 
p. 425).23 In 1898, the American Tin Plate Company w as Incorporated 
under the laws of the state of New Jersey as  a  holding company for 38 
subsidiary companies comprising 39 plants operating a  total of 279 tin 
plate producing mills.24 Such command of capital gave Moore's Amer­
ican Tin Plate Company monopoly status by bringing nearly all m anu­
facturers of tin  plate in the United States under one organizational 
structure . Hogan (1971, p. 290) comments th a t American Tin Plate 
Company "achieved the m ain objective for which it w as formed, to 
prevent harm ful price reductions by restricting severe competition."
One way the  company restricted competition was, upon its 
consolidation, to sh u t down and dismantle several of the plants it had
23 Moore and h is brother Jam es had already formed the National 
Biscuit Company and the Diamond Match Company (Hacker 1968, p. 
425; Wendt and  Kogan 1948, p. 185; Hogan 1971, p. 289). Moore's 
desire to form a  tin  plate corporation may be less than  coincidental 
when viewed against the fact th a t a t the time. National Biscuit 
Company's products were packaged in containers made of tin  plate.
24 Member companies of American Tin Plate were distributed in the 
following m anner; Pennsylvania (18 companies), Ohio (9 companies), 
Indiana (5 companies), Maryland (3 companies). West Virginia,
Illinois, and New York (1 each).
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ju s t  acquired, shipping usable equipm ent to other American Tin Plate 
locations. The decline of British dominance over the American tin  
plate m arket brought w ith it the dism antling and dislocation of mills 
in Wales, and, the domination of the American Tin Plate Company over 
the domestic m arket brought with it dismantling and closure of plants 
in the United States. This Illustrates the point th a t factory closure is 
an  aspect of both the deterioration of the m arket position of firms and 
of a  firm's establishing controlling position with respect to m arkets.
American Tinplate Company w as in th is respect similar to other 
tru s ts  in  steel formed in  the closing years of the nineteenth century. 
Like American Steel Hoop and American Sheet Steel Companies of the 
Moore Group, American Steel and Wire, and Shelby Seamless Steel 
Tube, Tin Plate Company represented a  horizontal merger of pre­
viously competing firms concerned largely with production of a  single 
product and was formed in order to avoid price fluctuations associated 
with competition between many capitals. Like these other companies, 
factory closures were im portant in the establishm ent of oligopolistic 
control of production. American Tin Plate, for example, was similar to 
American Sheet Steel Company, also of the Moore Group. American 
Sheet Steel, directly upon its consolidation in 1899, dism antled four 
of its works in Pennsylvania and one In Ohio.25 The closure of factories 
is seen to play a  vital role in the establishm ent of control over produc­
tion horizontally and vertically. This is something which is also appar­
25 These included its Laufman Works, Paulton; Shousetown Works, 
Shousetown; Steel Plant Works, Leechburg; and Butler Junction 
Works, Westmoreland County, all in Pennsylvania. In Ohio, Sheet Steel 
dism antled its Coshocton Works, Coshocton (Hogan 1971, pp. 295- 
296).
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en t In the histories of Shelby Seamless Steel Tube Company, which 
bought factories of competitors in order to sh u t them down, and 
American Steel and Wire Company where closed plants accompanied 
investm ents in  other aspects of steel production.
In explaining the reason for the closure of American Tin Plate 
factories, Hogan (1971, p. 292), accepting Knox's assessm ent, argues 
th a t they were part of an  overall p lan of consolidation to "insure effi­
cient functioning" by freeing the company of "inefficient" and "poorly 
located" p lan ts in order to bring operations into "closer coordination." 
Knox (1944, p. 24) also argues th a t the plants were dismantled as 
constituent companies were brought into closer, more centralized 
relation with company offices in Chicago and New York.
This raises several im portant Issues concerning the  notion of 
efficiency and  its relation to factory closures. In reality, the  issue of 
w hat constitutes efficiency of technique, organization, and  location 
enters the discussion as an  historical question since the level of 
efficiency, the  degree of coordination, etc., are historically relative.
For example, poor location is not an  inherent quality of a  factory. In 
fact, Knox's assessm ent and  Hogan's acceptance of It implies tha t the 
newly acquired factories of American Tin Plate Company were not 
poorly located until they were brought within th e  organizational 
framework of Moore's tin  plate monopoly, and th a t the continued 
operation of th e  plants posed difficulties of coordination in  relation to 
th e  location of corporate offices.
This raises yet ano ther issue. If the incorporation of the 
factories would leave them  in a position where it would be difficult to 
coordinate the  activities of the plants in relation to the location of
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corporate offices, why were they purchased in  th e  first place? The 
company, upon its formation, pursued a  conscious policy of restricting 
competition in the tin  plate trade. Part of th is policy was an  attem pt 
to gain control over the supply of machinery for producing tin  plate in  
order to limit independent tin  plate mills (Hogan 1971, p. 291).
While th is aspect of the company's policy m et with little direct suc­
cess, control over independent companies could be achieved through 
direct purchase of factories. However, if they could not be ru n  "effi­
ciently," if their purchase imposed a  poor location upon them , they 
were sh u t down since to leave them  unpurchased and therefore in 
continued operation would leave independent competitors in  the field. 
It is not enough simply to explain the closure of factories by stating 
th a t they are no longer efficient, since efficiency m ust itself be 
explained in relation to specific historical circum stances under which 
factors of production become efficient or inefficient, poorly located, or 
well coordinated. The closure of these factories of the American Tin 
Plate Company, therefore, had less to do with the establishm ent of 
efficient functioning and more to do with the process through which 
firms extend control over production and m arkets. The histories of 
Shelby Seamless Steel Tube Company and American Steel and  Wire 
Company also dem onstrate the essential role played by factory closures 
in the process of capitalist competition and the extension of control 
over all aspects of production.
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Shelbv and  American Steel and Wire Companies: Factory Closures 
in Horizontal and Vertical Competition in the  Domestic Arena
The histoiy of Shelby Seamless Steel Tube Company offers an  
example of the role played by factory closures In the process of 
monopoly formation and their importance within strategies of control 
pursued by firms. Especially during the years 1897 un til 1901, Shelby 
rose to near monopoly stature in  seamless tube production. Shut­
downs an d  dism antling of works accompanied the expansion of the 
company as It eliminated competitors and concentrated production in 
and around Shelby and  Toledo, Ohio.
The Shelby Steel Tube Company, located in Shelby, Ohio, w as 
incorporated in 1890 under the laws of th a t state, and the  company 
represented the first successful venture In the commercial production 
of seam less steel tubes in the United S tates (Boore 1951, p. 35: and 
Jones 1926, p. 42).26 The dem and for seam less steel tubes was 
sparked in  the late nineteenth and through the first decades of the 
twentieth century by  several developments: (1) as sta ted  above, a 
growing oil industry which required seam less tubes for drilling equip­
ment; (2) production of spindles and shuttles for the textile industry 
which h ad  been growing domestically since the end of the  Civil War;
(3) expanding m ilitary production leading u p  to and following the 
Spanish American War; (4) growing production of stationary boilers 
along w ith marine boilers as p a r t of the naval expansion program 
begun in  1897; (5) u se  of steel tube in production of automotive
26 The company was originally known as th e  Lozier-Yost Seamless 
Tubes Works after its incorporation in December of 1890 when its 
named w as changed in  January  1891 to Shelby Steel Tube Company 
(Boore 1951, p. 35).
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frames and engine parts; and (6) increased requirem ents of steel 
tubing in the production of locomotives (Boore 1951, pp. 75-84; and 
Warren 1972, p. 174).27
Besides all of these areas of demand, the seam less steel tube 
industry in the  United States took off because of the enormous 
demand for bicycles. The "bicycle craze" in the United States began 
around 1895 and was of great importance to the industry  because steel 
tubing for bicycles was produced under special patents which came to 
be controlled by bicycle m anufacturers (Boore 1951, p. 44; and Hogan 
1971, p. 282). Shelby’s first major acquisition was the Shelby Cycle 
M anufacturing Company in 1893. By 1896, the Shelby Company led 
the industry nationally in output.28
On 28 October 1897, Shelby Seamless Steel Tube Company w as 
reorganized under Pennsylvania law as a holding company. The new 
company, which merged six former competitors, had a  combined
27 Seamless steel tubes were used in construction of naval vessels in 
the British and French navies since 1895 and in the American navy 
since about 1898, replacing copper and b rass as tubing materials. 
Railroads were increasing their load capacities and building larger and 
more powerful locomotives. They adopted the use of superheated 
steam  engines requiring vast lengths of steel boiler tubes. Super­
heated steam  power was utilized in newly constructed locomotives, 
and railroads also undertook conversion of old locomotives (Boore 
1951, pp. 75-84).
28 Of the seven largest producers of seamless steel tube in the nation, 
Shelby Seamless Steel Tube Company had an  annual ou tpu t of
18.000.000 feet. The Mansfield Machine Company produced
15.000.000 feet per year, followed by the Ellwood Weldless Tube 
Company and the Pope Tube Company of Hartford, Connecticut, m aker 
of the Columbia Bicycle, each with outputs of 12,000,000 feet per year. 
New Castle Tube Company and  Brewer Seamless Tube Company each 
made 10,000,000 feet per year and the Ellwood Ivins Tube Company 
had an  annual output of 5,000,000 feet (Hogan 1971, p. 282).
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annual output a t the time of 57 million feet, which gave it a  great deal 
of control over the nation's seam less steel tube m aking capacity. 
Eventually, Shelby would stand in position to build a  monopoly with 
control of 90 percent of the nation 's seamless steel tube capacity, a t 
least before the formation of Morgan's National Tube Company which 
w as beginning to make Incursions into seam less tube production and 
later, Shelby's acquisition by U.S. Steel (Ripley 1916, p. 174-175; 
Jo n es 1926, p. 195; and Hogan 1971, pp. 282-283),29
Besides the original p lan t a t Shelby, Ohio, designated ''Factory 
A," the merger involved: Ellwood Weldless Tube Company, Ellwood 
City, Pennsylvania, or "Factory B"; Greenville Tube Company, Green­
ville, Pennsylvania, "Factory C"; American Weldless Steel Tube Comp­
any, Toledo, Ohio, "Factory D"; Brewer Seamless Tube Company, 
Toledo, Ohio, "Factory F"; and Auburn Nut and Bolt Company, Auburn, 
Pennsylvania, "Factory O" (Boore 1951, p. 60). From the time of this 
m erger until its acquisition by United States Steel Corporation in 
1901, Shelby Company pursued a  broad program of expansion, 
centralization of production, and elimination of competitors (Hogan 
1971, p. 283). This policy included the acquisition of the plants of 
competitors and their subsequent shutdown, dismantling, and transfer
29 Boore's (1951, pp. 60-61) account clarifies the  narrative.
Records seem  to indicate the existence a t  the time of twelve 
additional operating mills...whose combined capacity a t the time 
was certainly equal to or in  excess of 50 million feet. Indications 
are, however, th a t in m any instances, negotiations looking 
towards their acquisition by Shelby were well under way and the 
90 percent figure may have anticipated th a t eventuality.
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of facilities to Shelby's other plants—especially to those In and around 
Shelby and Toledo. Ohio.
About one year after the  merger, Shelby expanded by purchasing 
Mansfield M anufacturing Company of Mansfield, Ohio; Hercules Seam ­
less Tube Company of Garwood, New Jersey; and United States S tand­
ard Drawn Steel Company of Cleveland, Ohio, including its Cuyahoga 
Falls mill. Although receiving their designations as Shelby factories H, 
I, and K, respectively, all of these newly purchased mills were 
immediately closed (Boore 1951, p. 64; and Hogan 1971, p. 283). 
Boore's (1951, p. 62) account dem onstrates Shelby's approach to 
centralization.
On Ju ly  21, announcem ent was made th a t the Mansfield works 
was sh u t down and all the tube making equipment as  well as the 
in-process and finished stock moved to the plant a t Shelby, 
Ohio....On August 2, Shelby announced the dismantling of the 
Brewer p lan t [Factory F] a t Toledo, O., and the moving of its 10 
benches to the American Weldless p lan t [Factory D] in  the sam e 
city. These together w ith 21 more shipped in from other 
dismantled plants gave the American Weldless a  total of 43 cold 
draw benches.
Factory K a t Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio, was dismantled and its facilities 
were moved to the Shelby p lant and to Factory C a t Greenville, Penn­
sylvania, following the procurem ent by Shelby of a large order from the 
U.S Navy for projectiles. Factory I was dism antled and its equipment 
shipped to other plants (Boore 1951, pp. 65 and 128-129).
In May of 1899, Pope Tube Company of Hartford, Connecticut, 
and Albany Manufacturing Company of Albany, Indiana, were acquired 
by Shelby as Factories M and N, increasing the annual capacity of the 
concern to 100,000,000 feet (Boore 1951, pp. 65-66). In August of 
th a t year, Shelby acquired the facilities of the U.S. Projectile Company
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of Brooklyn, New York. This company, with an  annual capacity of
6,000,000 feet, produced a  full range of seamless tubing and was a 
major supplier of steel tubes used In making dynamite guns used in 
Cuba during the Spanish-American War. Although U.S. Projectile 
received the  designation of Factory E, its facilities were, upon their 
purchase, immediately dism antled and shipped to other Shelby plants. 
The dism antling of U.S. Projectile coincided with Shelby’s dism antling 
in Ju ly  1899 of a  large storage and shipping structure a t Factory B in 
Ellwood City, Ohio, and  its relocation at Factory D in Toledo (Boore 
1951, pp. 67 and 124-125).30
In 1900, Shelby w as reorganized under the laws of New Jersey, 
b u t not before it had attained a  near monopoly in seamless steel tube 
production with the purchase of the  McCool Tube Company of Beaver 
Falls, Pennsylvania, w hich became Factory L. This was the last acquis­
ition Shelby would m ake before its merger into U.S. Steel. In August 
of 1900, Factory L burned  down and was never rebuilt (Boore 1951, 
pp. 68-69; and Hogan, 1971, p. 283).
In all, before Shelby Steel Tube Company became part of United 
States Steel in June of 1901, it had  dismantled or permanently sh u t 
down these plants:
• Mansfield Machine Company, Mansfield, Ohio (Factory H);
• Albany Manufacturing Company, Albany Works, Albany, Indiana 
(Factory N);
30 Factory D had already been the recipient of the "usable pieces” of 
the  Brewer Works of th e  Brewer Seamless Tubing Company (Factory F) 
previously dismantled by  Shelby which had acquired it in 1897 (Boore 
1951, p. 125).
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• U.S. Projectile Company, Brooklyn Works, Brooklyn, New York 
(Factory E):
• U.S. Standard Drawn Steel Company, Cayahoga Works, Cayahoga Falls, 
Ohio (Factory K);
• Hercules Seamless Drawn Tube Company, Garwood Works, Garwood, 
New Je rsey  (Factory I);
• Brewer Seamless Tubing Company, Brewer Works, Toledo, Ohio 
(Factory F);
• Pope Tube Company, Hartford Works, Hartford, Connecticut (Factory 
M); and,
• New Castle Tube Company, New Castle Works, New Castle, 
Pennsylvania (Factory G) (cf. Hogan 1971, p. 284).
Following these shutdowns and relocations of various facilities. 
Shelby undertook an  improvements program ju s t prior to its acquisi­
tion by U.S. Steel. Plans were made for the  addition of a  new piercer 
a t Factory A in Shelby. This piercer was to complement facilities 
which h ad  been removed from the  Auburn factory and  relocated there. 
Most Importantly, p lans were m ade for the construction of a  new bar 
mill a t the  Greenville plant. The immediate purpose of such actions 
was, it seem s, to m ake Shelby attractive to the Steel Corporation as  an 
object of merger. Boore (1951, p. 72) comments,
All of these improvem ents were carried through to completion 
b u t with the exception of the Greenville bar mill were of ques­
tionable merit from the standpoint of cost reduction or increase 
of capacity. A contemporary suggests tha t they were for the 
m ost part window dressing to make the  company attractive to 
the Steel Corporation. In support of th is point of view the new 
hot mill at Shelby, Ohio, produced only a  few thousand tons of 
tubes in its entire existence.
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Hogan (1971, p. 284), w ith reference to this aspect of Boore's narra­
tive, agrees th a t these actions were indeed "window dressing"—an 
aspect of Shelby's "desire...to enter the United S tates Steel organi­
zation."
The history of the Shelby Seamless Steel Tube Company sup ­
ports two points. First, the pattern of its  factory closures resembles a 
sim ilar pattern  described in  current analyses of deindustrialization. In 
th is way, the closure of Shelby plants from 1897 to  1901, in the 
process of eliminating competitors, w as part of a  "method for shifting 
capital [involvingl physically relocating... equipment from one facility to 
another" (Bluestone and Harrison 1982. p. 7), and shifting Investment 
in the form of an  improvements program.
Secondly, the example of the Mansfield Works shutdown partic­
ularly calls into question explanations of the factory closure as repre­
senting the purging of obsolete facilities and methods from industries 
and economies through a  process of "creative destruction" (cf. 
McKenzie, 1984, p. 85; and  Thurow 1980, p. 77). Boore (1951, p. 62) 
points out th a t a t the time of its closure.
One of the men who assisted in the  inspection of the tubing 
from th is mill, as well as from others which were taken into the 
combination, stated th a t the tubing from the Mansfield mill was 
the m ost accurately drawn of any he had inspected.
Here, the case of the Mansfield Works, Factory H, among others in 
Shelby's history as an independent corporation, Indicates the prob­
lematic nature of such corporate actions, i.e., they cannot simply be 
explained by examining them  through the  lenses of "efficiency" and 
"obsolescence." Such term s are treated as, bu t in  reality are not, 
"natural" categories. Rather, efficiency and obsolescence are, in a  very
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im portant sense, socially created conditions imposed upon commod­
ities and  processes produced w ithin a  social order wherein such 
things a s  "usefulness" and "need" are  of little or no consequence in 
economic life (Brown 1986, p. 46). Indeed, in  the Shelby case, 
shutdow ns, dism antled factories, and  relocation of facilities took place 
with regard not to technical considerations of tube production bu t 
with regard rather to the  extension of control over production, the 
elimination of competitors, and building the bargaining position of the 
firm by making the company attractive as an  object of merger through 
"window dressing."
Making the com pany attractive for merger was im portant 
because while enjoying a  great deal of horizontal control in  seamless 
steel tube production, Shelby lacked control over any basic steel pro­
ducing capacity and depended on other producers for its in p u t of raw 
materials. U.S. Steel Corporation controlled the  vast majority of basic 
steel production, and  a s  a  fully Integrated firm, held National Tube 
Company as a tube-m aking subsidiary. Shelby could at least enter the 
corporation on its own terms. By th e  close of 1901, U.S. Steel held 
both National Tube and  Shelby Steel Tube as wholly owned subsidiary 
companies. Eventually, the plants of the Shelby Company would come 
to be operated by National Tube Company.
The cases of the American Tin Plate Company and, especially, 
Shelby Seamless Steel Tube Company dem onstrate a  m anner In which 
factory closures and relocations are p a rt of a  process wherein com­
mand over capital is established. Factory closures represent direct 
elimination of competitors in the process of monopoly building and 
with it, extension of adm inistrative control over production as more
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and more of the nation's capacity to produce comes under the direc­
tion of fewer and fewer firms. In this process, considerations of such 
things as efficiency, however it is defined, and obsolescence, etc., are 
of secondary importance to considerations having to do with control. 
Such is also the case of the American Steel and Wire Company prior to 
its incorporation into United States Steel. However, w hereas the 
Shelby case exemplifies the closure of p lan ts in the process of building 
horizontal control over production, the case of the American Steel and 
Wire Company, already commanding most of the nation's wire and nail 
capacity, illustrates the role of closures in building vertical control 
over production. In this case, factories becam e like pawns in capitalist 
competition and the shutdow n of its p lants were not to eliminate 
horizontal competitors, b u t to release it from vertical dependence on 
basic steel producers.
American Steel and Wire had developed originally from a p a rt­
nership between Jo h n  W. Gates and Elbert Gary, who together had 
formed the Consolidated Steel and Wire Company in 1892. As Wendt 
and Kogan (1948, p. 146), Gates's biographers, pu t it, "keeping with 
the McKinley era of laissez falre.’1 Gates and Gary sought to consolidate 
the wire industry  still further in order to
Put an  end to ruinous price cutting and take advantage of econo­
mics of scale to reduce high production costs which were being 
incurred by m any of the companies in  the wire industry  a t th a t 
time (Hogan 1971, p. 258).
Gates and Gary sought J.P. Morgan's financial backing, b u t Morgan was
pu t off the idea when the United States entered war with Spain in
1898. Gates and Gary, deciding to go ahead with their p lan for a  wire
and nail trust, formed the American Steel and Wire Company of Illinois
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in March of 1898. This holding company w as formed in  order to take 
over, in addition to several other properties, those of Consolidated 
Steel and Wire Company. The new  trust held 14 plants and  controlled 
75 percent of the nation 's wire producing capacity (Wendt and Kogan 
1948, p. 149; and Hogan 1971, p. 258).
It was here th a t the partnership between Gates and Gary ended. 
Gary and Morgan cooperated in the formation of Federal Steel. With 
the financial backing of J  & S Seligman banking house, Gates, in J a n u ­
ary 1899, went on to form the American Steel and Wire Company of 
New Jersey  which held 36 of the nation's largest wire producers and 
several smaller ones. Gates became chairm an of the board of directors 
and appointed John  Lambert president of the  new combination which 
attained a  "virtual monopoly" over the nation's wire, nail, and  fence 
m aterial business (Hogan 1971, pp. 260-261).31
From April of 1900 to the incorporation of United S tates Steel a  
year later, Gates engineered a strategy designed to expand control of 
American Steel and Wire in relation to other producers and  release it 
from dependence on companies producing basic steel by building a 
more vertically integrated operation. This program  involved the 
shutdown of p lants—at one point, one-third of the constituent plants of 
American Steel and Wire were closed.
Early In 1900, John  Gates announced to the steel industiy  tha t 
American Steel and Wire Company was in good financial condition and
31 According to Harvey O'Connor (1935, p. 39), when Gates was pu t­
ting American Steel and Wire together, "He bought mills sight unseen 
for $1,000,000 apiece." This along with his reputation as a  stock 
m arket speculator and a  penchant for gambling earned Gates the 
nicknam e of "Bet a  Million!" (Wendt and Kogan 1948, p. 176).
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commented with optimism on the sta te of the industry. However, on 
16 April 1900, Gates, w ithout warning, announced the shutdown of 
twelve of Steel and Wire Company's plants.32 In a  complete 
turnaround from his statem ent made less th an  two m onths earlier, 
Gates told reporter Robert Armstrong of the Chicago Record, w hen 
asked to explain the closings,
It all am ounts to th is...that the steel and wire business is in 
bad shape. It has been getting worse constantly and the mills 
of every sort have been running on orders th a t they obtained 
six or more months ago. The demand today in our line, a t 
least, and  I think proportionately in the other departm ents 
of the steel trade is only about 30 per cent of the volume it 
should be. For instance, we have been making 5,000 and 6,000 
tons of finished products in the justified expectation of selling 
about 6,000. We have, in fact, been selling only 2,000 or 3,000 
tons. That illustrates the situation (Wendt and Kogan, 1948, p. 
162).
From various quarters of the steel industry came statem ents 
from industry officials, Morgan and Gary among them, denying th a t 
there was any basis for Gates's pessimistic assessm ent of the industry. 
When pressed to  explain how the Industry could possibly have deteri­
orated so m uch in a  m onth and a  half, Lambert, asserting the '"divine 
right'" of capital, stated forthrightly th a t,’"Our company is running this 
business without any need of explaining! We sh u t down and open our 
mills when we see fit!"’ (Wendt and Kogan 1948, pp. 162-163). This 
was followed by a  statem ent from Lambert on 19 April th a t four of the
32 'Three of those shu t were wire-nail plants In Joliet; in addition he 
also closed a  wire-rod mill in  Waukegan, another in  Newcastle, Penn­
sylvania, a wire mill in Anderson, Indiana, the Ellwood plant in De 
Kalb, the Allegheny Furnace Company, another p lant in Cleveland and 
three wire mills in  Pittsburgh" (Wendt and Kogan 1948, p. 162).
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closed plants would be reopen In a  week (Wendt and Kogan 1971, p. 
164).
The announcem ent th a t these plants of American Steel and Wire 
Company were to be closed triggered a  panic on Wall Street which 
sent steel stock prices in general and those of Steel and Wire Com­
pany in  particular plummeting. Two days before the announcem ent. 
Gates, through his confidential secretary O.A. Owen gave word to his 
Chicago brokers to sell a large block of h is stock In American Steel 
and Wire Company. It was estimated th a t he sold 50,000 shares of 
common and 20,000 shares of preferred stock, and when the panic 
h it the stock m arket he merely began to buy the stock back a t a  m uch 
lower price (Wendt and Kogan 1948, pp. 164 and 174; and O'Connor 
1935, p. 40).33
Since we tend to m aintain and romanticize an  image of the 
reckless and adventurous entrepreneur, it is tempting to call Gates's 
behavior nothing more than  a  superior example of "stock Jobbing."
But there appears to be more to the stoiy than  that. Certainly, one 
would not w ant to deny the influence of a  personal profit motive in the 
entire episode, for, after all, accumulation of personal wealth is the 
"name of the game" under capitalism. However, this affair of using 
p lant shutdowns as a springboard for w hat amounted to stock 
m anipulation might be best understood by examining the position of 
American Steel and Wire Company Just prior to its absorption into the
33 Shortly after the episode. Gates resigned his seat on the Board of 
Directors of American Steel and Wire b u t did not lose influence within 
the company. It is estimated tha t when all is said and done. Gates 
walked away from th is affair with $1,000,000 to $1,620,000 (Wendt 
and Kogan 1948, pp. 174-175; and Hogan 1971, p. 262).
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United States Steel Corporation. Gates's was not Just a  case of "grab 
the money and run" b u t his actions sire also Intelligible within the 
context of the dynamics of capitalist competition and their relation­
ship to corporate control because it was a t this time tha t Gates began a 
program designed to break the dependence of American Steel and 
Wire on the Carnegie Company. As Shelby Company had prepared 
for merger by "window dressing." American Steel and Wire Company 
was also consolidating its position with respect to other steel 
producers.
It w as common knowledge in  1900 th a t a  merger of huge pro­
portions in the steel industry was in  the making. Carnegie had  already 
had several offers and had been nam ing prices.34 In fact, Carnegie had 
already been involved in discussions concerning possible mergers with 
both the Moores and with Rockefeller (Wendt and Kogan 1948, p.
186; and  Hacker 1968, p. 186). Since the Carnegie Company was 
setting the pace in the industry, other producers of both basic steel 
and finished goods were trying to improve their positions in relation 
to Carnegie.
American Steel and Wire Company sought to extend its vertical 
control by increasing its supplies of raw  m aterials and acquiring 
facilities to fill its own needs for basic steel. O ther firms such as 
National Tube and the Moore Companies were following suit. Between 
the time of the shutdow n of these twelve plants and the incorporation 
of United States Steel, Gates announced tha t he was negotiating for
34 According to Jennings (1926, p. 634), Carnegie first received from 
and considered an  offer of $250,000,000 made by an  English 
syndicate for the properties of Carnegie Steel Company.
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the purchase of additional coal m ines in West Virginia and for addi­
tional steel plants in  Milwaukee in  order to lessen dependence of the 
company on Carnegie.35 As part of th is  program, in  the last year of its 
existence as an independent corporation, Gates engineered the  p u r­
chase of four ships to transport iron ore from the Mesabi range on the 
Great Lakes (Wendt and  Kogan 1948, p. 188; and Hogan 1971, p.
263).36 At nearly the sam e time, American Steel an d  Wire Company 
perm anently closed and  dismantled its  Duncansville Works in  Penn­
sylvania, its Crown Point Works b last furnaces in New York, and  its 
Findlay Works and Cincinnatti Works, both in Ohio (Hogan 1971, pp. 
264-265).
In relation to the Carnegie Steel Company and  the central role 
tha t Gates and others in  the steel industry  knew it would play in  an  
upcoming merger, American Steel and  Wire Company was able to  
press a  two-pronged a ttack  in improving its position in  relation to 
other steel producers. First, vertical integration lessened dependency 
on basic and semi-flnished steel producers--in particu lar Carnegie 
Company which was m ost im portant among these. Hogan (1971, p. 
263) concludes th a t increased vertical control accomplished by 
American Steel and Wire along with o ther producers of finished and
35 American Steel and Wire had also shifted its orders from the 
Carnegie Company to Federal Steel (Wendt and Kogan 1948, p. 188).
36 One of the ships was named the J.W . Gates. The other three were 
nam ed for close associates of Gates: th e  Jam es J . Hill for one of 
Morgan's railroad lieutenants through whom Gates usually  dealt w ith 
Morgan, the I.L. Ellwood who stood w ith Gates th rough  the plant 
closing fiasco and who resigned with him, and the William Edenbom  
who took Ellwood's position on the board of directors (Wendt and  
Kogan 1948, pp. 174 and  188).
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basic steel "placed Carnegie on the defensive." Secondly, w hen 
American Steel and Wire shu t down twelve of its p lants on 16 April 
1900, it no t only created panic in the stock m arket b u t threatened to 
remove from the basic steel producers an  im portant m arket supplying 
semi-finished goods for wire production. The shutdow ns were con­
sidered im portant enough for representatives of Federal Steel, among 
whom was Elbert Gary, to attend the board meeting of American Steel 
and Wire because "they w anted...assurances th a t American Steel and 
Wire would not back ou t on its order for 50,000 tons of steel billets 
from Federal Steel" (Wendt and Kogan 1948, p. 165).37 While Ameri­
can Steel and Wire eventually shifted is orders to Federal, the wire 
tru s t successfully dealt Carnegie out of the wire m arket. Furthermore, 
against the backdrop of the closed plants. Gates delivered the  follow­
ing statem ent to reporters a t the conclusion of the  board meeting 
(quoted in W endt and Kogan 1948, p. 165):
The board of directors...discussed the general business situation 
and unanim ously decided th a t until the overproduction of m ate­
rials has been disposed of, the executive committee m ay make 
such reduction in prices as they may find necessary to accom­
plish this and resum e operation of the idle plants.
While producers of finished steel goods were moving into basic
steel production and limiting access to markets, Carnegie Company
developed a  program in  response and threatened to counter such
moves by Itself moving into wire and tube making. Plans were
announced by the Steel Company in  1900 and early 1901 to begin
construction of a huge steel tube works in response to National Tube's
37 A billet is a  semi-flnished steel product used in steel wire and  steel 
tube production.
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operation of blast furnaces a t its newly formed subsidiary, Tube Steel 
Company a t Benwood, West Virginia, in 1899 (Hacker 1968, p. 465). 
"Carnegie saw in  th is a  loss of m arket for he supplied the National 
Tube Company with m uch of its raw  steel" (Hogan 1971, p. 465). 
Despite Carnegie’s wish "to co-operate in every way with...fellow 
m anufacturers," it would be necessary to enter the  new field in "self- 
defence" (Bridge 1903, pp. 360-361, quoting the  Iron Trade Journal 
for 17 January , 1901). Also in response to Morgan, who w as heavily 
interested in the Pennsylvania Railroad and who had control over 
about half the country's railroads, Carnegie Company proposed to build 
its own rail Une, which would parallel Pennsylvania Railroad, to bring 
steel to the coast from Pittsburgh and, in basic steel, to invade the 
western territory of Federal's Illinois Steel Company (Cotter 1916, p. 
14). Further, 'To fight Gates, a  huge wiremaking plant...would be 
constructed near Pittsburgh" (Wendt and Kogan 1948, p. 189; and 
Hacker 1968, p. 399). In 1900, then, Carnegie announced th a t the 
Steel Company would enter wiremaking. Threatened by a  renewed 
and higher level of "destructive and ruinous competition," a 
destructive industrial war, with all capitals in steel poised an d  at the 
ready, the United States Steel Company was finally formed in  1901 
(Wendt and Kogan 1948, pp. 189-192; Bridge 1903, pp. 358-362; and
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Hogan 1971, pp. 263 and 46S-468).38 The companies, like Hobbesian 
men who establish the Commonwealth out of fear of dying violent 
deaths a t  the hands of their fellows, established the Corporation as a  
solution to the possibilities, and to avoid the dangers, of m utual 
annihilation.
Conclusions
The United States Steel Corporation, chartered in New Jersey as 
a  holding company, brought together the properties of w hat were then 
the largest of both basic steel and fabricated steel producers including 
the Carnegie Company, the companies of the Morgan and Moore 
Groups of allied holding companies, American Steel and Wire Com­
38 Wendt and Kogan (1948, pp. 189-190) comment further on this:
As he anticipated, Carnegie's enemies were thrown into turmoil 
by these announcem ents. Carnegie was in an  excellent position 
to fight and win an  industrial war...and he knew it. His railroad 
venture could wreck Morgan's growing rail empire, h is tube 
company might sm ash Morgan's...National Tube. If Carnegie 
made wire from his trem endous steel resources, he could 
engage in an  unconscionable price-cutting campaign, one that 
could ruin Gates.
In a related line of commentary Bridge (1903, p. 361) states:
In the conversion of the heathen, missionaries have found it 
useful to describe the condition of the dam ned before present­
ing a  picture of the joys of the blessed. It was on some such 
principle th a t the th reat of industrial war was thus m ade by the 
Camegies before the blessings of co-operation and consolidation 
were set out before the vision of the alarmed financiers of the 
country.
Carnegie's proposal to build a  tube works, railroad, and wiremaking 
plant were followed by "a bankers' dinner, a t w hich were preached the 
Joys of industrial peace" (Bridge 1903, p. 361).
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pany, and Shelby Seamless Steel Tube Company.39 In addition, it also 
incorporated Rockefeller's Lake Superior Consolidated Iron Mines. 
With the inclusion of Carnegie Steel Company, the financial backing of 
Morgan, and the incorporation of Rockefeller interests, the formation 
of United S tates Steel Corporation represented the unification around 
steel production of the in terests of three of the United S tates's most 
powerful and influential capitalists.
As the first billion-dollar corporation, United S tates Steel was 
the largest single consolidation yet formed, and its control over 
natu ra l resources and command over all aspects of steel production is 
indicated by Hacker (1968, p. 437), who states:
A royal domain was included In the assets of the corporation. 
These were made up  of 78 b last furnaces and 150 steelworks 
and rolling mills; ore lands whose reserves a t  the time were 
calculated to be three-quarters of a  billion tons of iron ore:
70.000 acres of coal lands as well as  limestone deposits; almost 
half of the  coke ovens of the United States (about 20,000 out of 
47,000), which produced more th an  one-half of the country’s 
coke; 112 steam ships and a thousand miles of railroad. The 
annual productive capacity of the United States Steel Corpora­
tion furnaces and p lan ts was 7,400,000 tons of pig iron,
9.400.000 tons of steel ingots, and  7,900,000 tons of finished 
steel. Its pig-iron production represented one half of the total 
output of the United States; its steel-rail production represented 
about 68 per cent: its  structural steel, 60 per cent; as m uch if 
not more, of the m anufacture of steel plates, sheets, bars, wire 
and wire rods, hoops and cotton ties; nearly the entire m anufac­
ture of tin  plates, tubes, wire nails, barbed wire, and woven-wire 
fence; and from 85 to 90 per cent of all the bridges in the 
country.
39 United States Steel received its charter in April of 1901. Shelby was 
actually not brought into the corporation until Ju n e  of th a t year. Also 
brought in a t th a t time was Rockefeller's Bessemer Steamship 
Company.
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With the formation of the  United S tates Steel Corporation, not only 
was the United States assum ing Its. leading place in  world production 
of steel, b u t it was becoming overall leader among capitalist nations as 
well. The formation of U.S. Steel was p art and parcel of the capitalist 
revolution of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—one of 
its creations and one of its makers.
The capitalist revolution was also a  corporate revolution where 
unprecedented concentration, and w ith it control over production, 
was achieved through centralized organizational command. Such 
com mand over production was established in the progressively cen­
tralizing transform ation of organizational forms from the pool to the 
highest form of merger of the time, the  holding company. This tra n s ­
formation brought with it  the passage from industrial control of the 
independently owned firm to the oligopolistic trust. These organiza­
tional solutions to problem s of accumulation faced by  firms were p u r­
sued in order to provide a  buffer against "ruinous competition" and the 
inadequacy of markets to absorb surpluses.
In th is  chapter, we see the im portant role of factory closures in 
th is development, i.e., the ir importance in  the process through w hich 
a capitalist nation constructed its basic capacity to produce. This is 
contrary to the contemporary view in which factory closures are 
synonymous with the dismantling of basic industry. Historically, in  the 
context of American capitalist development, what we have seen and  
w hat we will continue to see in this work is tha t the role of factory 
closures in  post-Civil W ar industrial expansion in the United States is 
comparable to tha t of the  factory closure In the post-World War II, or, 
more particularly, post-VIet Nam industrial decline of the  1970s.
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In Bluestone and Harrison's (1982, pp. 123-124) view, factory 
closures are fundamentally related to the post-1945 corporate con­
glomeration movement brought on by diversification of firms from 
single and related endeavors into totally unrelated fields. This 
resulted in the unique pattern of factory closing described by the term 
deindustrialization. Factory closures are recognized as a mechanism 
through which the conglomerate as  organizational firm type, form of 
capital concentration, and model of capitalist competition was created. 
The history of steel industry development up  to 1901 supports the 
claim th a t factory closures were as crucial to the creation of horizontal 
and vertical mergers as ways of organizing firms, concentrating capital 
and competing with other firms as  they are to conglomeration. Fur­
therm ore, as in the contemporary process of conglomeration, factory 
closures in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were not 
merely outcomes of business failures or of the operation of blind 
m arket m echanism s b u t were outcomes of decisions made and 
definite actions taken by real hum an actors, within given historically 
created circumstances, i.e., in the process of the social construction of 
capitalist society (cf. Perlman 1977, p. 65, and  Schweikart 1984, p.
33). Factory closures were conscious aspects of corporate policies 
actively pursued by firms in the process of competition and as 
individual capitalists took each other into account.
Overall, th is examination of steel industry development around 
the tu rn  of the century supports Mandel’s (1968, p. 434) point that, 
"trusts and monopolies do not suppress capitalist competition; they 
merely reproduce it on a  higher scale and in more acute form."
Factory closures were involved in th is reproduction process. The
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characteristic feature of the pre-1901 steel Industry was th a t 
previously competing Independent steel com panies were brought 
together as a  buffer to destructive competition and price fluctuations 
Into groups of competing tru s ts . In turn, the  post-1901 steel industry 
brought these previously competing Independent trusts together in 
the form of the United States Steel Corporation threatened competi­
tively as they were by the possibilities of each other’s vertical integra­
tion. The next chapter will cover the period of steel industry  devel­
opm ent in w hich other domestic corporations rose to challenge the 
dominance of U.S. Steel and th e  response of the  Corporation within 
th is  new climate of competition.
An analysis of the formation of the steel industry in the  late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries ra ises im portant issues 
concerning how we currently th in k  about deindustrialization. As 
sta ted  in chapter 2, current discussions of th e  deindustrialization 
issue are limited in  historical scope. Rather th a n  approaching 
deindustrialization as an historical question, it is framed as a  spatial, 
geographic, or regional issue by  commentators from a variety of theor­
etical perspectives. Examples Include those analyses which debate the 
issue of deindustrialization in term s of the flight of capital from urban 
centers to suburbs in local contexts, "Frostbelt" to "Sunbelt" in  the 
context of the United States, an d  North to South  or First World to 
Third World in the  global context. The factory closure in the  history 
of steel Industry development will form an im portant focus of the 
chap ter to follow where attention will be paid to  the role of shutdowns 
in th e  formation of the m anufacturing belt of th e  United S tates. This 
chap ter covered th e  formation of the  great steel tru sts  w hich were
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eventually consolidated into the  United States Steel Corporation in 
1901. The Steel Corporation and its constituent trusts, it is under­
stood, were b o m  of the "great merger movement" which lasted from 
the 1890s to the tu rn  of the century and  beyond.
CHAPTER V
STEEL AND MONOPOLY II: CENTRALIZATION, FACTORY 
CLOSURES, AND THE RISE OF THE MANUFACTURING BELT
Introduction
The outcome of the corporate revolution was the reproduction of 
capitalist competition on a  higher scale. The basic unit of capitalist 
competition was no longer the independent firm bu t the corporation, 
a  unity of firms previously in competition with each other. The corpo­
rate development of the steel industry in the years since the tu rn  of 
the century represented the continuation of trends established in the 
late nineteenth century, namely vertical, horizontal, and spatial inte­
gration b u t a t a  higher velocity, which, in th is development, accom­
panied a  more intense level of factory closure as firms sought control 
over raw m aterials and control over m arkets for finished products, 
acquisitions of other steel producers, diversification into endeavors 
not directly associated with steel production, and geographic concen­
tration of production. Each phase of corporate expansion, acquisition, 
and investment was accompanied by factory closures. This section 
covers the association between Investment and disinvestm ent— 
between growth, expansion, reorganization, and factory closures—from 
1901 to 1929. This will provide the basis upon which local effects of 
factory closures and industrialization can be discussed.
The specific em phasis of this chapter is the issue of factory 
closures in the  domestic context, their role in industrial development, 
and the issue of effects of this course of industrialization on the local
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level. This will be accomplished by presenting an  overview of the ex­
tent of factory closures in the th irty  years subsequent to the formation 
of the United States Steel Corporation, their relationship to th e  proc­
ess of investment, i.e., entry into other aspects of steel production and 
other m arkets. Especially im portant here are developments within 
the United States Steel Corporation since the tu rn  of the century and 
the relationship of these to development of the steel towns, both  those 
experiencing shutdow ns and those which becam e centers of steel 
production.
The substantive referent of this chapter is the tendency within 
current deindustrialization literature to emphasize the role of the 
factory closure as a  spatial issue. For example, factory closures are 
discussed within the process of capital flight from cities to suburbs (cf. 
Dowd 1977, pp. 226-265, and Ashton 1984, p. 63),1 and from com­
m unities in one region to communities in more favored regions, e.g., 
from "Frostbelt" or "Rustbelt" to "Sunbelt."2 In th is way, deindustriali­
zation is viewed as the "'shake-out' of entire sectors of US m anufactur­
ing industry, such as steel...giving rise to w hat Is called the 'decline' of 
the traditional m anufacturing belt In the Northeast and the 'rise' of the
1 Ashton (1984, pp. 63-74) describes the process of capital flight from 
the cities in the post-World War II period, its relocation and th a t  of 
labor in suburban areas, and the development of an  urban fiscal crisis 
and deterioration of u rban  services.
2 Peet (1987, pp. 53-54) comments: "The term s popularly used to 
rationalize the relocation of United States m anufacturing industry  as a 
move from the Frostbelt to the Sunbelt (implying locational determ in­
ation by natu ra l relations of production) represent an  ideological 
diversion from a more essential tru th . Natural resources are used, and 
space arranged and rearranged, under the control of the social rela­
tions of production.”
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so-called 'Sunbelt' in the South and West" (Agnew 1987, p. 19). The 
resu lt in the post-World War II period is the deterioration of cities and 
the  abandonm ent and destruction of local communities.
To Bluestone and Harrison (1980, p. 103, and 1982, pp. 82- 
107) there is another side to this kind of development—the social 
costs of deindustrialization bring with them costs of reindustrializa- 
tion. Block (1987, p. 128) refers to th is same process as the "myth of 
reindustrlallzation," the sim ultaneous destruction and  revitalization of 
a  nation's industries. It is not only the communities th a t lose factories 
th a t suffer the social costs of economic dislocation and  unemployment, 
b u t the communities where plants are built, where investm ents end 
up, th a t suffer the downside of development—the "boomtown syn­
drome," "the often destructive consequences of unplanned rapid 
development" (Bluestone and Harrison 1982, p. 86). The boomtown 
syndrome is characterized by a  cluster of "symptoms" described by 
Bluestone and Harrison (1982, p. 91) in  these terms:
The unrealized burden of boomtown expansion goes beyond th a t 
which is easily measured. Paradoxically, both the  physical and 
emotional health  consequences of boomtown developments tu rn  
out to be similar to those found in  communities like Youngstown 
and Akron th a t experience acute capital loss. El Dean V. Kohrs, 
for example, finds th a t unplanned expansions, "always seem to 
leave in the ir wake grim statistics of mental depression, family 
disorganization, emotional change, alcoholism, delinquency, and 
dissipation. These boomtown crises are not new ...but the social 
consequences are becoming clearer today, and  they are being 
felt in more parts of the country...." A growing segment of the 
population in the Sunbelt now recognizes the immense social 
costs th a t accompany unplanned and anarchic hyper-lnvestment.
To this, Feagan (1984, p. 124), commenting on Houston, adds,
[FJrom the working-class point of view, the shining buckle of the 
Sunbelt h as  its tarnished side, w ith its alr-pollution, congestion, 
lack of housing, poor m ass transit, and nonunionized, low-wage
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jobs. Houston is indeed a  transparen t window through which 
one can look to see the details of u rb an  growth and development 
in this era of late capitalism. In Houston this era is character­
ized not so m uch by Big Government a s  by Big Business, which 
takes the form of large-scale development projects and  expand­
ing industrial and commercial operations. And it is the centrif­
ugal and centripetal effects of this large-scale development th a t 
ordinary Houstonians m ust bear, as their job opportunities, 
transportation systems, working conditions, and residential 
choices are limited significantly by the  prior decisions of 
industrial development and finance capital.
For the proponents of the deindustrialization thesis, it is the "ghost 
town" accompanied by the "boomtown" th a t forms the kernel of criti­
cism of the neoclassical "creative destruction" thesis—destruction 
accompanied not by rational creation bu t by disorganized and destruc­
tive patterns of growth (Bluestone and Harrison 1982, p. 82).
But the problems associated with hyper-investment are prob­
lems currently discussed largely with respect to post-Second World 
War conglomeration carried out by cash hungry corporations which 
close factories as they shift investments to more profitable regions and 
endeavors (Bluestone, Harrison, and Baker 1981, p. 14). Deindustri­
alization and disinvestm ent are equated w ith conglomeration (Houston 
1984, p. 258). However, two things m ust be kept in mind. Late 
capitalism Is capitalism all the same, and to the extent th a t we can call 
a society capitalist, we understand tha t it develops according to cer­
tain  characteristic dynamics. In a  related sense, conglomerate merger 
is a  pattern  of capital investment, corporate organization, and  capital­
is t competition like horizontal and vertical merger. They also can be 
expected to share similar patterns in the dynamics of the ir operation 
and consequences. Therefore, factory closures bear the sam e rela­
tionship to the period of corporate development dominated by hori­
zontal and vertical merger as they do to the current period of con-
217
glomeration. My basic thesis, then, is this: while current accounts 
concerned with dom estic economic development since th e  Second 
World War emphasize the Importance and im pacts of factoxy closures 
in the deindustrialization process, the rise of suburbanization, and the 
deterioration of cities along with the rise of the Sunbelt, attention to 
the issue of factory closures in th e  historical development of the steel 
industry  indicates th a t they were similarly im portant, w ith similarly 
disorganizing im pacts in the processes of urbanization, 
industrialization, and the rise of the  "manufacturing belt."
Steel Corporations: Investment and 
Factory Closures. 1901-1929
Central to the current theory of deindustrialization is this
observation summarized by Newman (1985, pp. 7-8), who states:
Corporations b en t on cost cutting pulled out of the  traditional 
centers of heavy industry, leaving a  trail of destruction behind. 
Cities such as Detroit, Gary, Youngstown, and Philadelphia wit­
nessed severe Increases in unemployment, followed by plum ­
meting tax revenues, cuts in  city services, and in some instances 
by hum an flight, as some workers unable to make a  living moved 
out. The growth areas of the m anufacturing economy, by con­
trast, are the areas traditionally hostile to unionization, where 
average wages are low, public services meagre and where, in  
general, workers enjoy a m uch lower standard  of living.
With reference to th is  fundam ental concern of deindustrialization . 
theory, the purpose of this chapter is to identify and discuss the role 
of factory closures in the  process through which the very cities 
mentioned by Newman historically became the  growth areas of the 
m anufacturing economy in the first half of the  twentieth century.
Let u s briefly recall from chapter 2 the influence of the Youngs­
town example on cu rren t work on the issue of deindustrialization. In
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1977 the  Lykes Corporation, owner of Youngstown Sheet and Tube 
Corporation, announced the closure of the Campbell Works. And in 
1980, Jones and Laughlin, which had acquired the Campbell Works, 
closed the Brier Hill Works, also formerly a  property of Youngstown 
Sheet and Tube (Buss and Redbum  1983, p. 23). These events 
contributed to making Youngstown an  example or a  "microcosm" of 
the destructive im pact of disinvestm ent upon communities (Logue 
1985, p. 75).
Factory closures have contributed to the contemporary destruc­
tion of Youngstown. But a  brief look a t the history of Youngstown 
Sheet and  Tube Company reveals tha t the construction of the commu­
nity's m anufacturing base from 1900 to 1929 was also an outcome of 
capital flight--of disinvestment in the form of factory closures and 
reinvestm ent or relocation of capital in  Youngstown itself.
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company was organized in  1900 for 
the production of wrought iron sheet and tubing. In 1901, the com­
pany bought 117 acres of land in Youngstown, a  location which p u t it 
within easy reach of river transportation along the Mahoning River and 
on the Baltimore and Ohio and Pittsburgh and Lake Erie railroads. 
From 1901 to 1902, the company's Campbell Works, consisting of 
fifteen puddling furnaces, and b ar and skelp mills for rolling tubes, 
were built. The company's first acquisition was the Ohio Galvanizing 
Company of Niles, Ohio, the facilities of which Sheet and Tube bought 
expressly for the purpose of moving to its Youngstown plant 
(Schroeder 1953, pp. 62 and 66, and Hogan 1971, pp. 628-630).
After adding to its properties those of Little Alice Furnace, 
Sharpsville, Pennsylvania and iron ore properties of Pitt Mining Com­
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pany and Crete Mining Company. Youngstown Sheet and  Tube shifted 
to the production of steel goods. For th is purpose, it purchased Bes­
semer steel on the open m arket until its own Bessemer steel p lant 
was completed in 1906. With these facilities, Youngstown Sheet and 
Tube Company passed from being solely a  buyer of raw  materials to a 
seller of raw  materials, and in 1908, the company purchased the plant 
of Morgan Spring Company of Struthers, Ohio--a subsidiary company of 
U.S. Steel's American Sheet and Tinplate Company, which had been a 
major purchaser of raw  materials from Youngstown Sheet and Tube 
(Hogan 1971, pp. 631-637).
Following th is acquisition, Youngstown Sheet and  Tube Company 
began to diversify. The Alice b last furnace w as sold and  additional 
blast furnace capacity added a t Youngstown. Electrical conduit was 
added to its  line of products. To carry th is out, the p lant of the Harvey 
M anufacturing Company of Harvey, Illinois, including its galvanizing 
machinery, was purchased, dismantled, and moved to Sheet and 
Tube's recently acquired facilities a t S truthers, Ohio. Youngstown 
Sheet and Tube then organized the Western Conduit Company as a 
subsidiary which it eventually transform ed into a corporate depart­
m ent (Hogan 1971, pp. 637-639).
After shutting down and scrapping a  $2.5 million mill for rolling 
steel plate, Youngstown Sheet and  Tube Company constructed a  new 
plate making facility and electrified its sh ee t mills a t Campbell Works 
a t  Youngstown in 1922 (Hogan 1971, pp. 642 and 983). The following 
year, Youngstown Sheet and Tube made its two m ost im portant 
acquisitions, those of the Brier Hill Steel Company of Youngstown and 
the Steel and  Tube Company of America located in Chicago (Schroeder
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1953, p. 66). These purchases gave the company natural resource 
reserves in  both the Great Lakes region and in  and around Youngs­
town. the Redstone Central Railroad, steel processing facilities, addi­
tional capacity for making conduit, pum p parts, engines, and other 
finishing facilities. Most importantly, access was gained to m arkets of 
the middle west (Hogan 1971, pp. 983-985).
In 1924, the Youngstown Company disposed of several of its 
properties a t Niles and Zanesville, Ohio, as a  prelude to an  expansion 
program which lasted from 1925 to 1929. This included (Hogan 
1971, pp. 986-988):
• A $7,763,562 expenditure on improvements and  new construction 
including new blast furnaces and tin  plate mills a t  the company's 
Indiana Harbor Works and addition of new seamless tube mills a t the 
Campbell Works, all in 1925.
• In 1928, $14 million was spent on the completion of the electrifi­
cation of the Campbell Works and the building of new coke ovens in 
South Chicago.
Accompanying these improvements, the company disposed of 
properties in its Brier Hill Works and its works of the old Steel and 
Tube Company of Chicago. These properties included a plant a t 
Zanesville, Ohio, and coke ovens a t Mayville, Wisconsin. The la tter 
were abandoned by Youngstown Sheet and Tube and the former were 
dism antled and its parts used in other of the company's plants (Hogan 
1971, pp. 987-988). Besides Youngstown Sheet and Tube Corpora­
tion, other steel producers were locating operations in Youngstown. 
For example, United S tates Steel Corporation invested $11 million In 
its McDonald Works a t Youngstown from 1924 to 1929 as p art of its
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"Bar Mill Program." This m eant th a t bar mill facilities In Pittsburgh 
were being replaced by  those in th e  new location (Hogan 1971, pp. 
881-882). All in all, the veiy forces which contributed to the decline 
of the Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company, and  with it, the commu­
nity of Youngstown itself, also contributed to rise of th a t manufacturing 
community in the first place.
Similar developments were taking place within other steel 
companies and w ithin other communities during this period. Armco 
Steel Corporation, for example, one of the leading independent steel 
concerns, m aintained facilities for making ingots of basic steel a t 
Middletown, Ohio, in order to supply its steel sheet rolling mills in 
Cincinnati. In 1900, these rolling mills were dism antled and moved 
to Middletown in order to combine both operations a t one location. 
The corporation was further induced by an offer of $75,000 and land 
made by the city of Middletown to Armco for the purpose of develop­
ing steel production there (Schroeder 1953, pp. 69-70). This was 
followed in  1901 by a  merger between Armco and Muskingum Valley 
Steel Company. By 1910, Middletown plant capacity was doubled as 
the corporation began to produce its first automobile body sheets. In 
1927, Armco Steel bought Forged Steel Wheel Corporation which had 
plants in Butler, Pennsylvania, and Elyria, Ohio. The Butler plant was 
not yet completed and Armco reorganized it a t the same time th a t op­
erations a t Elyria were stopped (Hogan 1971, pp. 616-623 and 978).
The dismantling of facilities played an im portant part In the 
diversification of Bethlehem Steel and  its movement away from mili- 
tary to commercial steel production. Bethlehem Steel was originally 
established in 1886 as a  producer of iron and steel products. From
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the outset, Bethlehem was a  specialist in  production of steel for the 
military, centering its activities on production of arm or plate and 
shipbuilding (Hogan 1971, pp. 537-538). Although a t one time the 
Morgan syndicate held all of the stock of Bethlehem Steel Company, 
its entrenchm ent in military production, its eastern seaboard location, 
and its freedom from reliance on Great Lakes ore, with its  control over 
Cuban and Chilean sources, kept Bethlehem ou t of reach of United 
States Steel (Ripley 1916, p. 104, and Davis 1933, pp. 176-179 and 
214).
In 1904, Bethlehem Steel Company w as reorganized as Bethle­
hem Steel Corporation, a  holding company of nine subsidiary firms 
(Hogan 1971, pp. 539-540):
• Bethlehem Steel Company, with its p lant in  South Bethlehem, Penn­
sylvania, was primarily a  producer of armor plate and m unitions as well 
as holder of stock control of the Juragoa Iron Company which oper­
ated iron ore mines in Cuba;
• The shipbuilding and railroad car building facilities of Harlan and 
Hollingsworth Company of Delaware;
• Shipbuilding facilities, machine shop, and foundries of the Union 
Iron Works a t San Francisco;
• Marine repair facilities and foundries of Sam uel L. Moore and Sons a t 
Elizabeth Port, New Jersey;
• Carteret Improvement Company, owner of unimproved real estate in 
Carteret, New Jersey;
• Eastern Shipbuilding Company of Groton, Connecticut:
• The shipbuilding plant of Cresent Shipyard Corporation. Elizabeth 
Port, New Jersey;
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• The shipbuilding plant of Bath Iron Works. Bath, Maine; and,
• Hvde Windlass Company, a  m anufacturer of m arine equipment.
Upon its reorganization, Bethlehem undertook a  program of 
diversification aimed a t bringing it away from specialization in military 
and  ship production and into production of commercial steel. As a 
prelude to th is program, Bethlehem sold both Bath Iron Works and 
the Hyde Windlass Company and dismantled its facilities a t Cresent 
Shipyard—its property p u t up  for sale. Following these, Bethlehem's 
entry  into commercial steel production began w ith the purchase of 
250 acres of land adjacent to its Bethlehem plan t where construction 
began on b last furnaces, an open hearth  steel plant, and rolling mills 
for the production of rails and construction steel. Also, Bethlehem 
built a  new plant a t Saucon, Pennsylvania, where the new "Bethlehem 
Section" was to be produced. The Bethlehem Section was an  innova­
tive structural beam rolled from one piece of steel b u t as effective as 
the riveted beam s in use at the time (Hogan 1971, pp. 540-541).3
Republic Steel was engaged through the first thirty years of its 
existence in  wholesale restructuring of its organization carried out 
through a  program of factory closure accompanied by investments in 
diversified steel activities. Entering the steel game late, Republic was 
established as a  holding company in  1899 and reorganized as  Republic 
Iron and Steel Company, a  rolling mill tru s t operating 36 previously 
independent iron and steel making, mining and processing concerns
3 The Bethlehem Section was developed by Henry Grey. Grey offered it 
to all of the im portant steel companies producing structu ral steel.
Only Bethlehem Steel showed interest and bought the patents for its 
production.
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located largely In central and southern states (Wendt and Kogan 1948, 
p, 256, and  Hogan 1971, p. 558). The m ost Im portant problem facing 
Republic was its transition from a  company engaged primarily in 
ironmaking to a diversified and integrated steel producer. According 
to Schroeder (1953, p. 52), the policies of the company,
...Involved consolidation of the company's scattered properties 
and conversion of the company from a  mere collection of rolling 
mills with no steel making capacity to a  fully integrated and 
cohesive basic steel company.
This transition involved the entire replacem ent of its rolling mill
equipment and improvement of b last furnaces and raw material
processing facilities a s  well as the dism antling and relocation of steel
making facilities, a  total of 24 in its first ten years of operation (Hogan
1971, pp. 569-574).
The first step in  its transition to a  steel producing concern was
an  improvements program initiated in 1900 a t  the Brown Bonnell
p lant of Republic Steel, located a t Youngstown, which had  been
completely rebuilt and converted to steel production by 1902. These
changes and those th a t were to follow were to some extent part of a
scheme engineered by John  Gates, who had bought heavily into the
stock of Republic Steel and Tennessee Coal, Iron, and Railway
Company (TCI)—both competitors of each other in the South—with
designs to create a  "southern steel empire" capable of competing on
an  equal footing with United S tates Steel which lacked Influence in
the southern states (Hogan 1971, p. 564; Wendt and Kogan 1948, pp.
256, 262, and 276; and  Cotter 1916, p. 69). The th reat to United
States Steel Corporation was th a t TCI enjoyed advantages of location
near rich ore and coal reserves—minimizing its transportation costs—
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and open-hearth steel making, a  process of making steel th a t was less 
expensive th an  the Bessemer process to which U.S.S. was a t th a t time 
committed. W hat TCI lacked was rolling mills, and w hat Republic 
lacked was steel making facilities. By 1905, Gates had control over 
Republic stock and a  significant block of TCI. Gates managed to 
reorganize the sales division of TCI by merging It with th a t of Republic 
Steel and a t the same time, the executive offices of Republic Steel, 
were moved from Chicago to New York where they were combined 
with those of TCI (Wendt and Kogan 1948, pp. 271-272). On the 
verge of a successful merger of the two Southern steel concerns which 
Gates proposed would make Birmingham, Alabama, the "steel capital of 
the world," United States Steel through the Morgan bank acquired TCI 
itself in  1907 (Cotter 1916, pp. 61-70).
From 1901 until the loss of TCI to United States Steel, Republic 
partially or completely abandoned or dism antled the following plants 
p lan ts (Hogan 1971, pp. 569-570):
• The Alabama Steel Works, Fort Payne, Alabama, which w as completed 
in 1890 for open-hearth steel production and rolling were dismantled 
in  1901.
•The Phoenix B last Furnace at Youngstown, Ohio, was built in 1854 and 
dism antled in 1901.
•The White River Works of Muncie, Indiana, completed in  1892 for 
production of basic steel, were dism antled in 1901.
• The Peoria Works a t Avery, Illinois, In operation since 1892 for 
production of finished steel products, were dism antled in  1901.
• The Bessemer converters of the Springfield Works a t Springfield, 
Illinois, in operation since 1887, were transferred to the Brown
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Bonnell Works of Republic Steel Corporation a t Youngstown In 1900 
and its other facilities were dism antled in 1906. The Springfield 
Works were established in 1872 primarily as a  producer of various iron 
products.
• The open-hearth furnace of the Sylvan Works a t Moline, Illinois, built 
in 1898, was dism antled in 1901.
• The open-hearth steel operation of the Mitchell-Tranter Works a t 
Covington, Kentucky, built in 1879, was dism antled in 1904.
• The Cleveland Works a t Cleveland, Ohio, producer of railroad rolling 
stock, was dism antled in 1904.
• The New Albany Works a t New Albany, Indiana, built in 1869 with a 
rolling mill added in 1887, was dism antled in 1904.
• The open-hearth operations of the Springfield Works, built in 1879 
were dism antled in 1904.
• The open-hearth operations of the Minnesota Iron Works a t Colum­
b u s Heights, Minnesota, which had  been making steel since 1899, 
were dism antled in 1904.4
• The Terre Haute Works of Terre Haute, Indiana, established in 1868 
for production of iron products, was dismantled in  1904.
• The Alexandria Works of Alexandria, Indiana, producing iron since 
1895 was dism antled between 1904 and 1905.
• The Indiana Works, of Muncie, Indiana, producer of iron and steel 
bars since 1892, was dismantled in 1905.
4 Minnesota Iron Works also had a  rolling mill which was completed in 
1895. At the time th a t its  steel m aking facilities were dismantled, the 
rolling mill was not in operation.
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• The Atlantic Works a t New Castle, Pennsylvania, an  Iron making 
facility established In 1838, was dismantled in 1905.
• The Wetherald Works of Franklin, Indiana, built in 1893 for produc­
tion of iron, were dismantled in 1905.
• The Sharon Works a t Sharon. Pennsylvania, an  Iron m aking facility 
established in 1850. was dism antled between 1904 and 1905.
• The Andrew Works a t Niles, Ohio, in operation since 1872 for pro­
duction of both iron and steel skelp, bars, and bands, had  been pre­
viously removed to Haselton, Ohio, a  suburb  of Youngstown, between 
1880 and 1881. They were finally dism antled by Republic in 1905.
• At the Mitchell-Tranter Works, facilities for making finished iron 
shapes, established in  1873, were dism antled In 1907.
After failing to acquire TCI, Republic initiated a program of 
diversification in its transition to steel production and centralization of 
operations especially in Ohio by improving and expanding its existing 
plant a t Youngstown and starting new operations there. The first step 
in this diversification movement was the organization by "Interests 
friendly to Republic" of Haselton Steel Tube Company of Youngstown, 
Ohio (Hogan 1971, p. 565).5 With the takeover of Haselton in 1911, 
Republic rebuilt the blast furnace of the steel tube concern and added
5 According to Hogan (1971, p. 565):
In order to build the tube works and for working capital, the 
new company Issued $1.5 million of notes secured by mortgages 
on its  properly owned and to be acquired (by Republic]. These 
were sold with the guarantee by Republic a t 99.5%. According­
ly, Republic obtained an  option to purchase a t its convenience all 
the stock of the tube company a t par and  6% interest less any 
dividend paid.
This is w hat Hogan means by "interests friendly to Republic."
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three more.6 Also, Republic moved its corporate headquarters from 
Pittsburgh to Youngstown (Hogan 1971, pp. 569 and 571).
In 1909, Republic built a  n u t and bolt works a t its Chicago plant 
and m ost importantly, began construction of a  huge open-hearth steel 
making complex a t Youngstown which when completed two years later 
had  eight 60-ton open hearth  furnaces and capacity to produce 30,000 
tons of steel ingots and other forms of seml-flnished steel per m onth 
(Hogan 1971, p. 565). These additions did not take place, however, 
before the company dism antled four additional properties. Foremost 
among these was the Minnesota Iron Works of Columbia Heights, 
M innesota, in operation since 1895. This company had  itself been a 
producer of open-hearth steel in addition to finished steel products.
It w as dism antled In 1908 along with the following (Hogan 1971, p. 
570):
• The Central Works of Brazil, Indiana, established in  1895, produced 
Iron.
• The Marion Works of Marion. Indiana, in operation since 1893, 
produced a  variety of steel goods.
• The Westerman Works, also of Marion, Indiana, established in 1891, 
produced iron.
These closures preceded Republic's further diversification of products 
and concentration of production in and around Youngstown. Further 
additions were m ade to the the Brown Bonnell plant; the open-hearth 
steel p lant a t Youngstown was expanded in  1913, 1915, and 1918; in 
1913, Republic expanded its coke oven capacity a t Youngstown; and,
6 A fourth b last furnace was added to the Haselton property In 1917.
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in 1919, the Bessemer Coal and Coke Company and DeForest Sheet 
and Tinplate Company of Niles, Ohio, were acquired. In this expan­
sion. Republic nearly doubled its basic and finished steel making 
capacity (Hogan 1971, p. 574).
It Is apparent from these changes which took place within the 
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company, Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 
and Republic Steel Corporation th a t in the first twenty years of the 
twentieth century factory closures were essential to the process 
through which capital became concentrated in  local areas. The flight 
of capital from scattered areas and its concentration In places like 
Youngstown, Ohio, was as im portant to the growth of th a t city as a  
steel m anufacturing center as it  was a t a  la ter time to its decline as 
such. This suggests, historically, the importance of factory closures to 
the general process of capital concentration and urbanization. This is 
the focus of the next section, where special attention will be paid to 
changes taking place within the United S tates Steel Corporation, 
especially the shift of steel production from Pittsburgh to Chicago, 
Illinois and Gary, Indiana, the corporation's role in the building of 
steel cities, and the role of factory closures in  th is development.
United S tates Steel Corporation. 1901-1929:
Factory Closures and Urbanization in the Steel Republic
Several Im portant locational changes had  been taking place in  
American industry in general and within the steel industry  in particu­
lar in the last years of the nineteenth century and the first decades of 
the twentieth. It is In relation to these changes a t both the regional 
and u rban  level th a t the development of the United S tates Steel
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Corporation can be considered. Regionally, the center of gravity of the 
American economy w as shifting westward. In the steel industry, this 
shift was represented by the decreasing Importance of Pittsburgh as 
the steel producing center of the nation and the rise of rival centers, 
especially in the Great Lakes region. For example, Pennsylvania, 
which accounted for about 45 percent of the nation's employment in 
steel, accounted for only 37 percent in 1929. At the same time th a t 
Pennsylvania's share was in decline there were parallel rises in those 
of the Calum et—including Indiana--region, Youngstown, and Michigan 
(Davis 1933, p. 133).
At its  formation. United S tates Steel Corporation had facilities 
spread across three regional centers. These included eastern Ohio, 
especially Youngstown where both the Ohio Works and McDonald 
Works were located,7 and the Chicago area where the companies of 
Federal Steel were located. The m ost im portant center of U.S.S. was 
the Pittsburgh area where it was m ost heavily concentrated,8 Seven of 
the firm’s constituent companies where located there—Carnegie Steel, 
American Steel Hoop, American Steel and Wire, American Tin Plate, 
American Sheet Steel, American Bridge, and National Tube (Hogan 
1971, p. 484).
The rise of Pittsburgh as a  steel center in the late nineteenth 
century is explainable in  part by the  importance of Connelsville coke
7 In Ohio were also located most of the facilities of the Shelby Seam ­
less Steel Tube Company.
8 The "core" of United States Steel Corporation was Carnegie Steel 
which w as located principally in and around Pittsburgh (Davis 1933, p. 
135).
231
and Great Lakes ore which replaced charcoal In Iron production and 
which were particularly suitable for the Bessemer steel process (Davis 
1933, p. 135). But the Pittsburgh district had been steadily declining 
in importance since the late 1800s. Largely, this can be related to the 
relative distance of Pittsburgh to expanding w estern m arkets which 
were served less expensively from places like Chicago as "steel buyers 
—the railroads, agricultural machinery companies, and  construction 
firm s—were moving westward w ith the population" (Markusen 1985, 
p. 78) .9 M arkusen (1985, p. 79) comments:
...Pittsburgh had lost its magnetism as the center of an  agglom- 
erative steel industry. Pittsburgh's location was relatively poor 
with respect to markets, and as coal mining activity shifted to 
the southwest down the Appalachians and the significance of
9 In response to this situation. United States Steel Corporation, the 
industry 's leader, instituted the "Pittsburgh Plus" pricing system  in the 
early twentieth century—a  system which remained in practice until 
about 1921. Under the Pittsburgh Plus system the delivered price of 
particular steel goods was calculated on the basis of freight rates from 
Pittsburgh regardless of the real proximity of a  mill to a  m arket 
(United S tates Steel Corporation 1940, pp. 98-101). This system  of 
steel pricing "enabled a  Pittsburgh mill, or any nearby producer, as In 
the upper Ohio or the Valleys, to offer equal competition with a 
producer anywhere in the United S tates in  term s of delivered price" 
(Warren 1973, p. 197). Pittsburgh Plus was essentially a  system of 
internal protectionism which "protected the initial advantage of Pitts­
burgh p lants by eliminating any m arket advantage th a t decentralized 
locations could realize from their proximity to  d istan t markets" 
(Markusen 1985, p. 79). This system was followed with some varia­
bility by the rivals of the Steel Corporation. To many, adherence to 
this pricing system offered profit advantages realized from the collec­
tion of "phantom freight" (Warren 1973, p. 199). On the other hand, 
when it looked as If Republic Steel and TCI would merge, G ates's 
corporation, interested in underselling U.S. Steel, ignored the price 
agreement (Wendt and Kogan 1948, p. 279). In fact, after TCI was 
acquired by U.S.S. and tha t corporation was able to expand its position 
in the Calumet area, Pittsburgh Plus became less necessary. After 
1907, steel corporations found "co-operation paid better th an  cu t­
throat competition" and Pittsburgh Plus was gradually replaced by 
price leadership of United S tates Steel (Warren 1973, p. 197).
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input costs was diminished by large gains in  productivity, Pitts- 
burgh's growth rate slowed. Pittsburgh's share  of output peaked 
in the year 1900; the last major new mill to be constructed In 
Pittsburgh went up  in 1911.
To this m ust be added the transition from the importance of Bessemer
steel to the open-hearth process, which was less dependent upon high
grade iron ore,10 could m ake use of scrap as part of its  input, made
larger outputs in shorter Intervals possible, and required less labor.
O pen-hearth steel was on the rise in the developing steel centers of
the country. While United States Steel accounted for 55 percent of
the nation’s open hearth  steel capacity, very little of th is was located
in Pittsburgh, in fact, open-hearth capacity was no t added to the  Edgar
Thompson Works until 1915 (Hogan 1971, pp. 463 and 516).
In addition to the rise of western m arkets and the declining
im portance of Pittsburgh, of equal importance w as competition from
the South. A southern steel industry was built during the Civil War
centered around Birmingham, Alabama—"'the Pittsburgh of the
South'."11 Nearly destroyed during the Civil War, it was rebuilt during
Reconstruction with capital invested by northern industrialists and
served "a spatially distinct market" (Markusen 1985, p. 78). The
advantage of southern steel production rested In low cost which
obtained by virtue of the fact tha t raw material in the Birmingham area
w as readily available within a  ten-mile radius of steel mills. This made
transportation costs practically negligible (Hogan 1971, p. 500).
The leader of the Southern steel economy w as TCI, and the
10 The Bessemer steel process required ore with a  low content of 
phosphorus. In th is respect, the open-hearth process was more 
"forgiving." (Cotter 1916, p. 72).
11 Cf. Beard and Beard (1960, p. 286).
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impending merger between Republic Steel and  th is firm threatened to 
create, as discussed above, a  "southern steel empire" on a  par w ith 
United States Steel. This th rea t to U.S.S. w as all the more imposing 
since the corporation was heavily concentrated in  Pittsburgh, again, 
relatively d istan t from its m ost im portant m arkets, and increasingly 
d istan t from raw  material sources (Cotter 1916, p. 71).
This southern  insurrection, led by Gates, w as p u t down by 
United States Steel when TCI w as taken over by the Steel Corporation 
in 1907. TCI was a  valuable prize not only because the Republic 
merger would make it an  equal competitor, b u t because of its exten­
sive holdings in raw materials and facilities and  its contract with 
Union Pacific Railroad for 155,000 tons of steel rails a t prem ium  price 
(Hogan 1971, pp. 500 and 503, and Cotter 1916, p. 63). TCI passed  
into control of United States Steel in the m idst of a  banking panic in 
1907.
At th a t time, TCI had recently been reorganized as a holding 
company for a  num ber of southern  steel concerns. It stock had passed 
into the control of several large banking firm s including the Knicker­
bocker T rust Company of New York, a  leading financial concern of tha t 
city, and the T rust Company of America (Cotter 1916, pp. 63-64). 
These concerns used TCI stock as collateral on loans, and, according 
to Cotter (1916, p. 64):
Suffice it to say tha t the panic followed a  period of enormous 
expansion and of extension of credit eventually carried to a  point 
where business overreached itself and, in a  country lacking an  
elastic currency system, such  as the United States then was, 
financial stringency was bound to follow. The first rum blings of 
the coming storm went unheeded and i t  was not until late in  the 
year th a t there was any realization of the  desperate state of 
affairs. Then one big tru s t company closed its doors and w as
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followed by others. Banks stopped specie payments, stocks 
tumbled headlong on the exchanges of the country, industry 
halted, throwing thousands ou t of employment, and the financial 
hurricane swept over the country, leaving ru in  in  its wake and 
m aking its effects felt over the whole world.
The value of TCI stock plummeted and Knickerbocker T rust 
succumbed to a  run. It appeared as if the Trust Company of America 
would suffer the same fate.
Morgan took advantage of the opportunity and offered to 
exchange more secure collateral on loans in exchange for control over 
TCI stock. Morgan and Gates sought assurances from Theodore 
Roosevelt th a t the acquisition would not bring an ti-trust repercussions 
with it (Hogan 1971, p. 504). Roosevelt "gave satisfactory assu r­
ance... th a t the Federal Government would p u t no obstacle in the way of 
completion of the transaction" (Cotter 1916, p. 75).12 With the ac­
quisition of TCI by United States Steel, not only was the Republic-TCI 
merger headed off, b u t North and South ceased to exist as spatially 
distinct m arkets, and through United States Steel, an  integrated 
national m arket was created.
12 Following the TCI takeover by United States Steel, Roosevelt m ain­
tained th a t financial emergency facing the nation made the merger 
necessary. However, public sentim ent turned against U.S.S. In 
response to the TCI acquisition and other monopoly practices of the 
corporation. Samuel Gompers led the nation in d ie  call to break up 
United S tates Steel. After inconclusive Senate hearings which ended 
in 1909, the House of Representatives initiated an  Investigation to 
determine whether or not suit should be brought against the corpora­
tion for violation of the  Sherman Anti-Trust Act. This congressional 
committee led by A ugustus O. Stanley determined in 1911 th a t the 
U.S. Government should file suit, and make the case th a t United States 
Steel should be dissolved. "The subsequent trial continued past Mor­
gan’s death  in 1913. W itnesses num bered 402. In 1919 the United 
States Supreme Court finally ruled against the government, 6 to 3." 
U.S.S. rem ained in tact (Wendt and Kogan 1948, pp. 304-326).
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New Growth. Urbanization, and Factory Closures: From the 
Wasteland. Gary. Indiana
For the first twenty years of its existence. United States Steel 
acquired eleven competing steel corporations. Three of these were 
companies -which a t the  time had been major actors in the American 
steel industry. Among these were Union Steel Company in 1902- and 
Clairton Steel in 1904 (Schroeder 1953, p. 87, and Hogan 1971, pp. 
485-488). Union Steel was a t th e  time the second largest steel 
combination outside of U.S. Steel.13 But, given the th rea t of a  merger 
with Republic, the takeover of TCI by the United States Steel Corpora­
tion represents the m ost im portant instance of external growth—the 
merger or acquisition of competing companies—undertaken by U.S.S. 
before 1920 (Schroeder 1953, pp. 79-87). This acquisition, as we 
saw, was a  response to the changing locational pressures of the 
American steel industry, particularly the rise of the South. Equally 
im portant to the development of the  United S tates Steel Corporation 
w as the direction of internal growth, i.e., the construction or purchase 
of new facilities (Schroeder 1953, p. 79). This developmental trend 
within the Steel Corporation was also a  response to locational 
pressures emerging within the domestic steel industry, in this case 
particularly the expansion of the Western m arket and the rise of the 
Calumet region of the Great Lakes area as a  steel producing center of 
the nation, and the subsequent decline of Pittsburgh. The response of
13 This was a  sta tus Union Steel did not enjoy for long, having achieved 
it only one m onth prior to the takeover by itself acquiring Sharon 
Steel Company, Sharon Ore Company, Sharon Coke Company, Sharon 
Sheet Steel Company, Donora Mining Company, Republic Coke Com­
pany, River Coke Company, Sharon Tin Plate Company, and  Sharon 
Ore and Limestone Company (Hogan 1971, p. 485).
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the Corporation to these developments was concentration of produc­
tion westward from Pittsburgh, the highest expression of which was 
the establishm ent of the the city of Gary, Indiana. Gary would succeed 
Pittsburgh as the new capital of United States Steel's "steel republic." 
With respect to both the corporation’s external and internal growth, 
factoiy closures played a  significant role in the process of capital 
concentration geographically. By far the m ost significant levels of 
factory closures were found within U.S.S. for the first 30 years of the 
twentieth century. In two m ajor waves, the United States Steel 
Corporation abandoned or dismantled between 1901 to 1905 and 
1923 to 1929 a total of 66 plants. This section covers these events 
leading up  and subsequent to the building of Gary, Indiana.
Urbanization is both cause and effect of the concentration of 
capital. In this way, the organizational concentration of capital, which 
takes place through such practices as corporate mergers, is accom­
panied by and necessitates the spatial concentration of capital 
expressed In the process of u rban  growth. For the first 30 years of the 
twentieth century, the process of urbanization acted as a  stim ulus to 
capital concentration. Agnew (1987, pp. 57-58) notes th a t nationally:
Over the years 1898-1905 more than  3,000 mergers took place. 
Urbanization provided a  major part of the stim ulus. [Because a] 
spectacular consequence of urban  growth was the increased 
dem and for producer goods like steel, copper, power machinery 
and concrete—the stuff out of which cities are built.
Ready to supply th a t demand was United States Steel Corporation,
which controlled the majority of the nation's supply of structural steel,
tin plate, sheet steel, plate steel, steel rods for reinforced concrete,
and cement, a  product into which the corporation diversified—a  by-
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product of the steel making process (Hogan 1971, p. 490, and cf. 
Schroeder 1953, p. 121). The Corporation produced and m aintained 
control over the raw  materials necessary for Its own development and 
expansion.
The growth of the steel industry, however, was not merely an  
outcome of urbanization. Urbanization was also an outcome of the 
growth of the steel industry, as  it had been since the nineteenth 
century. Walker (1950, p. 14) describes, for example, the origin of 
Ellwood City, Pennsylvania.
Ellwood City began as an  idea in the mind of a nineteenth- 
century steel man, H.W. Hartman, a  former partner of Andrew 
Carnegie. Mr. Hartman lived in Beaver Falls and is said to have 
exclaimed to his friends when he saw the pleasant valley of the 
Connoquenessing and perhaps when he realized its potential 
industrial strength and wealth: "This is the site for my city!" On 
Ju n e  1, 1889, as President of the Pittsburgh Company (a real 
estate holding company), he sent his m anager to call on the 
owners of the land in the valley and make arrangem ents for its 
purchase. By May, 1890, ground for the new town site was 
broken. H artm an named his project Ellwood City for his friend 
Isaac L. Ellwood, Chicago steel m an and inventor of the barbed 
wire fence.
In a  similar way, Gary, Indiana, was built upon a  strip of swamplands 
and sand dunes ju s t east of Chicago by the United States Steel Corpo­
ration (cf. Philips 1968, p. 309). And In this process, closure, dis­
mantling, and abandonm ent of factories played a  vital role as more and 
more capital was concentrated In fewer and fewer locations. Steel 
industry  development not only changed the shape of communities, 
transforming them  into manufacturing centers, b u t the building of 
cities like Gary, Indiana, from the ground up, were p art of an  overall 
policy of corporate growth.
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The Gary project was part of a  general program  of reorganiza­
tion, relocation, and expansion carried out by U.S. Steel from th e  time 
of its formation. Between 1901 and 1905, three im portant develop­
mental trends were unfolding within the corporation: organizational 
restructuring, investm ent projects, and with these  the first round  of 
p lant closures within the corporation since its formation.
Organizational restructuring. Besides the acquisitions mentioned 
above, several im portant organizational changes were implemented for 
the purpose of consolidating the adm inistration o f the firm, reducing 
its staff, simplifying accounts, and saving on managem ent cost. First, 
corporate entities were placed under the direction of single 
presidents. For example, Carnegie Steel, National Steel, and American 
Steel Hoop came under the direction of W.E. Corey. Bessemer an d  
Lake Erie Railroad and Union Railroad were directed by Jam es H.
Reed. All coal and coke companies lost identity a s  independent 
entities and were consolidated with the H.C. Frick Coke Company 
under the  direction of Thomas Lynch. In the sam e way, all tube 
production w as brought together and  all mining concerns of the  
corporation came under unified adm inistrations. Secondly, in 1903, 
this development was carried a step further in a  wave of "intracor­
porate mergers." Carnegie Steel, American Hoop Steel, and National 
Steel were merged under the charter of the National Tube Company 
and the nam e changed to Carnegie Steel Company. American Tin 
Plate and American Steel Sheet Company were merged and called 
American Sheet and Tin Plate. And, the facilities of Union Steel 
Company were distributed throughout the corporation's subsidiaries.
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Thirdly, a  single foreign selling agent representing all subsidiary 
concerns of the  corporation was established in the United States Steel 
Products Export Company, all the stock of which was held by Federal 
Steel (Hogan 1971, pp. 490-491).
Investment In Expansion and Factory Closures. The reorganization of 
the United S tates Steel Corporation was accompanied by a  wave of 
investm ent expenditure on internal growth between 1901 and 1905 
which totaled $106,938,891 for augm entation of existing facilities 
producing basic, semi-flnished, and finished steel as well as for raw 
m aterial mining, processing, and transportation (Hogan 1971, p. 489). 
This spending by the corporation reflects the movement of corporate 
investm ent west, especially into the Chicago area. Except for the 
addition of a  new  plant a t Ambridge, Pennsylvania, which produced 
bridge and structural equipment, and the addition of b last furnaces 
and open hearth-steel making capacity a t various sites throughout the 
corporation, th e  spending on new facilities was focused on three 
projects. These included the addition of fourteen 50-ton furnaces 
each for the South Works a t Chicago and the Donora Works of the 
Union Steel Company; new construction a t the South Chicago plant of 
the Illinois Steel Company; and the construction of a large cement 
p lan t located a t  Buffington, Indiana (Hogan 1971, p. 490).
Another aspect of the concentration of corporate development 
in the Chicago area was the partial and total dism antling of factories. 
For example, the corporation had recently acquired the facilities of 
the Troy Steel Company with plans to revive them —since they had 
been idled a t the time of the purchase—under the American Steel and
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Wire Company. Instead, the p lant was dismantled In 1907 and its 
blooming mills transferred to the South Works of the Illinois Steel 
Company (Hogan 1971, p. 487). The most intense wave of closures 
came between the years 1901-1905 when a  total of 33 of the corpora­
tion's plants, most of which were located in Pennsylvania, were dis­
mantled. By subsidiary, these included: eight plants of the American 
Steel and  Wire Company; 12 of the American Sheet and Tin Plate 
Company; four of American Steel Hoop; one of National Tube Company; 
one of Shelby Steel Tube Company; four of Carnegie Steel Company; 
and two of Illinois Steel Company (cf. Hogan 1971, p. 491-493).
In these developments the pattern  of corporate growth charac­
teristic of the United States Steel Corporation until 1930 had  been 
established: shutdown of plants accompanied by geographically con­
centrated investment. While p lants in Pennsylvania and other places 
were being dismantled as steel production concentrated in  the 
Chicago area, several Chicago area plants of the Illinois Steel Company 
were also dismantled as their location within the city of Chicago itself 
left them  no room for expansion. Between 1901 and 1904, the rail 
mill a t North Chicago and Union Works were gradually dism antled and 
finally abandoned (Warren 1973, p. 140). For a  while, expansion did 
take place a t U.S. Steel's South Works in Chicago, b u t by 1905, even 
this operation which covered 330 acres became too small (Greer 
1979, p. 55). So, following the 1901 to 1905 wave of closures, 
construction on the Gary Steel Works and the city of Gary was begun in 
1905 w ith the purchase of 7,500 acres of land on the Indiana-Illinois 
border, outside of the city of Chicago, on the swamp and sand dunes 
facing Lake Michigan. United States Steel Corporation established two
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new  subsidiary companies, the Indiana Steel Company and the Gary 
Land Company to carry ou t the project. In total, the project w as to 
build a completely integrated steel mill with a capacity of over one 
million tons of basic steel per year a s  well as a  city to support It. The 
city was incorporated in 1906, steel production began in 1909, and by 
1911 the Gary Works was capable of producing 2.16 million tons of 
steel (Greer 1979, pp. 55-68; W arren 1973, p. 143; Hogan 1971, p. 
505; Philips 1968, pp. 309-310; and Cotter 1916, p. 146).
Besides construction of the Gary Tlibe Works, United States 
Steel made some other im portant investments u p  to 1930. Some of 
these include (Hogan 1971, pp. 509-524 and 891-892);
• In 1906, U.S.S. organized the Universal Portland Cement Company 
and began construction of two new cement plants near Pittsburgh and 
Buffington, Indiana.
• Along the pattern  of the building of Gary, United States Steel, on a 
more moderate scale, began construction of a steel mill and commu­
nity  "from the ground up" a t Duluth, Minnesota, in 1910. This project 
w as organized under the Minnesota Steel Company, a wholly owned 
subsidiary of U.S.S. To th is  construction new ore docks and a  cement 
p lan t were added between 1911 and 1915. And in  1920, $8 .5  million 
were invested in  the diversification of D uluth operations to which 
were added wire and steel rod mills.
• Between 1911 and 1915, investm ents were m ade in existing 
facilities, including the addition of an  open-hearth plant a t the Edgar 
Thomson Works, and a b a r mill at Duquesne, and a  plant for smelting 
zinc and producing sulfuric acid at Donora.
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• Expanded demand brought about by World War I resulted In several 
additions: the building of electric steel p lants a t South Chicago; 
addition of an arm or plate departm ents a t  Homestead, Gary, South 
Chicago, and Fairfield Alabama; development of facllties for shipbuild­
ing in  New Jersey and  Alabama; and, addition of facilities for barbed 
wire production a t plants of the  American Steel and  Wire Company.
• In 1920, United S tates Steel acquired rich m anganese and iron ore 
properties in Brazil in  addition to the Central Railway of Brazil. These 
supplem ented the corporation's other foreign sources of m anganese, 
used in the steel smelting process, tha t it held in India and Russia. 
This accompanied in  tha t year the purchase of 17 cargo ships.
• Between 1924 an d  1929, $28 million w as invested in  the General 
Expansion Program of TCI.
• Between 1926 and 1927, $31 million w as invested in  the construc­
tion of a  beam mill a t  Homestead.
• Between 1928 and  1931, $25 million w as invested in  the m odern­
ization of facilities of National Tube Company.
B ut for the m ost part, th e  most in tense growth of the corpora­
tion w as taking place in the Calumet steel district, especially in South 
Chicago and  Gary, Indiana. Of the eight m ajor investment programs 
initiated by United States Steel between 1922 and 1931, four—some 
$145 million worth—were given to expansion and modernization of
production in the Chicago area including Gary (cf. Hogan 1971, pp.
*
891-892). These Investm ents were indicative of the trend toward 
concentration of production a t  fewer locations. Between 1909 and 
1915, subsidiaries of the United States Steel Corporation began locat­
ing at Gary, for example. American Sheet and Tin Plate, National Tube,
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and American Bridge, in addition to a  works of Universal Portland 
Cement Company (Warren 1973, p. 143). Gary became the center of 
growth for both basic steel and finished steel production. While no 
new plants were built in  the area after 1916, the rise of Gary steel 
production brought with it over the next 15 years the dismantling of 
facilities in other areas, the equipment of m any of which was relocated 
to Gary as well as abandonm ent of factories made superfluous by this 
largest steel complex in  the world. W arren (1973, p. 143) comments:
In the agglomeration of all these operations Gary was the very 
antithesis of the scatter of Steel Corporation operations in the 
Pittsburgh area. Eventually other U.S. Steel Chicago plants, 
except the South Works, ceased to operate in  the primary lines 
of iron and steel-making. Bay View Works, Milwaukee, closed in 
1928; Joliet, although it retained its mills and coke ovens, was 
abandoned as an  iron and steel-making plant in  1932.
In addition to these mentioned by Warren, between 1923 and 1930
United S tates Steel abandoned or dism antled more th an  30 of its
plants. The highest concentration of p lant loss was from Pennsylvania,
accounting for about half. Most of th is loss was from Pittsburgh itself,
which lost 11 plants during the period (cf. Hogan 1971, pp. 892-893).
The majority of plants abandoned or dismantled were properties
of Carnegie Steel Company, which lost 14. American Steel and Wire
Company closed 11, and the rest were fairly evenly distributed
between American Bridge Company, National Tube Company, and TCI.
In 1916, Illinois Steel Company absorbed completely the Indiana Steel
Company and with it administration of the Gary Steel Works. In 1935,
Carnegie Steel Company lost its identity as an independent subsidiary
of United States Steel as it was merged with Illinois Steel and its
name changed to Camegie-Illinois Steel Company (Hogan 1971, pp.
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528 and 1203). This not only brought the steel mills of Chicago, 
Pittsburgh, and Youngstown under a  single administration, it  also, 
perhaps, symbolized the decline in importance to the nation 's steel 
industry of Pittsburgh.
Boomtown and Bust-town: Planned Decline. Unplanned 
Growth. Community Development a t the T urn  of the Century
As th is discussion of steel Industry development from 1901 to
1930 shows, the concentration of capital in m anufacturing cities
involved a  process similar to th a t described in curren t literature on
deindustrialization. Specifically, th is process involves a  shift of capital
location from one spatial context to another, e.g., between regions or
between "outlying" areas and cities. This process of disinvestment and
reinvestm ent is empirically expressed in the event of the factory
closure in  one place along with the concomitant rise of production
elsewhere. Such was the case in the history of Youngstown and
especially in the development of Gary, Indiana.
To Bluestone and Harrison (1982) and to others, Feagin (1984)
for example, central to deindustrialization theory Is the antithesis
between boomtowns and bust-tow ns—between the destinations of
capital flight and the points from which capital departs. What unites
them is the socially destructive aspects of each—of the destruction of
local economic bases and of unrestrained economic growth in the local
context. Bluestone and Harrison (1982, p. 86) s ta te  their position:
Indeed the economic ju ices of the nation seem  to be flowing 
swiftly to areas like Houston, and  millions of families are follow­
ing the flow. Youngstown's loss seems to be Houston's gain, so 
th a t on average the nation prospers. But does it? A closer look 
a t America's new boomtowns suggest tha t all is not well there
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either. The movement of capital Imposes enormous social costs
on the "winners" ju s t  as it does on the "losers."
While Bluestone and Harrison argue th a t th is dynamic is characteristic 
of the current dismantling of the nation's basic capacity to produce, a 
sim ilar dynamic can be identified in  the period under discussion in 
this work—the period of massive industrialization, of the creation of 
the nation's basic capacity to produce, and the rise of the m anufactur­
ing belt (later the "Rust Belt") of the United States. In other words, 
from 1901 to 1930, the economic juices of the nation were flowing to 
places like Gary, Indiana, through basically the same process by which 
they apparently "dried up" some fifty years later. This dynamic can be 
illustrated in the parallel development of communities experiencing 
factory closures a t the time of massive capital concentration and 
urbanization of the area in and around Gary, Indiana.
The Rise and Fall of Greenville. Pennsylvania, and the Shelbv Seamless 
Steel Tube Company: U.S. Steel and the Shutdown of Factory C
The history of Shelby Seamless Steel Tube Company following its 
acquisition by United States Steel is a  litany of closed plants. Shortly 
after the merger between 1901 and 1904, for example, U.S. Steel 
closed Shelby's Factory M, the Hartford Works: Factory N, its Albany 
Works; and Factory D, the Toledo Works (Boore 1951, pp. 81, 123, 
and 137).
In 1903 experiments carried out a t Shelby’s Greenville, Penn­
sylvania, plant. Factory C, and a t Factory A in Shelby, Ohio, resulted in 
the discovery of the automatic rolling process—a new method of 
making seamless steel boiler tubes a t greatly reduced cost.14 U.S.
14 The technical aspects of this continuous mill process is described in 
detail by Boore (1951, p. 79), basically, it m eant th a t seamless steel
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Steel Corporation then undertook the expansion of its seam less tube 
production since the m ethod developed a t Greenville could replace 
National Tube's old method of producing lap welded, th a t is, seamed 
boiler tube. The expansion program w as carried ou t between 1906 
and  1907 and began with the dismantling of one of the bar mills a t 
Shelby Factory C. This sam e mill was rebuilt and p u t into operation a t 
the plant of National Tube Company located at Ellwood City, Ohio 
(Boore 1951, pp. 79-83).
Factory B a t Ellwood City, Pennsylvania, was also involved in 
experiments to find a cheaper way to produce tubing. However, with 
th e  adoption of the autom atic process, the so-called "continuous mill" 
developed there was dism antled. Following the dism antling of th is 
mill, Factory B had  a  new building added to it. This building was itself 
dismantled a t the  Toledo facility. Factory D and reconstructed a t the 
new  site (Boore 1951, p. 117).
When Shelby Steel Tube Company was completely subsum ed 
u nder the organization of National Tube Company, Factory B was 
operated by the latter. Factory B, the old Ellwood Weldless Tube 
Company, was given the designation of "Ellwood City, Plant B" to 
distinguish it from the old National concern in the sam e city, which 
received the designation of "Ellwood City, Plant A." In 1923, P lant B 
w as abandoned by National Tube, the equipment and buildings were 
dismantled, an d  in  1924, the property w as sold to the  Pittsburgh and 
Lake Erie Railroad (Boore 1951, pp. 117-118). These developments
tube could be produced a t greater lengths and with fewer in terrup­
tions than previously possible.
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took place In conjunction with the development of steel tube 
production by National Tube at Gary, Indiana.15
The year 1908 was important in Shelby's and U.S. Steel's h is­
tory, a t least in the area of seamless steel tube production. It was then 
th a t Shelby Steel Company lost all identity and was absorbed finally 
and completely by the Steel Corporation, w ith all steel tube operations 
and  production placed under control of National Tube. The final 
im portant event of 1908, and the term inal event In the hlstoiy of the 
Shelby Company, was the shutdown and dismantling of Factory C four 
years after the autom atic process for producing steel tubes was devel­
oped. It w as th is  p lant which In 1903 became the  first operation 
commercially capable of producing tubes in this way (Boore 1951, p. 
122).
Shelby Factory C had its origins as the Greenville Tube Company, 
an  interest of Lozier-Yost Company which eventually was reorganized 
as Shelby Seam less Steel Tube Company. The Greenville Works went 
into operation in 1897 after inducem ent funds were successfully 
raised by the citizens of the community of Greenville, Pennsylvania. At 
the time, it w as common practice for firms to require grants of money 
or land as inducem ents for locating in  particular com m unities.16 In
15 The closure of Ellwood City, Plant A would not be announced until 
1947 (Walker 1950, p. 1). It is mentioned here because representa­
tives of National Tube In announcing the closure stated th a t tube pro­
duction was to be shifted from Ellwood City to Gary, Indiana, a  move 
which they further described as one th a t "has been deferred" (Walker 
1950, pp. 2-3).
16 Concerning the Greenville Tube Project and th e  system of induce­
m ents in general, J.G. White in Mercer County History stated, "It was 
one of those schemes by which some person or persons other than
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this case, the final decision to locate the p lan t in Greenville had more 
to do w ith the level of inducem ents the company received than  any 
other consideration such as the "suitability or availability of the site" 
(Boore 1951, p. 118).
The original price asked by the firm was forty thousand dollars 
and the project came to be known as the "$40,000 whistle," referring 
to the cost to the town for the privilege of having the company's 
whistle sound in the ir community and expressing animosity a t the 
unusually high am ount that had to be raised by the community.17 
Anxious to attract industry to the  community, the Greenville Improve­
ment Association agreed to the term s and sponsored a  drive to raise 
the funds. Boore (1951, p. 120) cites the account of Jo h n  L. Morrison, 
Secretary of the Greenville Improvement Association:
The bonus inducem ent...set was $40,000 which w as raised by 
superhum an efforts of the  community. We committeemen m et 
Lozier in Cleveland. Producing a m ap of Greenville he pointed to 
a  "blank spot" of 14 acres and added th a t as additional bonus 
requirement. This upped our offer to $45,000. We accepted 
th is  hard deal and the land owner reduced the $5,000 price to 
$2,500. Eventually we raised the $42,500. The p lant came. It 
covered most of the 14 acres b u t in the buildings there were 
wide open spaces. The night the contract was signed we 
ascended the hotel stairway as heroes and came down in 
disgrace.
those intended by the  contributors profited by the contribution" 
(quoted in  Boore 1951, p. 119).
17 As Boore (1951, p. 119) points out, compare the $40,000 am ount to 
the $15,000 inducem ent required by P.L. Kimberly & Co. to locate 
their Greenville Rolling Mills In the  town shortly after the Greenville 
Tube Company deal w as finalized.
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Commenting on the fund-raising efforts of the community, Boore 
(1951, pp. 119-120) cites the account of the Greenville Advance 
Argus:
Probably no town in the country h as  worked more unitedly or 
earnestly to secure a  bonus than  has Greenville. Nearly every 
society raised or guaranteed a  sum  of money, the W.C.T.U. 
pledged a  good am ount, and a  num ber of young ladies sold 
flowers to swell the fund, the la tter realizing $75 in one day.
The ladies of the town have been behind the m en in working to 
secure this industry, and the young girls and boys have shown a  
spirit tha t is m ost commendable. The minstrel show and the 
band  concert m ust not be forgotten as a  m eans to the end. In 
fact...everyone has done his utm ost to help Greenville along.
In a  little more than  ten  years from the m instrel show and the band
concert, the plant was sh u t down.
The history of seam less steel tube production in Greenville is
typical of Shelby history overall. As a un it in the Shelby organization.
Factory C was characterized by its modem facilities, and, as previously
mentioned, was one of the locations a t which the autom atic process
for producing seamless tube was first developed. In 1898, one of the
piercing mills a t Greenville was dismantled and installed a t  Factory A.
At the sam e time, the Greenville Works received 31 hydraulic tube
drawing benches which had been dism antled and removed from other
Shelby plants. In 1906, a  bar mill was dismantled and rebuilt a t
Ellwood City, Plant B of National Tube Company. In 1907, production
ceased a t Greenville and in  1908 the p lant was closed by U.S. Steel
and dismantled. The property and empty buildings were then  used by
a company which built and repaired railroad cars (Boore, 1951, pp.
121-122). Boore (1951, p. 122) comments, "According to Jo h n  L.
Morrison, the United States Steel Corporation, although under no
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legal or m oral compulsion to  do so, reim bursed the Greenville citizens 
to the extent of $25,000."
Gary. Indiana: A Steel Boomtown a t the Turn of the Century
That Gaiy, Indiana, w as created through a  process nearly
identical to current discussions In literature on deindustrialization Is
exemplified in  O'Connor's (1935, p. 322) observation th a t for the first
thirty years of its existence. United States Steel Corporation,
closed entire plants in  smaller cities to concentrate a t Gary and 
Youngstown. For instance, Scotdale, Pa. former city of mills, 
becam e a  "ghost town," kept alive thanks only to federal relief 
doled to 80 percent of the inhabitants.
W hat will be done here, though, is to determine to w hat extent the
internal dynam ics of the development of Gary, Indiana, resembles the
socially disorganized development attributed to the so-called boom
town described in contemporary discussions of the im pact of the
deindustrialization process on national development.
In the 1920s, Gaiy, Indiana, could literally be described as a
factory city. T hat is, it w as not merely a  city where factories were
located, b u t it exemplified an  urban plan where the city itself was a
factory built ’"in accordance with the dictates of economic necessity
and advantage'" (Greer 1979, p. 57). The site on which the city was
built encompassed 9,000 acres covering ten  miles of shore front on
Lake Michigan and was two miles wide. The site was chosen for its
suitability for the location of ore docks, proximity to expanding steel
m arkets, and  access to U.S. Steel's other operations w ithin the city
limits of Chicago. The city w as laid out in such a  way th a t three lines
of rails, 55 m iles in all extended from the mill area and connected
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blast furnaces, open-hearth furnaces, and  finishing mills so that, 
literally, iron ore could be unloaded at one end of th e  city and finished 
steel products could leave the  other with a  minimum of disruption in  
the processes (Greer 1979, pp. 56-61). On this point W arren (1973, 
p. 143) states, "By this m eans heat loss and  internal haulage were bo th  
reduced....The excellence of Gary's plan and internal m aterial flow h as  
scarcely if ever been exceeded."
As a  site for the profitable and large-scale production of steel, 
the urban plan of Gary, Indiana, was eminently rational. However, a s  a  
site for hum an  living indications are th a t the social aspects of the city 
were subordinated to the needs of capital accumulation with dire 
results. While a  great deal of planning w ent into the layout and 
arrangem ent of steel works, the city was Itself treated a s  "merely a 
m eans to staff the mills" (Greer 1979, p. 58, and O'Connor 1935, p. 
256). Upon the 9,000 acres on which G aiy was built, only 800 acres 
were allocated for the city. The rest was given over to industrial 
development. The result w as that,
The city Itself was an  afterthought, thrown over to Gary Land 
Company to be laid out in a  dismal rectangular town plan. It 
sprang from the mind of the realtor rather than  of the 
professional city p lanner (O'Connor 1935, p. 256).
The town was laid ou t according to a  typical u rb an  grid pattern,
b u t it was essentially imposed upon the landscape w ithout regard to
hum anly created or natural terrain features, made no provision for a
definitive downtown, and conspicuously omitted the construction of a
civic center which, "served the  interests of the board of directors who
...clearly preferred tha t Gary's working class not engage in  too much
political activity" (Greer 1979, p. 67). In th is  pattern of development.
2 5 2
Gaiy is rem iniscent of contemporary boomtown cities. Bluestone and 
H arrison (1982, p. 86) describe this pattern .
With a deliberate policy of enacting no zoning laws and doing 
practically no  planning, Houston an d  other boomtown cities have 
been virtually overrun by  the Influx of capital. Growth h as  
occurred so rapidly and haphazardly tha t boomtown metropol­
ises now paradoxically exhibit m any of the sam e urban woes that 
plague northern  central cities. To m ost planners, "Houston's 
sprawling growth represents how n o t to do it. In  Houston, 
developers can  build w hat they w ant, when they  want, where 
they want. While such laissez-faire certainly engenders boom­
town vitality, it  also creates boom-town problems.
But w ith the subordination of city development to th e  needs of co­
ordinated industrial expansion, the problems of Gaiy were associated 
not w ith  sprawling growth b u t with constrained development a s  space 
was jealously conserved for the  addition of steel mill capacity.
Among the problems of Gaiy, the m ost socially disorganizing 
were associated w ith housing. First, Gaiy was overcrowded. The 
housing problem w as compounded by the fact that n o t only was rela­
tively little space given over to  housing development, b u t expansion of 
the residential section of the city was restricted by a  rechanneling of 
the G rand Calumet River so th a t it was situated on one side by Lake 
Michigan and on th e  other side by the river, and beyond the river, by 
the mills (Greer 1979, p. 60, an d  O’Connor 1935, p. 256). The result 
of th is w as a housing shortage described by Davis (1933, p. 72), who in 
quoting a  1922 report of the U.S. Children's Bureau s ta tes  of Gary,
Housing shortage severe enough to ham per the  passage an d  
enforcement of regulations governing building an d  sanitation has 
existed in Gary practically from the beginning.
In a related way, th e  housing situation reflected the class composition
and the  composition of the workforce at Gary.
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Typical of the steel Industry at the time, the labor force was 
composed of a  majority of unskilled and a  minority of skilled laborers. 
Also, the wage situation in the industry w as bleak. In a  letter of the 
National Committee of the American Federation of Labor sen t to Elbert 
Gary on the eve of the nationwide Steel Strike of 1919, it was stated:
The conditions of employment, the home life, the m isery in the 
hovels of the steel workers is beyond description. You m ay not 
be aware th a t the standard of life of the average steel worker is 
below the pauper line, which m eans th a t charitable institutions 
furnish to the pauper a  better home, more food, clothing, light 
and heat than  many steel workers can bring into their lives upon 
the com pensation received for putting forth their best efforts in 
the steel industry (quoted in Foster 1920, pp. 83-84).
This assessm ent of living conditions was borne out by an  independent
study undertaken by the Interchurch World Movement in 1920 to
determine the causes of the strike. On wages and standard of living,
the inquiry determined the following for 1919 (Interchurch World
Movement 1920, p. 85, em phasis in the original):
• "The annual earnings of over one-third of all productive iron and 
steel workers were and had been for years, below the level se t by 
government experts as the minimum subsistence standard for families 
of five."18
• "The annual earnings of 72% of all [steel] workers were, and had 
been for years below the level se t by government experts as the 
m inimum  of comfort level for families of five."
• "Skilled steel labor is paid wages disproportionate to the earnings of 
the other two thirds, th u s binding the skilled class to the companies 
and creating divisions between it and the rest of the force."
18 At the time, a  family of five w as considered to be of average size.
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This Industrywide condition w as reflected in  the housing 
situation of Gary, Indiana. In general, skilled workers were often able 
to afford homes, financed by morgage money made available by Gary 
Land Company. Rates were generally favorable, and as Greer (1979, p. 
67-69) argues, this situation was politically expedient from the point 
of view of the corporation. First, the availability of home ownership for 
skilled labor, who represented a  scarcer form of labor power, tied 
them  "into a  position of dependency through...privileges afforded to 
the labor aristocracy'." This dependency operated to prevent skilled 
laborers lending any active political support to Gary's unskilled labor 
force. Juxtaposed to the four- to six-room frame housing u n it were 
w hat O'Connor (1935, p. 256-257) describes as  the  "flimsy shacks" on 
which real estate speculators made a  return  of fifty percent and  the 
"double dry goods boxes" of "Hunkyville" which appeared in  ju s t  one 
year from the city's creation.19
In general, the socially disorganized development of Gary and 
the process which accounted for its growth—the flight of capital and 
its relocation—resemble the dynamics of contemporary u rb an  develop­
m ent described by writers such as Bluestone and Harrison in  their 
support of the deindustrialization thesis and their analysis of the rela­
tionship between boomtown and bust-tow n development.
19 Greer (1979, p. 70), comments: "The corporation made one small 
effort at housing its unskilled workers, b u t its fifty four-room wood 
frame houses for this purpose were quickly to m  down w hen the 
laborers doubled up in order to afford the rents." Also, in  comparing 
the situation in Gary to those of other steel areas, O'Connor (1935, p. 
256) states, "The Corporation could complain th a t It inherited the 
slum s along the Monongahela b u t Gary, Indiana, w as its own creation, 
built on the uninhabited sand dimes.”
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Conclusions
Of the factory closures th a t occurred between 1901 and 1930, 
Hogan (1971, p. 491) comments:
In such  a  large aggregate of plants, as was assembled in the 
United S tates Steel Corporation, one might well expect to find a  
num ber of obsolete plants. One of the fortunate aspects of size is 
the ability to abandon and write-off these plants without harming 
the m ain structure. It resembles a  pruning operation on a  tree 
and gives the rem ainder great strength.
W hat Is notable here with respect to Hogan's statem ent and develop­
m ents within the United States Steel Corporation is, first, the simi­
larity of this tum -of-the-centuiy process to corporate developments In 
steel since the 1970s which Mueller (1982, pp. 76-77), In explaining 
the contemporary wave of factory closures, described as "major su r­
gery on the substance of...companies" and as "streamlining operations" 
in order to eliminate "structural deficiencies."20 The difference, how­
ever, between the two is th a t the former is taken to describe corpo­
rate developments in the period of massive national industrialization, 
and the latter is taken to describe a  current wave of deindustrializa­
tion.
Secondly, despite the imagery of "creative destruction" th a t Is 
characteristic of both, one is struck in  Hogan's account with the age of 
m any of the p lants tha t were shu t down in this process of locational 
change undertaken by U.S. Steel, m any of them having been opened 
only shortly before being dismantled. This is especially true of those 
concerned prim arily with finished steel products. Several examples 
stand out:
20 See chapter 2.
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• The Ellwood City Works a t Ellwood City, Pennsylvania, which 
produced plates for tinning and steel sheets, w as In operation since 
1893 and dism antled in 1902.
•The Johnstow n Works a t  Johnstown, Pennsylvania, which produced 
tinning plates, was p u t Into operation In 1898 and  dismantled in 
1901.
• The Dennison Works a t Dennison, Ohio, which produced tinning 
sheets, was pu t into operation in 1897 and dism antled in 1905.
• Another producer of tinning sheets, the Atlanta Works, of Atlanta, 
Indiana, w as pu t into operation in 1895 and dism antled in 1902.
• The Atlanta Mill a t Atlanta, Georgia, producers of steel hoops and 
cotton ties, was built in  1900 and dismantled in  1902.
• The Toledo Works a t Toledo, Ohio, which produced semi-finished 
steel for tube making, was pu t into operation in 1896 and dism antled 
in 1905.
If we look at instances of factory closure such  as these in 
comparison to current concern with factory closures in the steel 
industry, w hat we notice is tha t the issue of deindustrialization has 
been developed with reference to the closure of factories m any of 
which had been in operation prior to or since the  closure of these 
plants. For example, Lynd's (1982) and Buss and Redbum 's (1983) 
accounts rely on analysis of the 1977 closures of the  Campbell Works, 
in operation since 1901; the Brier Hill Works, in  operation since 
1912; and the McDonald Works, in operation since 1924. Also, 
Bensm an and Lynch's (1987) account of factory closures in the Chicago 
area during the early 1980s emphasizes analysis of the shutdow ns of 
Wisconsin Steel, a subsidiary of International Harvester, in operation
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since 1902, and  the South Works of North Chicago Rolling Mill, w hich 
w as first p u t into operation in  1880. This lends support to the idea 
th a t factory closures can be historically located within a  general 
process of investm ent and disinvestm ent which among other things 
was as vital to the building of the nation's industrial heartland a t the  
tu rn  of the century as to its dismantling in  the contemporary period. 
Also, with particular reference to the case of Gary, Indiana, factory 
closures were as im portant to urbanization and the rise of that city a s  a  
m anufacturing center as they are taken to be currently In the process 
of the destruction of cities and communities with essentially sim ilar 
socially disorganizing Impacts.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS: THE HISTORICAL FACTORY CLOSURE 
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALIST SOCIETY
Introduction
The overall concern of this dissertation has been w ith the issue 
of factory closures. In th is  study, the factory closure h as  been treated 
historically In order to discover its relationship to the general process 
of capitalist development and in so doing to re-evaluate the  tendency 
to emphasize the  importance of su ch  events only with specific regard 
to the  theoretically formulated process of deindustrialization which 
generally characterizes current literature.
At each point in th is study of the American steel industry su b se­
quent to 1865 and of factory closures In this development, I have em ­
phasized different aspects of capitalist development. In chapter 3, the 
destruction of the iron industry and the transition to steel production 
was related to the destruction of the craft-based workforce and its 
conversion to an  industrial one. Thus, the connection of capital de­
struction  to interclass processes, m ost notably, the conflict between 
capital and wage-labor and the subsum ption of labor to th e  conditions 
of capitalistic production, was stressed. The central conflict of th is 
time w as the extension of capitalist control over production in conflict 
with direct producers. Chapter 4 covered the  role of th e  factory 
closure during the corporate revolution—the period of t ru s t  formation 
which, in the steel industry, culminated in the  rise of the  "royal 
domain" of the United S tates Steel Corporation. Here, th e  connection
2 5 8
259
between the factory closure and Intraclass processes, especially those 
concerning capitalist competition horizontally, vertically, and spatially 
over m arket control were brought to the forefront. In the passage 
from industria l control of the  independently owned firm to the 
oligopolistic trust, the im portance of factory closures in the extension 
of capitalist control over production in  conflict w ith each other can be 
observed. Chapter 5 was a  discussion of the historical role of factory 
closures in the spatial development of American capitalism, particu­
larly with regard to the development of the American steel industry. 
Here, both  urban  and regional development were stressed, and  the 
importance of factory closures to the rise of m anufacturing cities like 
Youngstown, Ohio, and Gary, Indiana, and  with them  the rise of the 
m anufacturing belt were discussed in relation to the parallel issue of 
urban and  regional development which typifies curren t deindustrial­
ization literature. The historical importance of factory closures to 
creation of class and m arket conditions and to the organization of 
geographical relations across international borders, within the domes­
tic context, in regions, and in localities, holds implications for the 
m anner in which deindustrialization theory is currently formulated. 
The deindustrialization view is seen to contain several shortcomings, 
each of w hich is related to the narrow historical focus which charac­
terizes th is  approach to economic development.
In general, the history of factory closures in the  steel industry of 
the United States reveals their importance within the  process through 
which conditions of capital accumulation are reproduced, especially as 
this process relates to the activities of capitalist firms. J u s t  as  the 
sta te more or less advances the interests of capital generally consti-
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tuted, the firm advances those of capital constituted In particular. 
Renner (1949. passim) asserts, for example, th a t the organizational 
form of the firm accounts for the reproduction of capital in particular 
in a  way analogous to the process by which the sta te  provides for the 
reproduction of capital in general (Brown 1986, pp. 95-96, and  cf. 
Poulantzas 1975; Miliband 1969; and Zald 1970, pp. 221-257). The 
firm, like the state, secures the interests of individual capitals which 
seek the maximization of profit under compulsion of competition 
(O’Connor 1984, p. 191). That is, the firm organizes the in terests of 
individual capitals against each other and  mirrors the way the state 
organizes the interests of a  national capitalist class against o ther 
national capitalist classes. If, as Poulantzas (1975, p. 133) argues, the 
capitalist state is the purely political expression of economic relations, 
then  the capitalist firm is the strictly economic expression of political 
relations, i.e., between the interests of capital and labor forces and 
between capitalists and each other. This idea is contained in Anthony 
Sam pson's (1980) reference, in his corporate history of International 
Telephone and Telegraph, to ITT as a  "sovereign state," and is tacitly 
recognized In Elbert Gary's reference to United S tates Steel Corpora­
tion as a  "steel republic" (Hogan 1971, p. 470). Factory closures, along 
with other actions taken by capitalist firms, reproduce the conditions 
of capital accumulation as capitalists engaged in competition pursue 
the discipline of labor forces, create the conditions for the sale of 
labor power, attem pt to discipline each other, i.e., advance the ir par­
ticular interests over and against those of other capitalists, create and 
extend m arkets for labor and other commodities, and  create in  
organization of space the conditions conducive to th is accumulation.
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Problems Associated with the Ahlstorlcal 
Nature of the Deindustrialization Thesis
As stated a t the outset of this work, Bluestone and Harrison's 
formulation of the theory of deindustrialization has become m ost influ­
ential in curren t sociological work on the issue. But, their focus is 
upon American industrial development subsequent to the Second 
World War. They assume, especially with respect to the issue of fac­
tory closures, th a t the post-World War II period is markedly different 
from th a t of the pre-World War II period. This is to say th a t the prob­
lem is not factory closures in themselves, b u t the scale and velocity of 
capital flight which by virtue of its intensity, especially since the 
1970s, m akes contemporary development problematic. This aspect of 
Bluestone and Harrison's work is summarized by Zipp (1984, p. 225):
Although plant closings have occurred throughout the history 
of industrialized capitalism, what is new in the U.S. is the 
frequency and scale of such  closings in some regions and the 
resulting public awareness th a t they represent a  th rea t to the 
economic and social well-being of those affected areas.
To Bluestone and Harrison (1982, pp. 105-106), the problem Is one of 
degree, of quantify, not of investm ent bu t of "hyper-investment" which 
brings "hyper-disinvestment" and unprecedented rates of factory clos­
ures. Such developments are equated with the organizational trend 
among business firms to conglomerate.
Capital mobility and the form it takes in  the plant shutdown is 
treated as an  outcome of U.S. corporate growth in the three decades 
following the war (Zipp 1984, p . 230). Factory closures in  th is view 
are associated only with the trend  toward the conglomerate diversifi­
cation of capitalist firms. For example, as steel firms move ou t of steel 
production to more profitable endeavors or m arkets, they leave closed
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steel mills In their wake. Therefore, factory closures In the era  of 
conglomeration are considered a  "newly Important aspect" of capital 
accumulation, e.g., in  the conflict between capital an d  labor over con­
trol of the workplace and wages, etc. (Zipp 1984, p. 226). In th is  way 
factory closures are the result of the dismantling of the nation's basic 
capacity to produce.
The choice of the post-1945 period as the m ajor concern of 
deindustrialization theory rests upon the assertion th a t patterns of 
domestic capitalist development subsequent to 1945 are distinct from 
those prior to 1945—distinct because growth In th e  post-war period 
was unprecedented. This assertion led to a  further assum ption about 
factory closures in each period. While It Is often recognized th a t fac­
tory shutdowns are nothing new to capitalist development, it is gener­
ally held th a t prior to 1945, plants were closed more often as a  resu lt 
of business failure. That is, plant shutdowns were more or less passive 
outcomes of the norm al process of capitalist competition. In th is way, 
there h as  been a  fundam ental change in the character of plant sh u t­
downs (Bluestone and Harrison 1982, p. 15, and Zipp 1984, p. 229).
Of the post-war era, deindustrialization, and factory closures, Blue- 
stone and Harrison (1982, p. 15) 'write:
Deindustrialization does not ju s t  happen. Conscious decisions 
have to be m ade by corporate managers to move a  factory from 
one location to another, to buy up  a  going concern or to dispose 
of one, or to sh u t down a  facility altogether. These things never 
happen automatically nor are they simply a  passive response to 
mysterious m arket forces. The planning behind such decisions 
is usually intricate, often costly, and extensive.
In the post-war period, shutdowns are outcomes of active conscious
m anagem ent decisions characteristic of the conglomeration process.
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In the pre-war period, they are passive results of Impersonal forces 
characteristic of the age of horizontal and  vertical merger (Bluestone 
and Harrison 1982, p. 123). However, such  corporate practices as 
buying the plants of competitors in order to shu t them  down as firms 
pursued the construction of horizontally and vertically Integrated 
operations culm inating in the formation of United S tates Steel Corpo­
ration dem onstrates th a t closures were no t ju s t  passive outcomes of 
m arket forces.
It seems th a t every stage of national capitalist development is 
accompanied by unprecedented rates of factory closure relative to 
preceding stages, and what Bluestone and Harrison state above con­
cerning post-World War II factory closures was true also of the period 
of industrialization and steel industry formation from the end of the 
Civil War. If horizontal and vertical m erger/integration are thought of 
along with conglomerate merger/diversification as "particular accum ­
ulation models" (Amin 1975, p. 357) developed a t the level of the  firm 
in the historical development of capitalism, then factory closures are 
seen to be not a  "newly im portant aspect of capital accumulation," but 
are central in the formation of each. As such, factory closures then 
contribute to the historical reproduction of the conditions of capital 
accumulation. The history of th e  steel industry  dem onstrates th a t fac­
tory closures are as  m uch a  p a rt of vertical and horizontal integration 
of steel firms, i.e., of their entrenchm ent in steel production, the 
building of steel producing capacity and w ith it of the creation and ex­
tension of the nation's basic capacity to produce, as they are of con­
glomeration and the dismantling of the nation 's basic capacity to 
produce.
264
The focus of contemporary sociological analyses of the deindus­
trialization process principally upon the era  of conglomeration has led 
to the advance of a  theory with a  narrow historical focus. It has 
neglected to take into account the  way in  which the very cities and 
regions currently undergoing deindustrialization were themselves 
created through a  similarly conscious process in which closure of 
factories and movement of capital was essential. If. as Bluestone and 
Harrison (1982, p. 106) claim, "Growth in  the Sunbelt...is surely 
happening at the expense of the Frostbelt," then it w as also true tha t 
growth of the Calum et steel region happened a t the expense of Penn­
sylvania, and the rise of Gary and  Youngstown took place a t the ex­
pense of Pittsburgh, as well a s  involving the movement of capital out of 
the city of Chicago itself. In h is criticism of the "spatial reification" 
implied in  the term s "Frostbelt" and "Sunbelt," Richard Peet (1984,
45) sta tes,
The change in employment location during the 1970s and early 
1980s can therefore be explained as  a  move from "Frost Belt" to 
"Sun Belt" only as long as "frost" and "sun" refer to the social 
conditions for profit-making.
Taking th is  one step  further, the history of the steel industry implies
as well th a t "frost" and "sun" refer to the historiral conditions of
profit-making and th a t the tendency to reify the presen t m ust be
resisted.
Historically, the  possibility of disinvestment exists once m ulti­
plant operations of capitalist firms come into being. It is then  th a t the 
conditions exist for taking profits from one endeavor or location and 
shifting them  to another. It is also then th a t factory shutdowns, d is­
mantling, and abandonm ent en ter into the: (1) cycle of labor control
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exemplified in the transition from iron to steel production; (2) cycle 
of capitalist competition exemplified in the deliberate policy of buying 
the plants of competitors in order to close them  and shifting useable 
parts  to other facilities as corporations extend horizontal and vertical 
control over production; and (3) geographic shift of capital to other 
locations exemplified by the shift of steel production from Britain to 
the United States and within the  la tter from east to west. The impli­
cations of factory closures within the areas of labor control and capi­
talist competition are fundamentally the sam e between the periods of 
domestic industrial formation and domestic industrial disformation.
Also, besides class and capitalist competition, factoiy closures 
historically play a fundamental role in the creation of the space- 
economy of capitalism or the organization of geographic space which 
assum es the form of "business climate" or w hat Jaffee (1986, p. 300) 
calls the "social structure of accumulation" which includes "elements 
of the external environment th a t impinge on the process of capital 
accumulation." The historical effect of the movement of capital into 
and out of nations, regions, and localities is the formation of the "built 
environment" of changing landscapes which Harvey (1982, p. 233) 
describes in these terms:
The built environment comprises a whole host of diverse ele­
m ents: factories, dams, offices, shops, warehouses, roads, rail­
ways, docks, power stations, water supply and sewage disposal 
systems, schools, hospitals, parks, cinemas, restau ran ts—the list 
is endless....At any one moment the built environment appears as 
a  palim psest of landscapes fashioned according to the dictates of 
different modes of production at different stages in  their h istor­
ical development. Under the social relations of capitalism, 
however, all elements assum e a  commodity fonn....The built 
environment has to be regarded, then, as a  geographically 
ordered, complex composite commodity.
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I suggest, then , the Importance of stressing historical continuity be­
tw een stages of capitalist development rather th a n  assum ing historical 
disjuncture, for example, between pre- and post-World W ar II periods. 
Bluestone and  Harrison (1982, p. 121) are essentially correct when 
they equate concentration of capital within corporations w ith capital 
mobility and therefore w ith factory closures. However, they are incor­
rect to imply the  fundamental importance of the  conglomerate form of 
corporate control only. This socio-hlstorical analysis dem onstrates as 
well the importance of factory closures in the process of capital be­
coming concentrated in horizontal and  vertical mergers. In each era, 
factory closures share essentially the same relationship to the  general 
process of capitalist development w hether or no t the th ru s t of tha t 
development is growth or decline of industry in  the domestic context. 
To this extent, the post-Civil War history of the steel industry  is not, as 
E.H. Carr (1961, pp. 23-24) would say, "a dead past, bu t a  p as t which 
in some sense is still living in the present."
Capital Accumulation and the Progress of Social Disorganization 
Swartz and  Bonello (1986, p. 17) summarize the positions of 
McKenzie and Bluestone and Harrison on the issue of deindustrializa­
tion in the debate over whether or no t corporations exploit workers 
and  communities. McKenzie's basic argum ent is th a t disinvestment 
from one p lant to another or one p a rt of an enterprise to another part 
of the  same enterprise is totally consistent with the profit maximiza­
tion rule advanced by neoclassical economists. The closure of plants is 
an  aspect of a  healthy economy which is continually restructured 
according to th e  criteria of economic efficiency, the  benefits of which
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eventually reach all segments of society. Bluestone and Harrison's 
basic argum ent is th a t disinvestm ent and factory closure "violate the 
internal logic of [neoclassical economics" since consideration of 
profitability does no t necessarily enter into decisions to do se  plants.
In the process, immense hardships are imposed "on workers and 
communities where they are located." But, the em phasis upon post- 
1945 developments w ithin the domestic economy carries w ith it the 
implication th a t the destructive aspects of capitalist development are 
confined to the present historical period and comprise a  deviation 
from w hat is otherwise a  healthy accumulation process.
Addressing the argum ents of both the McKenzie school and the 
Bluestone and Harrison school, my position on the Issue of deindustri­
alization as it is currently formulated can be summarized as follows. By 
looking a t the history of the steel industry and placing factory closures 
in historical perspective, McKenzie's observation th a t disinvestm ent Is 
consistent with the logic of profit maximization, characteristic of 
capitalist development, is correct to the extent th a t events such  as 
factory closures can be located w ithin the process whereby the  condi­
tions for accum ulating capital are reproduced. It Is incorrect for Blue- 
stone and Harrison to conclude th a t such events are aberrations of the 
accumulation process on the basis of their scale and intensity in  the 
post-Wold War II period. But Bluestone and Harrison are correct 
insofar as  the operation of the accumulation process involves the 
imposition of hardships upon workers and communities. Again, this is 
characteristic of capitalist industrial history in  general and not unique 
to the present or to the domestic situation. Social disorganization is
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an  aspect of the logic of capitalist development, i.e., accum ulation is 
social disorganization.
In their criticism of the view that factory closures are p a rt of the 
creative destruction process through which capitalist society 
advances, the m ost significant contribution of deindustrialization 
theorists has been the documentation of the destructive aspects of 
capitalist social development upon  workers an d  communities, not only 
those communities experiencing factory closures, bu t so-called rein- 
dustrializing cities such as Houston. The physical, emotional, and 
m ental health costs of deindustrialization are well documented (cf. 
Bluestone 1984, pp. 39-51; Nelson and Lorence 1985, pp. 71-86; 
Lamphere 1985, pp. 259-268; Hopper 1985, pp. 183-236; an d  Per- 
rucci 1986, pp. 215-228). In each case they tell a  story of the  greater 
incidence of loss of Income, illnesses, stress, divorce, suicide, feelings 
of inadequacy and the inability of community welfare agencies to con­
front such problems as revenues are progressively dried up. Rayman 
and Bluestone (1982, p. 262), for example, also find that.
Families were no t the only primary group caught up In the rip­
pling effect of Job loss events....The m ost common reported 
effect of job loss was increased distancing from friends and co- 
workers, feeling less and less in touch w ith others.
At Youngstown, following the closures of Brier Hill, Campbell Works, 
and  McDonald Works, Buss and Redbum  (1983, pp. 73-78) report 
higher rates of crime, mortality, and  liquor sales. Bluestone and  Har­
rison (1982, p. 64) also say of Youngstown that,
Headaches, u p se t stom achs and feelings of depression were the 
most widely-reported health  problems. Aggressive feelings, 
anxiety, and alcohol abuse were the observed psychological con­
sequences of the  Youngstown steel closings.
It is on the basis of su ch  findings th a t proponents of the deindustrial­
ization thesis claim to be describing the destructive side of creative 
destruction.
The limited historical scope of the deindustrialization argum ent 
h as  brought with it a  model not only of the community destroyed by 
factory closures bu t a  model of the community prior to such events. It 
is an  idealized community founded upon a  stability which is thought to 
accompany employment. In the conclusion to their study  of the im­
pacts of steel mill closings in South Chicago in the early 1980s. Bens- 
m an and Lynch (1987, p. 208) state:
Economic dislocation, social traum a, and dwindling resources 
are combined to underm ine a  basic un it of American society--our 
communities. Ever since the Puritans founded the  M assachu­
setts Bay Colony, the ideal of community has been central to 
American culture, a  counterweight to th is  country's restless 
individualism....Economic stability is critical for sustained com­
m unity life: th u s  it  is tha t m any of our m ost enduring communi­
ties have been linked to a  major workplace. This is true not Ju st 
of renowned industrial areas like Southeast Chicago or Youngs­
town. Even the m ost bucolic of small towns can often be found 
to shelter a granary, a  meat-packing plant, or an  auto  parts 
factory.
In the development of th e  steel industry, th is stable community or 
Gemelnschaft. as consistent with an  ideal of community, did not exist 
in  the period of industrial formation. The towns which are currently 
being destroyed by decisions to close factories made according to the 
criteria of capital accumulation were originally built through the very 
sam e force. The history of Gary, Indiana, is b u t one example of this. 
Steel communities were creations of capital in  the first place so th a t 
communities are historically not so m uch a  basic unit of American 
society as they  are a vital organization of space in the process of capital
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accumulation. For example, a  conclusion of the Interchurch World 
Movement (1920, pp. 184-185, and cf. Davis 1933, p. 140) was that.
The [United States Steel] Corporation owns towns. In many 
localities institutions, such as churches, schools and news­
papers, are dependent on it for existence.
This control of firms over local institutions, and over such things as 
housing, recreation, even the  m anner in  which the town is to be built 
and developed, led Foster (1920, pp. 1-8 and 25) and Davis (1933, pp. 
139-140) to describe steel towns as organized under a system of 
"industrial feudalism.”
This is not to say th a t life in the steel towns and other industrial 
centers was completely devoid of communality. For example, the 
church, union hall, household, club, and especially the working class 
and ethnic neighborhood, e t cetera, arose within the towns and 
formed the bases of working class community and culture. These 
Gemeinschafts grew—although often in  unwitting collusion with the 
interests of capital—despite and  often in  resistance to attem pts to 
control labor and to  organize social life and living space according to 
the dictates of capital accumulation.
Not ironically, the im pacts on life conditions of workers and 
families living in  steel towns were not dissimilar to im pacts experi­
enced by  workers currently undergoing factory closures. Various 
accounts point to feelings of despair, disruption of family life as a  
consequence of long hours of mill work, mental and  physical exhaus­
tion, low income, susceptibility to various diseases, industrial acci­
dents, e t cetera. Davis (1933, p. 72), for example, states:
The steel town is not a  healthy place to live in. One of the best 
w ays to judge the healthfulness of a  town is to look a t its Infant
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mortality rate. The steel towns having an  infant mortality rate 
above the  average outnum ber the steel towns below average by 
two to one. Especially pestilential are Steubenville, Ohio, with a 
rate of 110.8 deaths under one year of age per 1,000 live births. 
Ashland, Ky., with a  rate of 109.6, and Steelton (near Harris­
burg), Pa., with a  ra te  of 103.6, compared w ith a  general average 
for all cities of 65.5.
Also, Margaret Byington (1910, p. 184) concludes in her survey of
home life in Homestead that,
...the wives of m any of its workers may find life merely a  round of 
wearisome tasks In the attem pt to make bo th  ends meet; its 
men may be too worn by the stress  of twelve hour shifts to care 
for their own individual development or too shorn of self- 
dependence to exert themselves to m aintain a  borough govern­
m ent th a t shall give them  better living conditions. "Life, work, 
and happiness,—these three are bound together." The mill 
offers the one, subject to no effective dem and by society nor 
commercial necessity th a t the work shall be done under con­
ditions which make the other two possible.
The problematic impacts currently associated w ith factory closures 
and the destruction of steel cities are historically concomitant to the 
problems associated with capitalist industrialization and the Impacts of 
the creation of those same cities. The unilateral power of steel corpo­
rations within these communities during the early 1900s h a s  a s  its 
m irror image the unilateral power to close plants, both of w hich have 
socially destructive implications for peoples’ lives.
Historically, workers and communities suffer consequences of 
factory location as well as  factory dislocation. The problem is no t one 
of employment versus unemployment, b u t of the historically created 
conditions of work life in general and its  relation to other aspects of 
life. Factory closures are not currently undoing social solidarity 
created in a  p as t age of industrialization, because capitalist industriali­
zation was never conducive to solidarity. The image of the community 
advanced in curren t studies of factory closures is similar in one sense
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to the problematic ethnographic Image of nonlndustrlal or peasan t 
societies which m any anthropologists are currently criticizing. It is an 
image of the purely traditional and untouched society without history 
until confronted by modernity. "History is often treated as something 
th a t arrives, like a  ship, from outside the society in  question" (Ortner 
1984, p. 143). In the deindustrialization literature, a  community's 
tradition leaves w ith the factory.
Friedrich Engels (1845/1987, p. 40) noted as  well the destruc­
tive character of capitalist industrialization and the form of urbaniza­
tion It entailed in  his description of M anchester and  the emergence of 
England as the "workshop of the world." Quite contrary from the 
image of Gemeinschaft. Engels (1845/1987, p. 69) says of the m anu­
facturing towns:
...the social war, the w ar of each against all. Is here openly 
declared. J u s t  as In Stim er's recent book, people regard each 
other as useful objects: each exploits the other, and the end of it 
all is, th a t the stronger treads the  weaker under foot, and th a t 
the powerful few, the capitalists, seize everything for them ­
selves, while to the weak many, the poor, scarcely a  bare 
existence rem ains.
David Harvey (1973, pp. 121-147) gives credit to Engels for first
discovering the relationship between the creation of the city as a
context for capital accumulation and social misery. Factory dislocation
and factory location to the extent th a t both enter Into the process of
creating conditions conducive to accumulation carry with them
socially destructive costs. W hat Bluestone and Harrison and others
describe as the social impacts of factory closures are no t the outcome
of deindustrialization so m uch as they are of the capital accumulation
process in general. The current situation In places like Youngstown
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and w ith it the socially disorganized growth of Houston with its "’73- 
square-mile slum"' and large perm anent underclass (Bluestone and 
Harrison 1982, pp. 87-88) contain the contemporary and domestic 
consequences of th a t alienating process (cf. Oilman 1976, p. 137). But 
such consequences are not unique to the current period wherein the 
nation's basic capacity to produce is being dismantled. The history of 
factory closures in the steel industry indicates that, ultimately, they 
are not p a rt of the process of creative destruction. Nor Is their 
Importance limited merely to illustrating the destructive side of 
creative destruction. Rather, they exist within a  universe of events 
which dem onstrate th a t the very process of capital accumulation is 
one of destructive creation.
Summary
In th is dissertation, the historical case of the development of the 
United States steel industry from the end of the Civil W ar to 1929 was 
used in a  socio-historical analysis in order to address the theory of 
deindustrialization by examining the role of factory closures in the 
formation of the nation's basic capacity to produce. Two basic conclu­
sions are reached when the period of industrial formation is compared 
to th a t currently held to be the period of industrial disformation.
First, factory closures were seen to play as im portant a  role in the 
formation of industry and the centralization of capital culminating in 
the establishm ent of the United States Steel Corporation as they do 
contemporarily in the dismantling of the domestic steel industry. For 
example, factory closures and capital flight, advanced by such theorists 
as Bluestone and Harrison as the central mechanism of deindustrial­
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ization, were crucial in the formation of the cities and regions which 
are currently  the objects of concern within the deindustrialization 
literature and within the process through which the United States 
rose to pre-eminence a s  a  capitalist Industrial nation as well as within 
the process wherein th a t position declined In the post-war period. 
Secondly, it is suggested th a t factory closures are historically impor­
tant In the  reproduction and expansion of the social conditions of 
capital accumulation, i.e., the social relations of class and m arket. This 
is to say th a t factory closures are events wherein the following are 
created, extended, and intensifed: (1) social conditions under which 
labor-power is bought and sold, for example, in the increasing sub­
sum ption of labor "as a  factor of production whose guiding force is 
capital" which forms "the 'logic' of capital's self-expansion" and pro­
gressively resolves labor power, for example In its form as craft, into 
increasingly simplified forms (Aronowitz 1978, p. 126, and Marx 
1859/1970, p. 31); (2) social conditions of capitalist competition 
where individual capitals compete with each other over rights to 
control surp lus and opportunities for profit and where concentration 
of capital reproduces competition on a  "higher scale and in more acute 
form" (Mandel 1968, p. 434); and (3) the organization of space in a 
way conducive to capital accum ulation including the ordering of space 
at the local and regional levels in the process of urbanization and in 
the process where:
In pu rsu it of profit, all capitalists m ust be willing to go wherever 
the  highest rate of profit can be obtained. In a  very real sense, 
imperialism is simply the extra-state expression of th is dynamic 
inherent in all forms of capital accumulation. Capital as such 
recognizes no such  thing as foreign raw  materials, foreign labor
275
supplies, and foreign m arkets, b u t only sees opportunltes (Smith 
1981, p. 229, and  cf. Perlman 1977, p. 64).
In general factory closures are understood not to be the outcomes of 
an  aberration of an otherwise healthy accum ulation process specific to 
the current era  and resulting in the dism antling of the nation 's basic 
capacity to produce. They are, rather, in the history of capitalist 
development, located w ithin the process though which corporations 
seek to overcome the real barriers to capitalist production imposed by 
capital itself (Marx 1894/1967, p. 250).
The problems of the deindustrialization thesis as currently 
formulated are understood to be a  function of its  limited historical 
scope. These can be added to a  range of problems identified by other 
com m entators relevant to limitations of scope in other areas. For 
example, di Leonardo (1985, pp. 238-243) argues th a t the  deindustri­
alization concept emerged as a new discourse on the economy which 
focuses its attention on the "American economy alone and on its blue- 
collar white male workers." The outcome is th a t "the deindustrializa­
tion model th u s  signals a  new economic nationalism" which falsely 
dichotomizes the United States and the rest of the world which really 
exists within an  interconnected capitalist world-economy. Houston 
(1984, p. 259) also describes the deindustrialization thesis as limited 
by virtue of its  nationalistic bent. Also, Harrington (1984, p. 40) states 
th a t factory closures are currently of such  concern because of their 
effect upon America's "labor aristocracy." While I have not addressed 
such  issues specifically in  this work, it is hoped th a t the historical 
orientation of this study will contribute to shifting attention back to 
the process of capital accumulation, the reproduction of capitalist
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society, its implications for social life; and In so doing, submerge the 
issue of development of any particular nation or social category of 
persons, not only with respect to the issue of factory closures, bu t 
regarding other substantive Issues as well.
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